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Summary
Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time and requires unprecedented
changes to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to climate-change impacts.
However, different definitions of climate change are used by scientists, decision makers
and stakeholders, making it a challenge for climate-change science to be credible, demand-
driven and policy-relevant at the same time. These issues relate to (i) the ontology
of climate change, i.e. its essence and its multiple drivers in the context of the
anomalous speed of complex human-environmental interaction (the ‘what’), and (ii) the
epistemological challenges posed by the different knowledge systems, viewpoints and
stakes that have evolved from an earlier dominant positivist viewpoint to the current
post-modern and relativist viewpoints (the ‘how’).
In the context of this knowledge paradigm, the future is by definition unknown and
unknowable. Climate-change scientists have to deal with a high degree of uncertainty
about the future and a high level of complexity by structuring analysis with scenario
typologies ad methodologies. The challenge of scenarios is to be scientifically credible
(credibility) while at the same time reflecting different viewpoints (legitimacy) in order
to be relevant for decision-making (salience). These three criteria are complemented with
a fourth ‘consistency’ criteria, which evaluates scenario typologies (elaborated in Section
1.2) and their balance between credibility and legitimacy. The challenge of fulfilling these
criteria is amplified by the lack of a clear goal and methodology for scenario analysis,
which I address by classifying the typologies and methodologies of scenarios analysed in
this thesis in the context of the state-of-the-art knowledge.
The overall research questions were developed to guide the operationalisation of the
essence and definition (ontology) as well as knowledge paradigms (epistemology) of
climate-change science through scenario analysis in four chapters. Firstly, I analyse
scenario types (qualitative and quantitative) and identify the weak link between narratives
and quantifications which still undermines the credibility and full consistency between
qualitative and quantitative scenarios. I then address and analyse this link in Chapter
2 by developing a fuzzy-set methodology. Secondly, I analyse scenarios across scales and
identify the opportunities and limits of developing multi-scale scenarios with ‘nesting’
approaches, which undermines the balance between the credibility and legitimacy of
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scenarios. I address this in Chapter 3 by combining quantitative top-down scenarios
with qualitative bottom-up scenarios. Thirdly, I examine the meaning of consistency
across scenario scales and scenario types. I explore this with a scenario archetype
analysis in Chapter 4. Fourthly, I analyse scenario goals and identify the problem
that scenarios are generally developed to provide input to IAV and IAM studies, but not
used to contextualise normative scenarios. I conclude by proposing that their salience
could therefore be enhanced by identifying the users and the policy-questions that need
to be addressed. The specific operationalisation is based on an analysis of capitals and
capacities as a means to frame exploratory scenarios as the enabling or constraining socio-
economic context for normative scenarios.
All the analyses presented in the chapters have been developed using the European and
Central Asian versions of the global Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs) and, to a
conceptual extent, of Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs), developed as part
of the IMPRESSIONS project.
Chapter 2 focuses on the link between qualitative (narratives) and quantitative (input
variables to integrated assessment modelling) scenarios by assessing the different
uncertainties resulting from their inherent complexities. These complexities can be
addressed in both narratives and modelling using a fuzzy-set methodology. This
methodology makes it possible to build narratives and detail them quantitatively using the
SAS approach, while simultaneously reducing subjective interpretation in the conversion
between narratives and quantifications.
Chapters 3 and 4 discuss both the quantitative and qualitative scalability of the scenarios.
In Chapter 3, I use an artificial-surface modelling framework to weigh the relative
importance of demographic urban land-use drivers and combine them with bottom-
up narratives from local (national, regional and municipal) case studies. In Chapter
4, using a qualitative archetyping approach, I classify all SSP narratives to assess
divergences and similarities across the same scenario archetypes. The findings of Chapter
3 suggest that global and European scenario archetypes are consistent across scales,
and that both downscaled scenarios and local stakeholder-led narratives contribute to
the creation/formation of holistic scenarios of what drives the future of urbanisation in
Europe. In Chapter 4, I conclude that archetyping scenarios by redefining global scenarios
in contextualised scenarios reduces sources of inconsistencies. In both Chapters 3 and 4,
the SSP with high challenges to mitigation and low challenges to adaptation (SSP5) tends
to be the most extreme scenario (with skyrocketing GDP and high population growth)
with a different magnitude of challenges across the European continent. In addition,
the local versions of SSP5 tend to diverge from the global archetype more than the
other SSPs. Chapter 5 provides a novel scenario angle. SSPs have been developed as
‘exploratory scenarios’, i.e. without explicit policy assumptions. At global scale, the
link with policy assumptions has been developed with quantifications of land-use change
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and energy portfolio trends, together with policies on mitigation. Such scenarios are
‘normative scenarios’ that depict a choice of trajectories to match a defined goal such as
emissions targets or measure the effects of policies, etc. In this chapter, I develop the
conceptual link between exploratory and normative scenarios, and design the exploratory
scenario to be the context for adaptation and mitigation. The exploratory scenarios
describe the potential for societal transformation to enable change (actual transformation)
in normative pathways. In the synthesis, I evaluate the analysis of Chapters 2 to 5.
In Chapter 2, the fuzzy-set methodology contributes to credibility by strengthening and
clarifying the link between narratives and quantifications. However, further broadening of
the credibility criterion to include legitimacy in Chapters 3 and 4 highlights the emerging
trade-off between legitimacy and credibility when bottom-up scenarios and worldviews
are not adequately included. The archetype concept of Chapter 4 demonstrates that
when scenarios diverge across scales, both scales and worldviews affect the scenario logic
within the same archetype. The degree to which scenario narratives diverge from their
corresponding archetypes reinforces the conclusion in Chapter 2 that both narratives and
quantifications should be fully utilised to develop consistent and comparable scenarios
that are capable of capturing the specific, context-relevant characteristics (legitimacy and
salience).
If scenarios are consistent and balanced across top-down and bottom-up scenarios, as well
as narratives and quantifications, then scenarios are also salient because they improve
understanding of the future potential to achieve desirable futures by analysing real-world
capacities, as analysed in Chapter 5. The definition of ‘consistent scenarios’ has been thus
expanded to include the credibility, legitimacy and relevance criteria. The comparison
across the SSPs demonstrates how the balance across the four criteria highlights different
components when analysed together. For instance, credibility evaluates how ‘scientifically
sound’, i.e. internally consistent and plausible, the scenarios are.
I highlight the importance of divergence in multi-scale scenarios, not only for specific
context-bound drivers but also for others which are taken for granted in multi-scale
scenario assessment. Such divergence arguably reflects different worldviews that challenge
state-of-the-art knowledge and can ultimately question the role of global scenarios
in guiding local scenario versions with a nested approach. Ontologically, redefining
the climate-change challenge as a sustainability challenge has helped frame the SSP
uncertainty space as one of challenges to transformation, rather than one of the challenges
to mitigation and adaptation. Epistemologically, this challenge has implied the role
of both narratives and quantifications to be equally important in capturing different
uncertainties, stakes and worldviews.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
2 Introduction
1.1 Climate-change science and exploratory
scenarios
Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time (G20, 2009). Since the onset
of climate-change science in the 1970s (Peterson et al., 2008) and politicisation of climate-
change science (Weingart et al., 2000), scientists and policy makers now agree that action
is urgently needed to mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and adapt to climate
change impacts (IPCC, 2014, 2018).
Translating such general agreement to a consensus on necessary action is less
straightforward because different definitions of climate change are used by scientists,
decision makers and stakeholders. Additionally, scientifically different perspectives emerge
on how climate-change science can be at the same time scientifically credible and demand-
driven and policy-relevant (Kunseler et al., 2015; Lourenc¸o et al., 2015). These issues can
be captured with two overarching questions: firstly, the essence of climate change (the
‘what?’) is still debated because climate change is a long-term, multi-faceted problem
with multiple drivers, challenges and solutions (Geels et al., 2016; Feola, 2015). Secondly
and related, different pathways span heterogeneous systems of knowledge, viewpoints and
stakes (the ‘how?’) (Geels et al., 2016). The ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions are the guiding
principle of this thesis. The introduction will, therefore, start with an introduction of what
is the essence of climate change and how the knowledge in this field has evolved.
The discussion about the essence of climate change and its definition is an ontological
question (i.e. what is climate change). In the last decades, the scientific debate
has expanded from the original definition of climate change as a physical anomalous
change in our climate due to increasing GHG emissions and accumulation in the
atmosphere (Crutzen & Stoermer, 2000) into a debate of solutions and wider societal
and environmental implications of policies aimed to mitigate and adapt to climate change
(Wise et al., 2014). This expansion is reflected in the involvement of broader and more
diverse disciplines: from the first seeds of the concept of Anthropocene in the late 1970s -
1980s, (paleo)climatology, geology, atmospheric chemistry and other natural sciences were
involved in understanding the role and mechanisms of climate feedbacks (Hulme et al.,
1999). As consensus grew stronger that humans were driving an unprecedented change,
not only in the climate but in the whole environment, other scientific disciplines started
to address the link between human activities and their impacts. In the last decades,
increasing computing capacity has sped up both the representation of feedbacks between
physical spheres (for example the atmosphere and the hydrosphere) in Global Circulation
Models (GCMs) and incorporation of human activities and climate change in integrated,
multi-sectoral modelling platforms, so-called Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs).
Scientific evidence is also growing around the anomalous speed of global change in
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both socio-economic and Earth Systems (Great Acceleration) (Steffen et al., 2004),
which further connects human activities and impacts through feedbacks among climate,
environmental and human systems (Fischer & Knutti, 2015). The magnitude of the Great
Acceleration is concerning because of its association to adverse impacts, both observed
and projected by IAMs. The ontological question of what climate change means needs
to be placed in this complex human-environmental-interaction context. This implies that
climate-change science needs to include different scientific disciplines.
Understanding ‘how’ climate-change science evolves and embeds different knowledge
paradigms is an epistemological problem. As explained above, climate-change science
currently covers many disciplines, uncertainties, values and stakes. In line with its
ontological development, the climate-change paradigm has profoundly changed from an
earlier dominant positivist viewpoint that climate change can be quantified and measured
(for example by measuring GHG concentrations over time) to include more post-modern
and relativist viewpoints that climate change is a multi-faceted reality told by different
narratives (Geels et al., 2016). Under this paradigm, climate-change science needs to
be not only sound and credible (for scientists of various disciplines) but also legitimately
developed (by including other stakeholders) and socially and policy-relevant (by including
decision makers). Crucial in relation to the epistemological issue is the acknowledgement
that there are multiple knowledge holders that need to be involved in climate-change
science.
An important component of climate-change science are scenarios that are developed
to understand drivers or solutions to climate change. This forward-looking objective
adds an additional layer of uncertainty to the (already) complex nature of human-
nature interactions, because under the post-modern paradigm, the future is by definition
unknown and unknowable. Therefore, climate-change science deals with both high
uncertainty about the future and high complexity (Zurek & Henrichs, 2007). A common
approach utilised to systematically explore the future is ‘scenario analysis’. Originally,
scenario analysis was not a scientific discipline but has developed from strategic military
planning in the 1950s to become an independent set of tools and methodologies applied
by many disciplines to systematically explore the future. To date, as a climate-change
scientific approach, scenario analysis needs to be credible, but also legitimate and relevant.
Scenario analysis is closely related to the epistemological and ontological issues.
This thesis aims at contributing to the climate-change scientific debate by using the
ontological and epistemological issues not only as conceptual guide but also as starting
points that can be operationalised with scenario analysis. In the next sections of Chapter
1, I first zoom on the criteria (credibility, legitimacy, consistency and salience) to evaluate
and link epistemology and ontology with scenario analysis. I define the scenario approach
utilised in this thesis in the broad context of state-of-the-art knowledge in the current
scenario literature. Subsequently, I introduce the scenarios in the specific context of
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the IMPRESSIONS project, i.e. the context of the European case studies utilised in
this thesis. I conclude Chapter 1 by introducing the research questions addressed by
the analysis in Chapters 2-5 and a reading guide through the analysis to the synthesis.
In the synthesis, I evaluate the analysis of Chapters 2-5 for scenarios to be not only
scientifically credible, legitimate (i.e. inclusive of different values and narratives) and
salient (i.e.relevant to decision making), but also consistent across epistemologies and
ontologies. The consistency criterion is introduced in the next section as key to enable
iteration between ontology and epistemology of climate change.
1.2 Criteria to evaluate progress on the ontology and
epistemology of climate-change science
The ontological and epistemological climate-change-science issues are highly
interdependent which calls for addressing them simultaneously. Changing knowledge
systems and knowledge holders are involved in the process of determining the ontological
question of what the future might look like and what needs to be addressed. This, in
turn, shapes the source and nature of knowledge utilised to structure the study of the
future. The conceptual view of ontological and epistemological issues in climate-change
science are operationalised using the criteria of credibility, legitimacy and relevance (Cash
et al., 2002) as widely utilised in the scenario literature (e.g., in the latest examples,
Frame et al. (2018) and Cradock-Henry et al. (2018)). See also Kunseler et al. (2015)
for examples from a participatory point of view and van Voorn et al. (2016) from a
modelling assessment point of view. These three criteria are complemented with a fourth
‘consistency’ criteria, which evaluates scenario typologies (elaborated in section 1.2) and
their balance between credibility and legitimacy. The criteria in Figure 1.5, adapted from
Cash et al. (2002), are defined as follows:
1. credibility: scientific adequacy of the technical evidence and arguments
2. legitimacy: scenarios that consider stakeholders’ divergent values and beliefs
3. consistency: quality and strength of links across scenario typologies in Figure 1.1,
as a balance between credibility and legitimacy
4. salience: relevance of the scenario to the decision-makers’ needs
The evaluation criteria are fundamental to ensure the delicate balance of scenarios to
be, on the one hand, comparable and applicable in multi-sectoral assessment, capable
to capture global drivers and therefore consistent with global scale assumptions and, on
the other hand relevant and representative of multiple views to be embedded in local
jurisdictions and decision making.
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1.3 State-of-the-art of multi-scale scenario typologies
and methodologies
The importance of the diverse attributes and goals of scenarios has lead to the fast
development of a myriad of typologies and purposes. Together with the need to integrate
different systems of knowledge to develop policy-relevant analyses, methodologies are
manifold and diversified over the past 20 years. Although a comprehensive methodology
and one classification do not exist, landmark papers (Van Notten et al., 2003; Bo¨rjeson
et al., 2006) and the recent international science-policy assessments of IPBES (Ferrier
et al., 2016) provide an up-to-date landscape of methodologies and classifications.
Van Notten et al. (2003) recognise 14 scenario typologies which are based on three
overarching themes: the project goal (i.e. exploration or decision-making support), the
process design (intuitive or formal) and scenario content (complex or simple). Bo¨rjeson
et al. (2006) classify scenarios on users’ questions: ‘what will happen?’ (predictions
or forecasts), ‘what could happen?’ (exploratory scenarios) and ‘what do we want or
should happen?’ (normative scenarios). The IPBES scenario assessment (Ferrier et al.,
2016) classifies scenarios according to four policy-making phases: (1) set the agenda
to develop exploratory scenarios in qualitative form; (2) design policies by developing
normative scenarios (i.e. alternative pathways to reach a desired endpoint); (3) analyse
alternative policy-screening scenarios; (4) review the past policy effects and compare that
to the desired endpoint of the scenarios. Figure 1.1 synthesises the vantage point for the
scenarios developed and analysed in this thesis. These vantage points are the definition
of ‘goal’, ‘type’ and ‘scale’ of the scenarios.
The first vantage point is the scenarios’ goal. In this thesis, the goal is to explore
alternative futures and, therefore, the scenarios’ answer to Bo¨rjeson’s et al. (2006)
question ‘what could happen’. However, even if the question is straightforward, a net
division probably does not exist in practice as exploratory scenarios could also be used
to identify targets and desirable futures (as will be described in Section 1.2.1). The
second vantage point defines the methodology. This includes defining both scenario type
and dimensions (the scenarios need to follow a rigorous scientific process, to be credible,
but they also need to be relevant to decision making (Chaudhury et al., 2013)). In
the literature (summarised in Figure 1.1), the most common classifications distinguish
between qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Qualitative methodologies include
narratives, videos and illustrations, while quantitative methodologies include numerical
information based on, for example, models. The third vantage point is the scenarios’
scale, which relates to its form and goal (Van Notten et al., 2003).
The three vantage points are iteratively approached in a scenario analysis. The scenarios’
goal determines what type and scales need to be addressed. Conversely, the scale of
analysis affects the type and even the scenarios’ goal as an indicator of their feasibility
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Scenarios
Goal
Type
Scale
Exploratory
Normative
Qualitative
Quantitative
Tight links
Loose links
Figure 1.1: Updated macro-classification of socio-environmental and climate scenarios.
Adapted from Van Notten et al. (2003), Bo¨rjeson et al. (2006) and Ferrier et al. (2016)
and desirability.
In the next subsections, I explore the state-of-the-art knowledge of how the vantage
points polarities (e.g. normative, exploratory in Figure 1.1) are operationalised to discuss
why scenarios approaches need to be redefined within the epistemological and ontological
understanding of climate change.
1.3.1 Goal
Exploratory and normative scenarios: The scenarios’ goal can be defined by their
objectives, but also by their process and the question they address. In this sense, the
international climate-change and environmental scenario community has generally focused
on the question ‘what could happen’, at least at the first stage of any scenario process,
whereas the regional and national communities have focused rather on the ‘what should
happen and how’ questions. Although conceptually clearly distinct (Bo¨rjeson et al., 2006),
the distinction between exploratory and normative has become less pronounced since the
development of the latest global climate-change scenarios (Moss et al., 2010). These
scenarios consist of three elements: the global Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs);
the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs); the Shared Policy Assumptions
(SPAs). Given that the SSPs, RCPs and SPAs are defined as ‘pathways’ and not
‘scenarios’, the literature can clarify how do SSPs, RCPs and SPAs form scenarios and
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if a distinction between normative and exploratory scenarios can be made. A citation
from O’Neill et al (2014) suggests that a pathway (SSP or RCP) combined with policy
assumption (SPA) constitute a scenario:
“SSPs include quantifications of factors that are considered drivers of such
outcomes such as population growth and economic growth, but quantification
of the consequences of these drivers is left to scenarios that will be produced
based on the SSPs (van Vuuren et al., 2014). It is for this reason that the
scenario framework distinguishes between “pathways”, which describe one
component (such as RCPs or SSPs) of integrated scenarios, and “scenarios”
themselves, which combine pathways with other information such as emissions,
climate projections and policy assumptions to produce integrated descriptions
of future climate and human system development. It is these scenarios,
rather than the SSPs themselves, that would be used to do analysis such
as comparing outcomes in a policy scenario with outcomes in a reference (no-
policy) scenario.”
van Vuuren & Carter (2014) suggest that SSP and RCPs are considered scenarios, similarly
to previous SRES scenarios. They, however, suggest that an SSP and an RCP can be
combined in a single scenario (van Vuuren et al., 2012b), thus with or without a SPA:
“the current paper concentrates on establishing linkages both within the new
scenarios framework (relating SSPs and RCPs) and between the framework
and the existing scenarios literature. This can then: (i) assist IAV researchers
in using (elements of) existing scenarios in studies based on the new
framework, and (ii) aid interpretation in assessments that compare findings
using the new scenarios framework with results based on existing scenarios”
and “It is only by combining RCPs with SSPs (thus reconciling the socio-
economic and climate projections) in the next step of the process that coherent
and integrated characterisations of the future can be crafted.”
Also according to the IPCC glossary, from a content point of view, an SSP is the same
as a socio-economic scenario:
“SSP: Currently, the idea of shared socio-economic pathways (SSPs) is
developed as a basis for new emissions and socio-economic scenarios. An
SSP is one of a collection of pathways that describe alternative futures of
socio-economic development in the absence of climate policy intervention.
The combination of SSP-based socio-economic scenarios and Representative
Concentration Pathway (RCP)-based climate projections should provide a
useful integrative frame for climate impact and policy analysis.”
“Socio-economic scenario: A scenario that describes a possible future in
terms of population, gross domestic product (GDP), and other socio-economic
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factors relevant to understanding the implications of climate change.”
Initially, the SSPs and RCPs have been developed as a ‘parallel process’ (Moss et al.,
2010). One of the main reasons was pragmatic (i.e. a faster process to produce integrated
scenarios). But other reasons include the fact that a one-to-one link between one SSP and
one RCP does not exist (Ebi et al., 2014). Rather, one socio-economic future can lead
to a range of different emission scenarios. This was new, because all previous scenarios
consisted in pre-defined global associations of selected socio-economic and climate-change
trends. Methodologically, the SSPs and RCPs were developed to be more flexible, and
to be matched in a ‘scenario matrix’ (van Vuuren & Carter, 2014; van Vuuren et al.,
2012a,b). In theory, any SSP could be matched with any RCP. Immediately after their
publication, multiple combinations of SSPs and RCPs have been used, especially in
regional IAV applications of this matrix (IIASA, 2013). The development of scenarios
that contain global trends on energy and land-use and policy assumptions (e.g. SPAs)
have only recently been published (Riahi et al., 2017). The SSPs have been designed by
the international climate community for several applications, first and foremost as input
to Integrated assessment models but also as regional, national and sectoral extensions in
combination with (downscaled) RCPs (Absar & Preston, 2015). This was the case for the
US SSPs (Absar & Preston, 2015), European SSPs (Kok et al., 2018)and (Ta`bara et al.,
2018), and European Coastal SSPs (Reimann et al., 2017), and West African scenarios
(Palazzo et al., 2017) as in Figure 1.2. Such applications have utilised the SSPs and RCPs
as ‘exploratory’ scenarios. Absar & Preston (2015) and Kok et al. (2018) downscaled the
‘basic SSPs’. As with the IPCC SRES scenarios that preceded the SSPs, the global SSPs
consist of narratives, qualitative tables and quantifications of key drivers.
Although recent application utilise also the SPAs to develop regional scenarios (Kebede
et al., 2018), this thesis places itself in the regional sub-global extensions which start from
basic SSPs to better utilise SSPs as exploratory scenarios.
1.3.2 Type
Scenarios can be developed in different forms depending on the goal of the scenario
exercise. Quantitative scenarios are generally computed by expert-developed models and,
as such, they are regarded as more transparent than qualitative scenarios because the
underlying assumptions are, in principle, explicitly specified and documented in variables
or parameters (Alcamo et al., 2006). Quantitative scenarios can be limited to a subset of
assumptions and can be based on models that represent only one viewpoint about how
the world works (Alcamo & Henrichs, 2008), posing a risk that users may misinterpret
such seemingly precise quantitative information. In contrast, qualitative scenarios can
incorporate multiple points of view (especially when stakeholders are involved) and
can potentially better capture complex behaviours of the system. The involvement of
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Figure 1.2: Overview of utilisation of Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs) in the
impacts, adaptation and vulnerability (IAV) community. SSPs can be combined with
Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) and Shared Policy Assumptions (SPAs)
stakeholders also increases scenario salience and legitimacy (Cash et al., 2003; Rounsevell
and Metzger, 2010). A trade-off, however, is that underlying assumptions tend to remain
implicit and difficult to test, whilst the lack of quantification can also add to subjectivity
and lower credibility (Alcamo and Henrichs, 2008; Alcamo et al., 2006).
A common practice consists in combining both quantitative and qualitative scenarios to
have scenarios which incorporate the advantages of both. This practice is systematised in
the so-called Story and Simulation (SAS) approach. As the name suggests, this approach
involves the development of both scenario narrative and quantifications. A key element
is the iteration process to ensure consistency, at least in theory. In practice, the short-
comings of SAS have been identified as the conversion between qualitative and quantitative
scenarios and the reproducibility of the results.
Although SAS is still used, especially in global scenario exercises, the sub-global
community is developing alternative methodologies which move beyond SAS. The iteration
element is complemented, or substituted, by increasing the structure of the qualitative
elements (for example, with Morphological Analysis, Fuzzy Cognitive Maps, and CIB)
directly applicable for quantification, or by developing direct quantifications with Bayesian
statistics approach.
In this thesis, I start from the assumption that narratives and other qualitative scenario
products are a fundamental part of the scenarios and that narratives should be linked
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‘ better ’ to quantifications (Chapter 2), rather than structured more. The implication
is that narratives and quantifications can still be developed separately, using different
methodologies and in separate moments. But to develop a systematic link, the nature
of narratives and quantifications need to be unravelled. The goal of better linking
narratives and quantifications is ultimately to maintain the richness and diversity of the
scenario products. This stems from utilising different sources of knowledge, while having
a comprehensive and consistent final product.
The choice to maintain diverse scenario products also affects multi-scale scenario
methodologies. For instance, by combining participatory approaches with IAMs, different
dimensions can be explored. This affects also the overall goal and nature of the scenarios.
Also the methodology is affected with different sources of knowledge to allow and demand
different strengths of links across scales.
1.3.3 Scenarios across scales
Fundamental in (exploratory) scenario development is the fact that drivers that act over
a range of scales are brought together. This has resulted in ‘scale’ being an essential
notion in scenario development. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the concept of ‘scale’ stems
from its early system theory conceptualisation in the ecology hierarchy theory developed
in the 1980s by Allen and colleagues (Allen & Starr, 1982; Allen & Hoekstra, 1992).
According to this theory, elements of complex systems are organized hierarchically based
on multiple spatio-temporal and functional scales. Linkages within and among socio-
economic, political and biogeochemical systems (Gallop´ın et al., 2001, Gibson et al., 2000)
have evolved also in scenario exercises, since at least the 2000s with the MA sub-global
scenario assessments. In landmark papers on multi-scale linkages, reasons to develop
linked scenarios include stakeholders engagement, cross-scale interactions highlighting and
better understanding of impacts due to socio-economic, political and natural (e.g., climate
and ecological) processes at different scales (Kok et al., 2007, Biggs et al., 2007). Scenarios
can be ‘loosely linked’, developed at several scales simultaneously and then linked (for
example by up- or down-scaling) a posteriori, or ‘tightly linked’ and developed iteratively.
In the literature, these two typologies are referred to as ‘multi-scale’ and ‘cross-scale
scenario’ (Biggs et al., 2007; Scholes et al., 2013). To date, truly cross-scale assessments
are still rare (Scholes et al., 2013). However, the number of multi-scale scenarios is
increasing with the aim to better understand the interactions of processes at different
levels and scales (van Ruijven et al., 2014). Although different degrees of linkages are
possible, depending on their desired outcome and purpose (Biggs et al., 2007, Zurek and
Henrichs, 2007), the multi-scale scenarios are being operationalised as ‘nested scenarios’
(Absar & Preston, 2015) with Schweizer & Kurniawan (2016) defining them as:
“outcomes for a country within a region within a global context”
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In this definition, global scenarios (both in narrative and quantitative form) are used
as boundaries for downscaled regional quantifications. The global scenario input is then
‘linked’ with local narratives and quantifications, often with a participatory process. The
persisting subjectivity of this linking process, as well as what tightly or loosely linked
scenarios means, has been recently questioned and addressed in several analyses. Firstly,
by taking a step back to analyse the original meanings of ‘equivalence’, ‘consistency’ and
‘coherence’ across scales, as originally defined in Zurek & Henrichs (2007) and Biggs et al.
(2007), in Kok et al. (2018) and Chapter 4. Secondly, by systematically structurally
defining key qualitative elements to be ‘consistent’ across scales (Schweizer & Kurniawan,
2016). Thirdly, by explicitly linking bottom-up and top-down approaches (e.g. Absar
& Preston (2015); Nilsson et al. (2017); Kebede et al. (2018)). In all cases, the overall
approach consists in applying global scenarios (SSP RCP SPA framework) either directly
or downscaled regionally with both qualitative and quantitative elements nested from
global to regional scale. This thesis develops from this context and explores links across
scales in both qualitative and quantitative elements. Special focus is given to the aspect of
consistency across scales and across qualitative and quantitative scenarios in all chapters.
Importantly, also in this thesis, scenarios are classified as ‘multi-scale’, although cross-
scale elements in the regional scenarios are also explored.
1.4 Context of the methodology
1.4.1 The IMPRESSIONS project and case studies
A specific context and application to the scenarios developed in this thesis is necessary
to understand scenario elements that are not analysed in the next chapters but that
are relevant to understand both state-of-the-art and what the scenarios want to achieve.
These elements are the normative scenarios, the detailed process of the SAS approach,
as part of collaborative efforts amongst scientists and stakeholders, and the description
of the case studies, within a larger European project of which the work in this thesis was
part.
The specific context is the IMPRESSIONS project (http://www.impressions-project.eu/),
a 5-year, 11 million Euro collaboration between 25 partners in 16 countries across Europe.
The IMPRESSIONS project’s objective is to identify robust solutions for Europe under
high-end (between 2°C and 6°C T increase in 2100 relative to 1850-1900) climate-change
and socio-economic scenarios. The specific ontological aspect in IMPRESSIONS is the
assumption that high-end scenarios and their adverse impacts are still plausible, and
therefore scientific efforts need to identify and promote robust solutions, by exploring
normative pathways from high-end impacts towards achieving a desired future.
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The overall methodology of IMPRESSIONS to achieve this objective is the project’s
most innovative element of integration across disciplines. Although the initial design
depicted the SSPs and RCPs as conform to SRES scenarios, SSPs and RCPs have been
extended within the case studies to co-create qualitative and quantitative knowledge
about alternative ‘high-end’ futures for impact, adaptation and vulnerability assessment
with a novel combination of approaches. Normative scenarios, which consist of bundles
of actions and strategies towards reaching a sustainability vision, are not only a
‘parametrisation of the SSPs and RCPs’, but consist of full societal contexts which
describe the enabling conditions and constraints to achieving a desired end-goal (vision).
The IMPRESSIONS methodological novelty to linking SSPs and RCPs with normative
pathways consists in developing and applying cutting-edge interdisciplinary and trans-
disciplinary methodologies to develop multi-scale scenarios. The multi-scale (exploratory)
scenario development process resulted from collaboration among IMPRESSIONS partners
and is part of this thesis in the form of both input data and goal of the scenarios.
This thesis, as part of the implementation of IMPRESSIONS, has performed the following
tasks, which provide the input to the analysis of this thesis:
1. Operationalise SAS in workshops with a flexible structure with stakeholder,
facilitators of the participatory process and case-study leaders (input to Chapter
1, section 1.3.2)
2. Operationalise the fuzzy-set methodology in the participatory process to strengthen
the link between scenario narratives and quantified scenarios. The scenarios
were developed in collaboration with stakeholders, case-study leaders and impact
modellers (input to Chapter 2)
3. Develop a multi-scale modelling framework to quantitatively analyse the socio-
economic and/or climate change cross-sectoral impacts and vulnerability. The
urbanisation quantitative scenarios, part of this thesis, were developed in
collaboration with modelling teams (input to Chapter 3)
4. Develop a multi-scale narrative for each SSP in the participatory process to
contextualise the global SSPs. The match between global and local narratives was
developed in collaboration with social scientists, stakeholders and facilitators of the
participatory process (input to Chapter 4)
5. Develop the multi-scale quantitative and qualitative multi-scale scenario to
contextualise normative scenarios in collaboration with natural and social scientists,
modelling teams, stakeholders and facilitators of the participatory process (Chapter
5)
The five steps of collaboration listed above were carried, as part of a multi-scale framework,
with five case studies (Figure 1.3) chosen to represent different levels of aggregation,
availability of information and policy-relevant sectoral foci. The five case studies are :
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Central Asia case study European case study
3 regional/local case studies
(Scotland, 2 Iberian catchments,
2 Hungarian municipalities)
Figure 1.3: Geographical distribution of the five IMPRESSIONS case studies
Central Asia as a pivotal region between Russian and Chinese powers and their sphere of
influence on Europe; Europe (28 EU countries + Norway and Switzerland); three local
case studies: Scotland, the trans-boundary Tagus-Segura and Guadiana river basins in
Iberia and Veszpre´m and Szeksza´rd municipalities in Hungary (Figure 1.3).
The European and local case studies reflect the diversity of the European continent. It
ranges from the sub-arctic climate of northern Scandinavia to the Mediterranean climate
of southern Europe, and from wide lowland plains to high mountains, with a mix of
land-uses including expanding urban areas, intensive arable and horticulture, extensive
upland grazing and forestry. Climate and socio-economic change are therefore likely
to have different impacts across Europe on social and economic sectors, human health,
ecosystems and the goods and services they provide. Central Asia case study focuses on
the relation between five countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
and Uzbekistan) and on the region as a sphere of external political influence on Europe.
In this case study, the scenarios have the objective of exploring and analysing the impacts
in the water, agriculture, energy and trade sectors to understand the indirect impact on
stability and trade in Europe.
Exploratory scenarios have been developed in all IMPRESSIONS case studies. Multi-scale
modelling allows for higher scale models (e.g. global) to provide information on boundary
conditions for lower scale level models (e.g. European/national). For example, global
trade flows at the global scale can provide the basis for understanding food imports to
the European region, or European-wide human migration patterns may affect population
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change at the national and sub-national scale. The multi-scale approach also supports a
comparison of model outputs across geographic scales for similar parameters. Similar to
the modelling, the global narratives contextualise the lower-scale narratives. Compared
to multi-scale modelling, the narratives also enrich the global SSPs. However, because the
SAS process was designed to be also context specific, local narratives could also diverge
from the global and European-wide narratives. Importantly, the Central Asia case study
is consistent with both global and European scenarios, although it may deviate from
global scenarios as local case studies would.
1.4.2 Operationalise Story and Simulation: truly bridging scenario narratives
and quantifications across case studies
The SAS approach implies that models and narratives are two main products that need
to be combined in an iterative procedure. Its implementation consists in stakeholder
participation to the scenario production process (i.e. co-production) of qualitative and
quantitative scenarios in 10 steps, as described in Alcamo et al. 2008. Scenario
narratives and quantifications were developed for each case study following a decision
tree that summarises the navigation between Steps 2-10, taking into account whether
relevant scenarios already existed and also the different spatial scales of the case studies
(Figure 1.4). The Pan-European and Scottish case study scenarios had been partly
developed within a previous project (CLIMSAVE), while the Central Asian, Iberian and
Hungarian case study scenarios were developed from the input provided by stakeholders
in workshops.
For each case study, after the narratives had been formulated and considered satisfactory,
selected variables were quantified for modelling purposes. As only a limited amount of
time was available within the workshops (or expert meetings for the Scottish and European
case studies), the maximum number of model variables that could be quantified with the
aid of stakeholder input was limited to three or four.
The selection of these modelling variables was based on meeting a number of practical
requirements. Firstly, the variables needed to reflect the expertise of most of the invited
stakeholders and at the same time, reflect the key issues of the particular case study.
Secondly, the variables should provide guidance for the quantification of a much wider
range of socio-economic variables to be used within more general meta-models.
In addition to the model variables, the stakeholders were also required to help in the
quantification of four types of socio-economic ‘capitals’ (human, social, manufactured and
financial). Capitals are useful indicators of the overall wealth in a society, vulnerability
of the system and ability of the society to adapt to changing circumstances (Gramberger
& Watson, 2013). The full 10 steps implemented in IMPRESSIONS are described in the
IMPRESSIONS Information Hub (http://www.highendsolutions.eu/).
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Step 2: Do relevant 
scenarios already exist? 
Steps 3 and 4: Stakeholders develop 
narratives & key quantification in a first 
workshop, followed by analysis (step 5) 
(CA, IB, HU)
Step 6: First iteration: 
what`s the scale of 
the case study?
Steps 3 and 4: Scenario 
team  develops narratives & 
key quantification in an 
expert meeting, followed by 
analysis (step 5) (EU, SC)
Step 6: Miniworkshop: 
Stakeholders apply direct changes 
to narratives and quantifications 
(SC, HU)
Step 6: Questionnaire: 
Stakeholders answer questions to 
clarify inconsistencies in either 
narratives or quantifications 
(EU,CA,IB)
Steps 7,8,9,10: Scenario team 
iterates with stakeholders until 
narratives and quantifications are 
consistent and then finalise 
scenarios (all case studies)
yes
no
local
Regional/ 
continental
Figure 1.4: Decision tree for the steps to develop scenarios in all IMPRESSIONS case studies
(EU= Europe, CA= Central Asia, IB= Iberia, SC=Scotland, HU= Hungary)
1.5 Problem statement: what contributions are the
scenarios expected to make to climate-change
science?
The ontological and epistemological background of IMPRESSIONS is well embedded in
the post-modern knowledge paradigm: the identification of solutions to high-end climate
change requires a highly interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary approach. The scenario
typologies introduced in Section 1.3, while providing an orientation in the state-of-the-art
scenario typologies and methodologies, also highlight the lack of a definitive approach
to assess the criteria of credibility, legitimacy, consistency and salience of the scenario
typologies.
This section addresses this shortcoming, by structuring the main challenges of
operationalising the criteria in four main points:
 1. Scenario types: The weak link between narratives and quantifications still
undermines the credibility and full consistency between qualitative and quantitative
scenarios. Considering that progress has been made towards improving structure
in narratives (Kok, 2009; Kok et al., 2014) or qualitative trends (Schweizer &
O’Neill, 2014; Carlsen et al., 2016) to better link to quantitative scenarios, this
thesis applies a different angle according to which narratives should not be better
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structured but linked as wholes to convey all the potential that narratives can offer
to the final scenario product. The specific operationalisation to strengthen and
clarify this link, analysed in Chapter 2, consists of the bridge between a fuzzy-set
methodology (to represent qualitative scenarios) and probabilistic methodology (to
represent quantitative scenarios)
 2. Scenarios across scales: multi-scale scenarios tend to be developed with
‘nesting’ approaches. While the advantages are enormous and allow to have
consistent scenarios across different scales and case studies, their legitimacy is
often questioned because multi-scale scenarios do not cover all the possible views,
especially if these are inconsistent scales and mismatch global assumptions. The
specific operationalisation to strengthen the link across scales consists in comparing
modelling downscaled assumptions and stakeholders’ assumptions to inform the
future of urbanisation in Europe (Chapter 3). This implies also the importance
of qualitative scenarios in informing the final message derived from downscaled
scenarios.
 3. Consistency across scales and scenario types: Because of the first two problems,
a re-definition of what scenario consistency means is necessary by assessing
consistency both across scenario scales and scenario types. Because, in both
typologies, consistency has been prioritised with quantitative scenarios, this thesis
develops the concept of archetype utilising the Cultural Theory, to complement
existing assessments of what consistent scenarios mean.
 4. Scenario goals: While scenarios are generally developed to be quantified in either
IAM or IAV assessments, they are not used to contextualise normative scenarios.
The criterion towards addressing the scenario goals is thus to evaluate their salience,
by identifying who are the users and what policy-questions need to be addressed.
The specific operationalisation is carried out by analysing capitals and capacities to
frame exploratory scenarios as the enabling or constraining socio-economic context
for normative scenarios.
1.6 Objective and Research Questions
The objective of this thesis is to develop socio-economic scenarios by applying novel
methods, and to evaluate them using four criteria that operationalise the guiding concepts
of ontology and epistemology. The following research questions (RQs) are addressed as
in Figure 1.5:
• RQ1 (Chapter 2): How can different types of knowledge be linked in exploratory
scenarios?
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Figure 1.5: Four evaluation criteria to iteratively link progress on ontology and epistemology
of climate-change science utilising scenario analysis. Updated from Cash et al. (2002)
• RQ2 (Chapter 3): What are the implications of matching top-down model-led
quantitative knowledge and bottom-up stakeholder-led qualitative knowledge in
multi-scale exploratory scenarios?
• RQ3 (Chapter 4): How does archetyping scenarios frame global top-down and local
bottom-up scenario narratives?
• RQ4 (Chapter 5): What is the role of exploratory scenarios to improve understanding
the future potential to achieve desirable futures and address the challenges ahead?
1.7 Reading guide of thesis chapters
Figure 1.6 guides through the content of the next chapters (2 to 6), to understand how
the chapters lead to synthesis discussion on the criteria to evaluate how the scenarios
have operationalised the ontology and epistemology of climate-change science. Chapter 2
(Ch2 box in Figure 1.6) sets the basis for Chapters 3, 4, and 5 (Ch3, Ch4, Ch5) with the
hypothesis that scenario narratives should not be analysed solely as qualitative versions of
model variables. Their application should be enhanced beyond communication purposes.
Therefore, Chapter 2 argues that narratives and quantifications are inherently different, as
they belong to different epistemologies, and therefore cannot be reduced but understood
and linked within the different uncertainties they represent. Because of this link, multi-
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Figure 1.6: Conceptual linkages across the 4 analysis-chapters (Chapters 2-5) and the
synthesis (Chapter 6)
scale scenario drivers need to be analysed in both qualitative (with qualitative knowledge
such as multi-scale actors) and quantitative form (with quantitative or semi-quantitative
form, i.e. scenario drivers).
In Chapters 3 and 4, the focus is on multi-scale drivers analysis in the context of
exploratory scenario analysis. In Chapter 3, qualitative drivers and quantitative drivers
are analysed to address understand what processes are captured when assumptions on
key drivers (GDP and population) are linked across scales. Chapter 4 complements this
analysis by utilising the concept of archetypes to link local and global scenarios and analyse
cross-scale consistency. Albeit with novel approaches, Chapter 3 and, to some extent,
Chapter 4 analyse scenarios from the perspective of scenarios as exploratory analysis of
future drivers of climate change.
Chapter 5 develops a novel approach to scenario analysis to ontologically understand
the nature of climate change as symptom of societal problems and worldviews (also
addressed in Chapter 4). In this perspective, the role of narratives as holistic scenarios
is fundamental in that they provide key information on what actors and what role they
might play in the future.
Chapter 6 (Ch6 in Figure 1.6) reflects on the evaluation of scenario analysis in Chapters
2-5 according to criteria of credibility, legitimacy, consistency and relevance.
Chapter 2
Bridging uncertainty concepts across
narratives and simulations in
environmental scenarios
This chapter is based on:
Pedde, S., Kok, K., Onigkeit, J., Brown, C., Holman, I., & Harrison, P.A. (2018). Bridg-
ing uncertainty concepts across narratives and simulations in environmental scenarios.
Regional Environmental Change, 1-12. doi: 10.1007/s10113-018-1338-2
20 Chapter 2
Abstract
Uncertainties in our understanding of current and future climate-change projections,
impacts and vulnerabilities are structured by scientists using scenarios, which are generally
in qualitative (narrative) and quantitative (numerical) forms. Although conceptually
strong, qualitative and quantitative scenarios have limited complementarity due to the
lack of a fundamental bridge between two different concepts of uncertainty: linguistic and
epistemic. Epistemic uncertainty is represented by the range of scenarios and linguistic
variables within them, while linguistic uncertainty is represented by the translation of
those linguistic variables via the fuzzy set approach. Both are therefore incorporated
in the models that utilise the final quantifications. The application of this method
is demonstrated in a stakeholder-led development of socio-economic scenarios. The
socio-economic scenarios include several vague elements due to heterogeneous linguistic
interpretations of future change on the part of stakeholders. We apply the so-called ‘Centre
of Gravity’ (CoG) operator to defuzzify the quantifications of linguistic values provided by
stakeholders. The results suggest that, in these cases, uniform distributions provide a close
fit to the membership functions derived from ranges of values provided by stakeholders.
As a result, the 90% or 95% intervals of the probability density functions are similar to
the 0.1 or 0.05 degrees of membership of the linguistic values of linguistic variables. By
bridging different uncertainty concepts (linguistic and epistemic uncertainties), this study
offers a substantial step towards linking qualitative and quantitative scenarios.
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2.1 Introduction
The drivers of climate change within socio-ecological systems, such as land-use change
and greenhouse gas emissions, alter anthropogenic and climatic pressures in the systems
(Schro¨ter et al., 2005; Folke, 2006; Holman et al., 2016). The interconnectedness of
these drivers adds uncertainty to our understanding of recent climate behaviour and
future climate-change projections, impacts and vulnerabilities. Such uncertainties have
often been accommodated using scenarios to systematically answer “what-if” questions
(van Ittersum et al., 1998; Zurek & Henrichs, 2007; van Vuuren et al., 2012a). Unlike
predictions and forecasts, scenarios do not imply a probability or likelihood (van Vuuren
et al., 2012a). Instead, scenarios have been defined as “plausible descriptions of how the
future may develop, based on a coherent and internally consistent set of assumptions
about key relationships and driving forces” (Alcamo et al., 2005). As such, scenarios
can be in quantitative (numerical) and qualitative (narrative) forms (Bambergerl, 2000;
Philcox et al., 2010).
The complementarity of qualitative and quantitative scenarios is considered a potential
strength in addressing complex problems (Vermeulen et al., 2013) since the so-called
story and simulation (SAS) approach (Alcamo et al., 2006) became mainstream in
scenario development (Kok, 2009). SAS consists of a ten-step approach aimed at
developing and translating (often stakeholder-led) narratives into (often scientist-led)
model quantifications, iterating and revising them until they are linked (van Vliet et al.,
2010). SAS yields credible, plausible and innovative scenarios because of the inclusion of
expert models combined with other creative elements introduced by stakeholders (Alcamo
& Henrichs, 2008). The co-production also ensures consistency between stakeholders and
model results (Kemp-Benedict, 2012; Schweizer & Kriegler, 2012). The final scenarios are
more relevant and legitimate for end-users as stakeholders can identify their views (i.e.
stakes) in the narratives.
Although conceptually strong, operationalising SAS has issues. Alcamo (2008b) already
identified two SAS pitfalls: the ‘reproducibility’ and ‘conversion’ problems. The
‘reproducibility’ problem exists because assumptions and mental models are not explicit
when a scenario narrative is developed, whereas the ‘conversion’ problem exists because
narratives cannot be directly translated into quantifications. Moreover, the distinction
between the two problems is often not straightforward. For example, fuzzy cognitive
maps (Kosko, 1986), recently applied by Kok (2009) and Van Vliet et al. (2010), ‘map’
variables and connections by assigning a weight to each connection. In the literature, this
method has been described as improving the structure and reproducibility of qualitative
scenarios (Alcamo, 2008) and has been applied as a conversion tool between qualitative
and quantitative scenarios (Mallampalli et al., 2016). Nevertheless, most state-of-the-art
studies have tended to focus on addressing the ‘reproducibility’ problem as evidenced
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by the proliferation of systematic stakeholder-based modelling (Voinov & Bousquet,
2010), whilst studies focusing on the ‘conversion’ problem show methodological trade-
offs between model compatibility, stakeholder expertise and development of narratives
(Mallampalli et al., 2016). Hence, further studies addressing the ‘conversion’ problem
are urgently needed. However, in order to tackle the ‘conversion’ problem in SAS, there
is a need to take a step back, i.e. to better understand the gaps in knowledge within
both qualitative and quantitative scenarios separately, before combining them (van Vliet
et al., 2010). Scenario narratives integrate imagination in strategic thinking and combine
short-term preoccupations in long-term planning with analytical thinking and creative
visioning (Rasmussen, 2005). Because narratives provide ‘holistic views’ of the future and
transcend the sum of single parts (Rasmussen, 2005), it becomes very complex to reduce
narratives to a selection of model variables. Whilst acknowledging this gap, we argue that
narratives can be bridged to models, while maintaining their original characteristics.
In SAS, two sources of uncertainty matter, epistemic and linguistic uncertainties (Regan
et al., 2002; Uusitalo et al., 2015) (Figure 2.1). Epistemic uncertainty is due to imperfect
knowledge about something that is theoretically knowable. In statistical models, epistemic
uncertainty is further distinguished from aleatory uncertainty that relates to irreducible
and unavoidable variation in stochastic processes (Uusitalo et al., 2015). Statistical models
represent uncertainty “in terms of (aleatory) probability distributions and (epistemic)
parameters” (O’Hagan et al., 2006). Linguistic uncertainty is inherent to our natural
language and includes vagueness and ambiguity. Here, we categorise aleatory uncertainty
as part of a broader ‘epistemic uncertainty’ category (Regan et al., 2002) and distinguish
it from ‘linguistic uncertainty’.
2.2 Material and methods
2.2.1 Developing participatory scenarios
The socio-economic scenarios analysed in this paper are developed within the EU-funded
IMPRESSIONS project (Harrison et al. in review). The objective of the scenarios is
to provide the context to understanding future impacts, adaptation and vulnerability to
climate change at different scales in Europe. Because of their geographic breadth and
narrative and quantitative character, the IMPRESSIONS scenarios can be applied to test
the fuzzy sets methodology and compare the results across heterogeneous stakeholder
groups. The IMPRESSIONS scenarios were intended to directly inform numerical inputs
to a European-scale model known as the Integrated Assessment Platform (IAP) (Harrison
et al., 2015), with the scenario-specific default values and uncertainty ranges of model
inputs being derived from the stakeholder inputs. The quantifications derived from
stakeholder input explicitly recognise both linguistic and epistemic uncertainty, in that
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Figure 2.1: Conceptual framework (Background adapted from: (Regan et al., 2002)).
the stakeholders intended the ranges (and the scenarios within which they occur) to allow
for epistemic uncertainties in the quantities described (section 2.1.1), while the fuzzy-
set and probabilistic interpretation accounts for linguistic uncertainty (sections 2.2.1 &
2.2.2).
The results discussed in this paper are based on scenario quantification for five case studies
which cover Europe and Central Asia: Europe as a whole (Europe) (Kok et al., 2018);
Central Asia (Central Asia); Scotland (Scotland) consisting of national scale scenarios
for Scotland; Iberian river basin scale scenarios (Iberia); and Hungarian municipality
level scenarios (Hungary). For the Central Asia, Iberia and Hungary case studies,
heterogeneous groups of stakeholders were engaged. For Europe and Scotland, scientists
acted as stakeholders to modify a set of existing stakeholder-developed scenarios (Harrison
et al., 2013, 2015). In this paper, we refer to these scientists as ‘expert stakeholders’.
Producing narratives and quantifications in a participatory scenario process
Stakeholders were invited to produce narratives and key quantifications in a two-day
workshop within each case study. Stakeholders were selected to cover a wide range
of expertise on different sectors and to have different age, country, and educational
backgrounds (see Gramberger et al. (2015)). All scenario products were produced by
stakeholders as the result of different workshop processes which alternate brainstorming
sessions in groups with plenary discussions, called the STIR approach (Gramberger et al.,
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2015). The approach is designed such that both narratives and key input quantifications
become intrinsically connected by having the same mix of facilitators and stakeholders
producing both scenarios and quantifying key drivers. Such an approach is fundamental
for consistent co-production of both narratives and quantifications.
The workshop process consists of three main components. In the first component,
stakeholders are guided to list, discuss and select key uncertainties relevant to all scenarios
and further develop narratives for each individual scenario. In the second component,
narratives are discussed in groups (group exercise), where stakeholders are asked to
provide qualitative (linguistic) trends for key variables in a written questionnaire. The
variables’ descriptions are presented to stakeholders without rephrasing the modellers’
wording to avoid misinterpretation. The third component consists of an individual
exercise, where each stakeholder provides their personal opinion on what quantitative
ranges represent those qualitative trends.
Given inevitable time constraints and the importance of completing all steps within the
workshop, the maximum number of variables that could be quantified by stakeholders
was limited to three or four. These variables were selected based on two criteria. First,
the variables had to reflect the expertise of most of the invited stakeholders, and nest
well among the key issues for the case study. Second, the variables should relate to model
input parameters that were among the most sensitive in the model. For the Europe
case study, the results of a full sensitivity analysis of the IAP (Kebede et al. 2015)
were available to support the choice of sensitive variables. In addition, stakeholders
provided qualitative guidance to inform the quantification by the modellers of a much
wider range of socio-economic variables used within the impact models. For example,
stakeholders provided trends for four capitals (human, social, manufactured and financial)
of resource availability (Porritt, 2007) to be applied to model vulnerabilities to climate
change (Dunford et al., 2015). This paper only analyses the trends for the stakeholder-
quantified variables, therefore analysis of capital trends is excluded.
Together with trends and quantification of variables, stakeholders were asked to provide
an indication of their confidence when quantifying each variable, to have qualitative
information on the stakeholders’ professed confidence levels about the quantifications. The
question asked to both stakeholders and expert stakeholders after the quantification of
each variable was ‘How confident are you for the quantification you provide for this variable
based on your background knowledge (0-10)? (0=not confident; 10=very confident)’.
We classified the data in four categories to analyse a qualitative ‘confidence index’.
The sample was not suited to infer statistical conclusions: firstly, the sample size was
too limited due to resource limitations; secondly, the motives behind confidence levels
cannot be assessed; thirdly a psychological and cultural analysis on the background of
the stakeholders is out of the scope of this analysis. We therefore decided to analyse the
confidence index qualitatively. The analysis of this index occurs according to one of the
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main assumptions introduced in this study, i.e. that incorporating a subjective level of
confidence could alter the value or weight of quantification (Van der Sluijs, 2007). In
the next section, we explore how to proceed with quantification of a given variable using
the ranges provided by stakeholders during a facilitated workshop. We use the variable
‘Change in food imports from 2010’ for Europe case study as an example to follow the
methodological steps and to illustrate the results of other linguistic variables.
2.2.2 Addressing the ‘conversion’ problem: quantification of narratives
Measuring vagueness using fuzzy sets
Vagueness in stakeholder-driven scenarios exists because each stakeholder could have a
different interpretation of the linguistic term ‘high increase’ in food imports compared
to 2010. To measure this vagueness, each stakeholder was asked to define what he/she
personally meant by ‘high increase’ by providing a numerical range. The analysis of
ranges derived from stakeholder values assumes that each stakeholder has a different, but
equally valid, interpretation of the same statement due to different backgrounds, beliefs,
knowledge, and so on.
Numerical ranges provided by each stakeholder can be represented with fuzzy numbers in
a membership function (see, for example, Cornelissen et al. (2001)). According to fuzzy
logic, ‘high increase’ is a vague statement that should be addressed in a mathematical form
(Zadeh, 1975b,a), i.e. by quantifying the degrees of membership rather than assessing the
likelihood or frequency of the linguistic term ‘high increase’. By providing a range for the
linguistic term ‘high increase’, stakeholders estimate the vagueness of the linguistic term,
thus addressing linguistic uncertainty. All the individual ranges constitute the input of
each linguistic value for each linguistic variable (Figure 2.2).
We define the analysed variable a ‘linguistic variable’ with a ‘linguistic value’. A linguistic
value is the vague analogue of a numerical value and is the imprecise non-numerical value
of a linguistic variable (Zadeh 1975a). Linguistic variable and model variable have the
same meaning to reduce the risk of misinterpretation, which means that the model variable
is presented to stakeholders as such in the form of a linguistic variable, without reducing
or simplifying the meaning of the original model variable.
A linguistic variable can have several linguistic values. In our example, linguistic variable
‘Change in food imports from 2010’ has five linguistic values ranging from high ‘decrease’
to ‘high increase’ (Figure 2.3). The purpose of the linguistic values is to inform the
calculation of fuzzy membership functions that will be used as model inputs. The
membership function of a linguistic variable µ A˜ assigns a numerical value to each range
(x), depending on how much the range ‘belongs’ to its linguistic variable. For instance, in
(Figure 2.2) we assume that all ranges of a linguistic variable belong in a space included
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Figure 2.2: Representation of the linguistic variable ‘Change in Food Import compared to
2010’ and its linguistic values, together with the numerical ranges provided by each stakeholder
for a linguistic variable and the fuzzy restrictions. Membership functions define the degree of
membership (µ A˜ in y-axis) of fuzzy numbers in a 0–1 scale. Adapted from (Zadeh, 1975a)
within the median, which belongs completely to the linguistic variable µ A˜ (x median
)=1, and the maximum and minimum of the ranges, which belong least to the linguistic
variable µ A˜ (x (min,max) )=0.
The last step is the defuzzification of the linguistic value using one of various existing
operators. The operator used here is the centre of gravity (CoG) (Figure 2.3), a continuous
defuzzification operator, which means that small variations in an input should result in
small changes in output values (Leekwijck and Kerre 1999). The centre of gravity of the
membership function is defined in equation 2.2.2 by the minimum, median and maximum
values of each linguistic value obtained from the results of the entire stakeholder group
(Kok et al., 2014). The CoG was selected because it represents the most “central” value
between the membership function‘s minimum, median and maximum and therefore was
considered a better indicator of higher likelihood than the median, which is more sensitive
to intermediate values. However, the disadvantage is that the CoG is more sensitive to
changes in extreme ranges, compared to other metrics such as the mode or median.
CoG(x) =
(min+median+max)
3
(2.1)
The CoG provides the basis for converting the qualitative changes into quantitative
changes for each scenario, as described below. The quantified changes are then run in the
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Figure 2.3: Defuzzification of the linguistic values ‘high decrease’ and ‘low increase’ for the
linguistic variable ‘change in food import compared to 2010’. Defuzzification is made with the
centre of gravity method
.
IAP. The uncertainty around these changes is handled as set out below.
Probabilistic interpretation of vagueness
The scenario quantification in the IAP recognises both epistemic uncertainty and the
validity of each stakeholders’ perspective on future changes through the derivation of
probability density functions for each model input. For each linguistic value of each
linguistic variable, the CoG represents the single output of a fuzzy set. We define the
CoG as the default value of the membership function. The variation in values around
this default value is taken to define the linguistic uncertainty, which must be taken into
account in subsequent analysis (modelling) steps. Generally, this can be achieved by
representing the variation as a probability density function (PDF), allowing the form
and range of the stakeholders’ quantification to be retained, and also allowing parameter
sampling for rigorous sensitivity or uncertainty analyses. Ideally, the form of the PDF
will be derived from the frequency of values suggested by stakeholders, with Gaussian and
uniform distributions offering particularly useful and contrasting alternatives. However,
in many cases the appropriate function is not clear, either because of an asymmetric
or multimodal frequency, or because inadequate frequency data are available. In these
cases, it may be preferable to define discontinuous probabilities that minimise the need for
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additional assumptions to be made. In the case of the IAP, input parameter values were
assigned different (linguistic) ranges: a ‘credible’ range within which the ‘default’ value
occurs and a wider ‘possible’ range. Assuming a probability distribution for the CoG, we
define, for each linguistic variable, a ‘default’, a ‘credible’ and a ‘possible’ range. Beta
distributions are often chosen in the literature when non-normality is assumed due to
their flexibility and limited ranges (Brown et al. 2014); however, they are not universally
appropriate. For consistency with previous work, we use beta-distributions here, but fitted
distributions all had a low alpha and beta (between 1 and 2), suggesting that uniform
distributions may have provided alternative adequate fits.
Fitting of the distributions to each linguistic variable’s CoG was carried out with an online
tool that requires a scaled [0,1] modal value and 10% or 90% limits (Brown et al. 2014).
The CoG was therefore scaled as in equation 2.2):
ScaledCoG(x) =
(median−min)
(max−min) (2.2)
This scaled CoG value was defined as the modal or ‘default’ value, with the 90% range
taken to define the ‘credible range’ and the 95% range taken to define the ‘possible
range’. This choice is based on previously selected confidence ranges with the IAP (Brown
et al., 2014) and on expert judgement on the distributions fitted to the data obtained by
stakeholders, but other choices would have been equally possible.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Addressing the ‘conversion’ problem: quantification of scenario trends
and input to the Integrated Assessment Platform
As the CoG consists of the defuzzification of a single linguistic value, defuzzifying all
linguistic values of a given linguistic variable is necessary to quantify the scenario trends
until 2100. To exemplify this, we follow on from the example used in the Methods section
of the linguistic variable ‘Change in food imports compared to 2010 [in %]’. For this
linguistic variable, we have defuzzified five linguistic values: ‘high increase’ has a CoG of
88%; ‘low increase’ has a CoG of 22%; ‘no change’ has a CoG of 0%; ‘low decrease’ has
a CoG of -27%; and ‘high decrease’ has a CoG of -63% (Figure 2.4). These values are
then applied according to the scenarios generated by stakeholders. For example, based
on the narrative for the European SSP1 scenario, the expert stakeholders were asked to
draw qualitative trends for the variable ‘Change in food imports compared to 2010 [in %]’.
They decided that the trend should be a ‘low increase’ in 2025, then a ‘low increase’ in
2055 and finally a ‘high decrease’ by 2100. With defuzzified values: in the future scenario
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Figure 2.4: Quantification of the centre of gravity for the five linguistic values (high
decrease–low decrease–no change–low increase–high increase) of the linguistic variable ‘Change
in Food Import compared to 2010 [in%]’. Four future trends are shown for the European
Shared Socio-economic Pathways
European SSP1, food imports in Europe will be 22% higher in 2025 compared to 2010 and
then remain constant at 22% higher in 2055, before decreasing to -63% by 2100 compared
to 2010 levels (Figure 2.4). These values for each SSP, based on the CoG of each linguistic
value, represent the default input values for the impact models used in the case studies
analysed.
The results suggest that the distribution fitted to the scaled CoG (interpreted as the mode
of the distribution) is close to a uniform distribution. Based on an assumption of quasi-
uniformity (i.e. apparent but not precise uniformity), the PDF ranges resulted in similar
ranges to the membership functions for all quantified IAP variables. 90% of the PDF was
thus close to a 0.1 degree of membership and 95% of the PDF was close to a 0.05 degree
of membership in the fuzzy set function (Figure 2.5). The quasi-uniform distributions
suggest the possibility of fuzzy numbers to directly provide all IAP input ranges (default,
credible and possible) and to account for nearly all ranges by stakeholders by staying
very close to the min and max of the fuzzy number (up to 0.05 membership). From
a conceptual perspective, the quasi-uniformity is also consistent with our assumption
of allowing stakeholders to define the likelihood of their quantifications by providing a
‘range’ instead of a ‘most likely value’ of each linguistic value and a ‘confidence’ index;
presumably this also suggests substantial uncertainty across stakeholders where wider
ranges result from more stakeholders being included.
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Figure 2.5: Visualisation of ‘default’ and ‘credible range’ for the integrated assessment
platform using stakeholder-derived quantification
2.3.2 Analysis of assumptions in quantifications of scenario trends
To test whether uniformity could be the best assumption, we accounted for and
qualitatively analysed the performance of the ‘confidence’ index that the stakeholders
and expert stakeholders provided with their quantification of the linguistic values for each
single linguistic variable. Three possible interpretations of the results were considered:
a) stakeholders, aware of their insufficient background knowledge, provide ‘very unlikely’
values and a low ‘confidence’ index or b) stakeholders provide what an expert would
consider a ‘reasonable or realistic’ estimate and are either ‘confident’ or ‘less confident’ or
c) stakeholders under- or overstate their expertise.
The qualitative analysis of the ‘confidence’ index supports our choice of a uniform-like
probabilistic representation of likely values for two reasons. Firstly, we observed similar
patterns in the ‘confidence’ index across the same case study rather than for the same
variable. For example, confidence is generally lower for Europe and Scotland case studies
compared to Central Asia, Hungary and Iberia. Stakeholders and expert stakeholders
all tended to provide a similar confidence level independent of the variable, and thus
independent of background knowledge. Secondly, we found no obvious correlation
between ‘reasonable’ quantifications and the ‘confidence’ index for stakeholders or expert
stakeholders: low confidence may indicate lack of knowledge in cases where unrealistic
ranges were provided, or may indicate a critical attitude when reasonable ranges were
provided. With the information available, however, we cannot infer whether, and how
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Figure 2.6: Log of ranges for all linguistic variables for five case studies. The blue line is the
theoretical normal distribution for all ranges (excluding single values, in the leftmost column)
and the red-dotted line is the empirical distribution following all linguistic values. Linguistic
value ranges for Europe and Scotland were quantified by expert stakeholders, while linguistic
value ranges for Hungary, Iberia and Central Asia were quantified by stakeholders
much, cultural and other personal factors (such as a critical attitude or understanding of
the exercise) played a role in the ‘confidence’ index.
Ranges provided by stakeholders and scientists acting as stakeholders (‘expert
stakeholders’) were also compared across case studies (Figure 2.6) to understand whether
minima and maxima values could lead to different distributions (e.g. multimodal or
particularly skewed for either stakeholders or expert stakeholders).
From a qualitative point of view, the analysis did not show any specific pattern in either
stakeholders’ or expert stakeholders’ ranges. The mean and standard deviation of ranges
are higher for the more extreme linguistic values of the variables (i.e. ‘high decrease
and high increase’). The ‘confidence’ index seems to be inelastic to variation in ranges,
narrower ranges being associated with greater confidence. For example, both Scotland case
study expert stakeholders and Central Asia stakeholders did not provide ranges for one
linguistic value but rather gave single values (represented by the leftmost column of each
graph in Figure 2.6), but Central Asia stakeholders produced more extreme values than
those provided by Scotland case study expert stakeholders. Central Asia stakeholders and
Scotland case study expert stakeholders scored differently in the ‘confidence’ index, though
they had similar ‘confidence’ in providing quantifications for the same variables (GDP
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and population trends). The ‘confidence’ index also differed between expert stakeholders.
Europe case study expert stakeholders provided the least ‘0’ range values and Scotland
case study expert stakeholders provided the most ‘0’ range values (Figure 2.6). Assuming
that scientists possess the background knowledge for the model input quantification, such
difference in ranges may indicate the preference of some scientists to provide the most
likely value instead of a range.
2.4 Discussion
Our analysis demonstrates and applies a method to translate vagueness to probabilities
as a double-edged sword that will improve current practice when operationalising
the Story-And-Simulation approach, while also improving statistical and fundamental
understanding of how uncertainties are perceived and dealt with.
To this end, we addressed linguistic and epistemic uncertainties by ‘bridging’ them,
rather than attempting to reduce them because the narratives provide ‘holistic views’
of the future that the models could not fully capture. In our approach, both narratives
and models still remain ‘black boxes’ (see the round and squared shapes in Figure 2.1)
throughout our analysis and neither the linguistic uncertainties of the narratives nor
the epistemic uncertainties of modelling are reduced but ‘bridged’. However, effective
methods do exist to unravel the single ‘black boxes’. These methods have the advantage
of adding structure to either narratives or both narratives and models (see for example the
Cross-Impact Balance approach for narratives in Schweizer and Kriegler (2012) or Fuzzy
Cognitive Mapping to link narratives and models in van Vliet et al. (2010)). However,
these methods do not yet address the different uncertainties and are less transparent or
too complicated to carry out in stakeholder workshops.
We chose to represent the stakeholders’ fuzzy numbers with uniform-like distributions
for input in the IAP to avoid adding further assumptions and unintended interpretation.
However, we provide a description of stakeholder ranges to enable a qualitative comparison
with direct quantification of stakeholder-led narratives by impact modellers (Figure 2.6).
This analysis shows that linguistic values in all case studies lead to different PDFs. In the
Hungarian case study, Gaussian probabilities could approximate distributions reasonably
well, in most cases, once the ‘0’ values (or zero uncertainty) were removed. We interpreted
this result as supporting the idea that stakeholders themselves can ‘bridge’ linguistic
and epistemic uncertainty within the fuzzy sets approach. Stakeholders may provide
reasonable ranges and could substitute expert judgement from impact modellers, at least
for selected variables.
In sections 2.1 and 2.2, we have introduced the assumption that direct quantification of
stakeholder-led narratives by impact modellers could add ‘assumptions on assumptions’,
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and fail to simply translate uncertainties, if impact modellers solely rely on their own ad-
hoc judgements (Mallampalli et al., 2016) or simply misinterpret stakeholders‘ reasoning
and opinions. Impact modellers are well experienced in addressing epistemic/aleatory
uncertainty but address linguistic uncertainty less systematically (Regan et al. 2002).
We tested this assumption by qualitatively comparing trends of stakeholders’ and expert
stakeholders’ ranges across case studies. Instead of comparing trends across case studies,
an alternative approach could have been to make single assumptions about interpreting
all variable ranges in terms of PDFs, or different assumptions for each variable. But,
after preliminary screening of the results, and due to the different types of variables
analysed, a direct comparison among similar variables was not possible due to the limited
number of participants and variables. Alternatively, a quantitative analysis can be useful
to validate the use of stakeholder-led quantifications from a modelling output perspective.
For example, Monte Carlo sampling from the PDFs generated for sensitive variables like
GDP, population and food imports (Kebede et al., 2015; Brown et al., 2014) could be
performed to analyse the propagation of uncertainty in impact models of both stakeholder-
led input uncertainty around the CoG and PDFs generated by direct quantification of
stakeholder-led narratives by impact modellers.
We have also assumed that, even if probability-based quantification is highly appropriate
given the inevitable approximations, there is no further information that can be introduced
to define the form of the PDF. In contrast, mainstream alternatives generally structure
both narrative and quantification assumptions using probabilistic methods based on
Bayesian statistics, such as Bayesian Networks (e.g. Henriksen and Barlebo 2008) and
Bayesian reasoning (Kemp-Benedict 2013). We concluded that both methods would
have been either incomplete or misleading in our analysis. Bayesian-based methods can
structure uncertainties more transparently with both prior and posteriori distributions
that quantify changing assumptions with acquired information. However, even such
methods can be problematic if 1) little agreement exists on the source of the data
– especially in data scarce case-studies such as Central Asia and 2) if participants
have different expertise. Our qualitative analysis of the ‘confidence’ also shows that
stakeholders’ and scientists’ (expert stakeholders) assumptions may be very different
and difficult to predict. Even in ‘expert stakeholders’ participatory contexts, extra
assumptions need to be minimised.
We suggest to further consolidate these results with a quantitative uncertainty analysis
from the IAP output perspective and efforts to strengthen the input from a stakeholder
workshop perspective. The stakeholders appreciated the usefulness of this exercise and
generally agreed that stakeholders can help modellers in quantifying key scenario drivers.
However, some stakeholders found the exercise difficult and this may have resulted in the
generation of ‘outliers’. Nonetheless, ‘outliers’ were included in the quantification of the
CoG simply because we interpreted them as extreme values or ranges, consciously provided
by the stakeholders. We limited ourselves to the exclusion of physically impossible values.
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The most important exception was the quantification of GDP for the Central Asia case
study. Here, extreme growth trends resulted in two very extreme scenarios. When faced
with a choice between their quantification and model-led trends, stakeholders chose the
(very extreme) trends resulting from their quantification. In such case, a compromise had
to be made by applying the trend provided by stakeholders at the upper limit of what the
models could represent. As suggested also by the confidence index analysis, however, there
could be different but equally legitimate reasons for stakeholders to provide their trends.
To reduce ‘outliers’ in future exercises, we suggest to improve the participatory process,
at the root of this quantification, by better adapting questionnaires and processes to the
stakeholders involved in the workshop, e.g. by including a formal stakeholder-mapping
exercise prior to the workshops, to address uncertainty about the representativeness of
stakeholders.
2.5 Conclusions
The fuzzy sets method has been recognised as a simple and transparent method (Alcamo
2008b; Kok et al. 2014; Houet et al. 2016) to be applied from global to local case studies,
despite room for further improvement from stakeholder engagement perspectives. This
analysis, based on the assumption that stakeholder values are the best available (or at
least better than some poorly-defined combination of stakeholder and modeller inputs),
is the first to show that stakeholders can provide reasonable ranges and that these can
be used without adding further assumptions. Ongoing studies applying stakeholders’
quantifications with fuzzy sets within impact models (e.g. Li et al. 2017) will further
explore this potential in different modelling environments, aiming at a universally accepted
tool to produce quantifications from narratives. Even though a formal validation step
may lead to changes in the method, the core steps described are transparent and can be
reproduced by practitioners in the field in any workshop settings.
At an epistemological level, this analysis contributes to enhanced dialogue and
understanding between modeller-led and local, stakeholder-led communities, and linkage
of qualitative and quantitative approaches by bridging the different uncertainty concepts
(linguistic and epistemic and aleatory uncertainties) addressed by their research questions.
We therefore did not simplify the relevant uncertainties (e.g. combining fuzzy logic and
probabilities), but created a common, systematic language between the two communities.
We further hope that our research will raise more attention to fundamental issues of
different sources of uncertainty in participatory scenario development.
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Abstract
We explore the effect of demography on urban land-use in Europe using multi-scale
scenario assumptions. The focus is on interrogating the consistency of assumptions
developed at multiple scales and their effect on urban land-use. The methodology builds
on the analysis of European Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs) of artificial surface
projections. The SSPs include (1) trends on total population, life-cycle and aging, and
fertility and (2) European scale narratives of residential preference and mobility. The
modelled SSPs are also combined with bottom-up qualitative SSP narratives. In all
scenarios, the driver trends of residential preference and population are very diverse.
However, the results for 2100 show a maximum increase of 20% in artificial surface
in Europe, compared to baseline, in three out of four SSPs (SSP1, SSP3, and SSP4).
Only in SSP5, increase will be >150%, due to strong preferences for green and coastal
area, economic growth and urban sprawl. On one hand, our findings suggest a strong
dependency between key modelling outcomes and demographic assumptions, especially
assumptions on fertility in SSP5. On the other hand, we suggest that pan-European
scenarios alone do not include all drivers and stakeholder-led narratives may provide
the necessary contextual data. For example, on the mobility and migratory trends that
can capture the complexity of socio-economic scenarios. These findings interrogate well-
established assumptions in the urbanisation modelling literature, such as the preference for
urban compact development in sustainable scenarios, and the relative weight of fertility
versus migration, for some European regions. Our results suggest that pan-European
modelling results provide a consistent approach to compare scenarios, but also need careful
interpretation, in view of all the assumptions, to convey the best possible knowledge.
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3.1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, global scenarios have developed to become instruments to
inform policy on environmental and sustainability problems at global scale (van Vuuren
et al., 2012a) but also at sub-global scale. The environmental and sustainability problems
analysed at sub-global scale are land-use, climate-change impacts and adaptation (van
Vuuren et al., 2010), structured in the form of scenarios, i.e. consistent narratives about
how the future might unfold. A recent example of such global scenarios are the global
Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs), a set of five socio-economic scenarios covering
the space of uncertainty across the challenges to mitigation (high for SSP3 and SSP5
and low for SSP1 and SSP4) and challenges to adaptation (high for SSP3 and SSP4
and low for SSP1 and SSP5). A fifth scenario, the SSP2, is located at the intersection
of the other scenarios, and therefore covers medium challenges to both mitigation and
adaptation (O’Neill et al., 2015, 2017). Compared to other existing global scenarios,
the SSPs are designed to be implemented in analyses of land-use change impact and
vulnerability at sub-global scales and provide boundary conditions as they account for
a variety of potential changes in the socio-economic context (van Ruijven et al., 2014).
An accepted finding is that sub-global assessments of land-use change generally consist of
modelling tools developed to spatially downscale coarser global scenarios (Sleeter et al.,
2012). The advantage of downscaling (coarse) global data is to provide gridded data
to develop transparent scenarios, consistent with the original data and across scenarios
(van Vuuren et al., 2010). Although the importance of socio-economic change to land-
use change scenarios has been highlighted (Harrison et al., 2018; Holman et al., 2005),
demographic assumptions are generally developed at the global scale (van Vuuren et al.,
2010) and successively downscaled. For example, Terama et al. (2017a) and Terama
et al. (2017b) have proposed an urban modelling approach which utilises sub-national
downscaling of detailed population projections to regional level, and the translation of the
downscaled projections into population structure driven by urban land use development up
to 2100. The study suggests that given the predicted future changes to the demographic
profile of Europe, in particular, an ageing population, strengthening the link between
urbanisation trends and population structure is increasingly important. These results
support the hypothesis that demographics is the major driver of urbanisation (Gonc¸alves
et al., 2017; Nilsson et al., 2014) and therefore approaches are needed that analyse the
effects of multiple aspects of demographics on urbanisation. For instance, urban sprawl
is directly related to both a changing population structure (i.e. the total population and
its age profile) and societal preferences. These, in turn, are determined by the socio-
economic context, in regard to the residential preferences of the population and planning
legislation. In addition to demographics it‘s important to recognise the importance of
wealth (sprawl) and land-use policy in encouraging or constraining urban development
(Reginster & Rounsevell, 2006). Because of the complexity of the interaction of drivers,
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which act at multiple scales, the use of either local data or global downscaled scenarios
only, is not enough to fully capture urban land use dynamics. Demographic change,
future urbanisation trends and the construct of these, must be analysed in their local
(national to sub-national) socio-economic contexts. However, an advantage of having
pan-European, top-down data is that population development is connected in a spatially-
consistent way across regions. Cross region consistency could, for example, account
for the connectivity between regions arising from population mobility (Reginster &
Rounsevell, 2006; Rounsevell et al., 2012). Bottom-up approaches are also important
since they can account for local contexts such as differences in land use planning policy
that is implemented locally, but also influenced by national and subnational governance
structures. The bottom-up is also important in accounting for the role of baseline urban
patterns. Decisions by people about where to live are influenced by the current urban
pattern and this varies across different regions. For example, Fontaine et al. (2014)
demonstrated how people at different stages in their life cycles have different preferences
for living in urban areas, peri-urban areas or rural areas. The legacy of urban development
has created very different urban patterns in, for example, Hungary rather than Scotland,
or Iberia and this will influence future urban development patterns (Li et al., 2016). In
this paper we highlight where caution is required when interpreting consistent down-
scaled scenario data, and explore where assumptions inherent in global scale scenarios
may influence regional scale models in perhaps surprising ways. We explore the effect of
using multi-scale scenario assumptions of demographic change using two methodologies,
i.e. downscaled quantifications and bottom-up qualitative trends, to discuss the relevance
of the assumptions developed at multiple scales.
3.2 Material and methods
The methodology consists of a multi-scale framework that links both qualitative
and quantitative scenario products across scales (Figure 5.3). We use the Shared
Socio-economic Pathways (SSP), which are qualitative and quantitative scenarios with
assumptions on demographics, human development, economy, policies, technology and
environment (O’Neill et al., 2017). The SSP scenarios are translated into two parts. The
first part consists in the translation into pan-European and local narratives, described in
Section 3.2.1. The European narratives are developed for Europe as whole, similarly to
the global SSP narratives. The local narratives represent different geographic and socio-
economic context, i.e. Scotland as a whole, Hungary with a focus on local municipalities
and Iberia with a focus on Spanish/Portuguese river basin context. The second part
consists of the translation into demographic scenarios, with quantitative trends on fertility,
mortality and migration classified according to baseline fertility rates and income (KC
and Lutz, 2017). Even if all European countries considered in this study are low fertility
(fertility rate <2.9), European countries are subdivided into three regions: the countries
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Figure 3.1: Conceptualisation of methodology. Arrows indicate direction of input
that joined the EU prior to 2004 (EU-15), “New EU member states that joined as of 2004
with high income” (EU-12H) and “New EU member states that joined as of 2004 with
medium income” (EU-12M) (see “Aggregation on the 32 region level” in the SSP database:
https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/SspDb/. This division is shown in Figure 3.3). Croatia was part
of the “Eastern Europe (excl. former Soviet Union and EU member states)” aggregation
group. However, its data was added to the list as part of the pan-European modelling.
Its modelled trends followed the same patterns as the new EU member states that
joined as of 2004 with medium income. The crucial elements that maintain consistency
across quantifications and narratives, global SSP narratives contextualise the national
scale quantifications and the European SSPs contextualise key scenario model variables.
The consistency between global and European SSPs is ensured by applying equivalent
narratives, i.e. fully matched SSPs across scales (Kok et al., 2018). The link across the
multi-scale European SSP narratives is explained in detail in the next session.
3.2.1 Multi-scale European SSPs
Within this analysis, population-centric change, consisting of demographic trends and
societal preferences (Terama et al., 2017b), is one of the most significant driver in urban
land use development across scenarios (Terama et al., 2017a). Demographic trends are
used as an input to the Regional Urbanisation Growth model (RUG). Demographic
drivers within the RUG model are (1) consistent with the global trends of population and
spatial planning quantified at national scale (Jiang & O’Neill, 2017; Kc & Lutz, 2017),
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and (2) influenced by the European SSP narratives (see Figure 5.3). These European
SSP narratives were enriched with context-specific ‘urbanisation narratives’, describing
artificial surface expansion driven by changes in total population, population structure,
societal preferences and spatial planning. The direction of these drivers is summarised
in the urbanisation narratives of the European SSPs. European SSP narratives were
developed in a participatory way with experts from multiple disciplines and countries
taking part in the process (Kok et al., 2018; Pedde et al., 2018c). The global SSPs
(O’Neill et al., 2017) are the starting point for developing the European SSPs (Kok
et al., 2018) by downscaling the global narrative to a Europe-wide narrative. Whilst
downscaling a narrative is often the step for developing downscaled quantitative scenarios
(van Vuuren et al., 2010), the methodological limitations of ‘translating’ the narratives
(from global to local and from qualitative to quantitative scenarios) have been addressed
by the European SSPs by maintaining the same assumptions and similar macro trends
in both the global the European SSPs (Kok et al., 2018), reducing expert judgement
assumptions in the direction of trends and, in some cases, key quantifications (Pedde
et al., 2018c). In terms of demographic change, for example, both global and European
SSPs assume high population growth in SSP5, stabilising trends in SSP1 and a total
population decline in both SSP4 and SSP3. Overall socio-economic development is also
identical in the global and European SSPs, with SSP5 being the fastest growing economic
scenario (although not environmentally sustainable), SSP1 the most sustainable both
economically and environmentally, SSP4 counting for moderate economic growth but with
high disparities within and across countries, and SSP3 resulting in socio-economic decline
and inequalities. The leading narrative, following the logic of global SSPs, was combined
with an existing European socio-economic scenario framework (Harrison et al., 2013,
2015). Additional, local European versions of the SSPs were also developed (hereafter
‘local SSPs’) for Scotland, Iberia and Hungary, with stakeholders selecting the main
assumptions in a facilitated process that allowed for defining the future challenges to
mitigation and adaptation (Gramberger et al., 2015). In terms of drivers, the local
SSPs are generally consistent with the European SSPs but their relevance may differ
if stakeholders consider scale relevant processes to result in diverging trends. The choice
of the location for the local case studies is independent of RUG model constrains and local
SSPs and RUG model are therefore unrelated in Figure 5.3. This choice, and the large
socio-economic differences across the case studies, imply that the local SSPs are developed
with a ‘bottom-up’ approach, unconstrained by RUG parameterisation. RUG, instead, is
designed as a coherent ‘top-down’ modelling approach, from global and European scales
(Figure 5.3). This analysis is therefore at the intersection between RUG model output and
the local SSPs narratives: we focus on identifying qualitative information from the local
and European SSP narratives on population, mobility and urbanisation trends to discuss
similarities and differences with key driving forces and their relevance for European scale
urbanisation modelling. The scenario narratives are published in Kok et al. (2018) for
Europe, in Li et al. (2017) for the Hungarian case study, in Dunn et al. (2017) for Scotland
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and in Ta`bara et al. (2018) for Iberia. An overview of the case studies and sectors for
decision-making is reported in Lourenc¸o et al. (2018) and the summaries of all the local
SSPs is provided in the IMPRESSIONS deliverable (Kok & Pedde, 2016).
3.2.2 Integrating SSP narratives and life-cycle assessment in spatially explicit
urbanisation modelling
The Regional Urbanisation Growth (RUG) model is documented in Terama et al.
(2017a) and Terama et al. (2017b). The focus for this paper is the influence of
global scale SSP narratives and European SSP parameterisation, more precisely the
links between the total population, age and life-cycle stage, residential preferences and
planning (Terama et al., 2017b) on modelling outcomes. The RUG model develops
time-dependent artificial surfaces, differentiating between multiple residential (defined
as a function of population/building density) and non-residential areas in each unit
(NUTS-2 geographical scale). The area of each residential type is calculated as a
function of the total population, consistent with the global SSP narratives (Figure
5.3), and regionally/scenario defined residential preferences, that is, the ‘attractiveness’
of residing in each residential type. Non-residential expansion is a function of the
predicted change in residential areas and a ‘rate of industrial development’; a function of
economic/manufacturing development within the socio-economic scenario. The types of
artificial surfaces are spatially autocorrelated with the residential transition matrix, which
defines the likelihood of each artificial surface type being observed in the presence of the
artificial surface type being considered. Non-residential and residential surfaces are driven
by the autocorrelation factor and scenario-specific industrial development and residential
preference parameterisation (Terama et al., 2017a). Fundamental to the residential
preference parameterisation in RUG is the concept that life-cycle stage influences the
residential preferences of individuals/households. To this end, RUG further distributes
the population of each region across a set of preferred residential types in a 10’ grid.
Preferences can represent a choice driven by an attraction for a given residential type,
or an enforced residential selection which is required (by the population) to satisfy a
need (for jobs or access to social services). Preferred residential types are defined as
a function of age-group, the scenario being considered, and a baseline (region specific)
description of the population’s residential preferences. The RUG baseline (year 2010)
population structure at a regional (NUTS-2) scale was derived from Eurostat (2015).
Demographics were modelled at the resolution of six age-groups: (i) 0 – 14 years, (ii)
15 – 29 years, (iii) 30 – 49 years, (iv) 50 – 64 years, (v) 65 – 74 years, and (vi) greater
than 75 years, defined to represent distinct life-cycle stages and ensure alignment with
important life-cycle events, such as retirement (Carter et al., 2016). Populations within
the same age-group were assigned the same properties and residential preferences, with
additional consideration made for dependent children (Terama et al., 2017b). Although
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the European SSP storylines were the key in defining future residential preferences, which
reflect changes in spatial planning and societal attitudes, the ‘global demographic’ SSP
database (Wittgenstein-Centre, 2015) provided the national scale population at each
future time-step.
3.2.3 Analysis of correlations
To analyse the relation between artificial surface trends and its drivers, we carried out
a correlation analysis (R2) of selected RUG drivers against the artificial surface output.
The drivers were selected to represent the different scales modelled in RUG: 1. Total
population (PO) based on assumptions developed in the global narratives 2. Elderly
(>65 year old population) (AG), consisting of the combination of age group (AG5)
and (AG6) populations (see Figure 3.4) 3. Fertility (FE), to represent the different
classifications of population trends based on current fertility rates These variables also
approximate the three scales which influence RUG as mentioned in the method (Figure
3.1 and section 3.2.2): total population trends relate to the global SSP trends (Kc &
Lutz, 2017; O’Neill et al., 2017), ageing relates to the European scaling approximating
lifestyle and preferences (Carter et al., 2016; Terama et al., 2017b) and fertility relates to
the national scale assumptions which divides countries in low and high fertility countries
(Wittgenstein Centre, 2015). In summary, RUG is influenced by assumptions at global
scale through the global SSP quantification of total population growth, at the European
scale through the parameterisation of European narrative preferences connected to socio-
economic factors, such as poverty, lifestyles and at national scale with assumptions on
fertility and migration. Coherence across these assumptions was tested firstly by analysing
the European broad-scale modelled results and by measuring the sensitivity of the multi-
scale assumptions (population, preferred residential type as a function of age and fertility)
against the modelled results (Section 3.3.1) and secondly by analysing these trends against
local scale narratives (Section 3.3.2).
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Broad-scale artificial surface change for Europe and selected European
countries
At the European scale, the greatest artificial surface expansion (AS) is observed in SSP5
with an increased 150% AS compared to current artificial surface of about 16.7 million
ha. This development could be classified as urban sprawl (Terama et al. 2017), and
is a clear characteristic of the SSP5 socio-economic scenario assumption in which a
growing, individualistic society with increasing wealth seek the larger properties and lower
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population densities associated with suburban, town and rural areas. In this scenario,
market logic prevails, driving urbanisation as the most preferable and profitable pathway
for development. The artificial surface demands of an expanding population are further
magnified by a shift towards expansive residential types. Contrasting the urban sprawl
of SSP5 are those socio-economic scenarios that promote migration to, and densification
of, cities. Both SSP1 and SSP4 are characterised by limited artificial surface increases
by 2100 with, compared to the baseline, 10% increase for SSP1 and 5% increase for
SSP4 (Figure 3.2). However, the mechanisms/drivers of this change differ significantly
between the scenarios. Within SSP1 an increasingly environmentally aware society values
sustainable urban development and a shift towards more compact, high density living;
a shift that mitigates substantive artificial surface expansion. Urban centres within
this socio-economic scenario are vibrant, attractive, environmentally-friendly residential
areas. These vibrant, attractive urban centres are in stark contrast to the urban ghettos
predicted for SSP4. Within this socio-economic scenario, urban living is driven not by
societal preferences, but in response to a poorer society moving to urban centres in search
of jobs and social services. This urbanisation combined with a declining population
limits artificial surface expansion within this socio-economic scenario even more than the
SSP1 scenario. The intermediate artificial surface expansion of SSP3 is driven by urban
migration and countryside abandonment. In contrast to the ‘urban ghettos’ of SSP4,
however, urbanisation in SSP3 is focused on suburban (peri-urban) areas, i.e. regions
that have a larger artificial surface ‘footprint’ than more densely populated city centres.
As a consequence, more artificial surface sprawl occurs in this scenario. This sprawl is
further magnified by weak planning legislation, which leads to uncontrolled development.
The SSP trends for Europe have a similar direction of change in the countries selected
for case study (Figure 3.2), i.e. Spain and Portugal (Iberia), Hungary, Scotland. Trends
for Bulgaria are also shown, to represent one of the low-fertility countries of (Figure 3.3).
Overall, the AS increase tends to be highest in the UK and Spain trends, i.e. always above
the European average except for Spain in SSP3. Trends for Portugal tend to be closest to
the European average. Hungary and Bulgaria have the lowest AS growth with increase in
AS between 0% and 1%. The exceptions are (1) a 13% AS increase in 2100 in the SSP3
scenario for Bulgaria, which is the only country reversing population decrease by 2100
(Figure 3.4), and (2) 61% AS increase in 2100 in the SSP5 scenario for Hungary consistent
with population growth, albeit at much slower pace than UK, Spain and Portugal.
The broad-scale European trends, as outlined above, follow the predicted socio-economic
response (and storyline) of each SSP but show variability across countries. When mapped
at the detailed model resolution (10’ cells) increased spatial variability in the patterns of
artificial surface change become evident (Figure 3.3). Across socio-economic scenarios, a
clear distinction exists in the modelling outcomes of the group of European countries part
of the EU-12M region of the SSP IIASA database (Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malta, Romania) and the rest of Europe; a distinction which can be ultimately linked to
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Figure 3.2: Projections of artificial surface development for four Shared Socio-economic
Pathways (SSPs) aggregated at country scale in Bulgaria, Spain, Hungary, Portugal, and
Scotland. The y-axis shows % change of artificial surface compared to baseline and the x-axis
decadal time steps from 2020 to 2100
the (globally) predicted demographic and population changes in each scenario.
Population change estimates for this group of countries (Wittgenstein Centre, 2015), do
not predict the significant increases in population associated with SSP5 in the remainder of
Europe (Figure 3.4). Instead, the countries are, within SSP5, characterised by an ageing,
but overall decreasing population. As a consequence of this declining population, model
outcomes predict that the population could be housed within the existing artificial surface
footprint (although the housing stock may change) limiting artificial surface expansion and
urban sprawl (Terama et al., 2017b). In contrast to the remainder of Europe, within the
subset of countries, the highest artificial surface change (and urban sprawl) is associated
with SSP3. While SSP3 is also characterised by an ageing and declining overall population,
the slower rate of change combined with a shift towards suburban development (associated
with urban migration and weak planning laws) results in artificial surface expansion. In
this context it is evident that a declining overall population is insufficient to prevent
artificial surface expansion if changing demographics and/or residential preferences result
in a shift to more expansive residential types. The rest of Europe more closely follows
the broad trends with the most substantive artificial surface expansion occurring in
SSP5.
The SSPs highlight the potential extent of future artificial surface change under very
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Figure 3.3: Map of the predicted change, from baseline 2010, in artificial surface extent (as
a percentage of the 10’ cell land area) by 2100 under four different socio-economic scenarios,
highlighting trends for European low-fertility countries (perimeters in red). Vertical axis is
’carbon intensity’ and the horizontal axis is ’inequality’
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Figure 3.4: Projections of total population in Bulgaria, Spain, Hungary, Portugal, and
United Kingdom, identifying structure at a regional (NUTS-2) scale, was derived from
Eurostat (2015). Demographics were modelled at the resolution of six age-groups: (AG1)
0 – 14 years, (AG2) 15 – 29 years, (AG3) 30 – 49 years, (AG4) 50 – 64 years, (AG5) 65 – 74
years, and (AG6) greater than 75 years
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different socio-economic scenarios. Important distinctions between the scenarios include
(i) the potential to mitigate artificial surface expansion via increasing population and
population densities (as evident in SSP1), (ii) the potential of artificial surfaces to ‘sprawl’
in the presence of increasing populations, and/or changing residential preferences, and (iii)
the regional variability in artificial surface expansion. In Figure 5, three input variables
are correlated against the artificial surface results as explained in the method (section
2.3). The variables are [AG], i.e. population >65 year old (AG5 and AG6 groups from
Figure 3.4); [PO] i.e. total population, and [FE] i.e. fertility. The analysis of the model
variables based on the R2 value shows the relative importance of each of the population
variables that we considered with respect to the development of artificial surfaces. It
also shows which variables had very little influences in determining artificial surfaces in
different countries (Figure 3.5). The low R2 value shows little correlation, but a strong
negative R2 has little correlation but it still important in determining the results. For
example, a 0.77 R2 value (or higher) between FE and AF, denotes a high correlation
between fertility and artificial surface for Portugal, Spain and Hungary. A value of 0.08
between population and artificial surface trends in Bulgaria means there‘s no correlation.
In all scenarios, a correlation of >0.50 is observed between all variables in all selected
countries, with the exception of [AG] and [PO] variables for Bulgaria. This suggests that,
for this country, fertility trends better relate to artificial surface than ageing or population
growth. That means that the choice, made at global scale, of placing Bulgaria in a different
category from the other countries of this selection (see also different population trends
for Bulgaria, compared to the other countries in Figure 3.4) has ‘overwritten’ the RUG
modelling assumptions of assigning residential preferences to the same age-group. This
is true at least for Bulgaria and the other countries in the same categories (which had
similar R2 trends).
The correlation analysis further shows that fertility in Bulgaria is also strongly
uncorrelated to total population growth and, especially, aging. For Spain and Portugal
(Iberia), Scotland and Hungary the correlation is always positive and >0.50 except for
a low correlation (0.36) between fertility and ageing in Scotland. The analysis suggest
that spatial variability should be interpreted carefully to understand what assumptions
are reflected in the results. In the case of the same SSP narrative, artificial surface trends
reflect fertility assumptions developed at global scale for each country (in low fertility
countries, such as Bulgaria) and scenario assumptions on population growth (global and
national scale) and ageing (European and NUTS2 scale), especially when the two trends
follow a similar growth path.
3.3.2 Multi-scale analysis of urbanisation in SSP narratives
Assumptions on spatial development and population growth, within European scale
modelling, directly influence pan-European modelling outcomes. For this reason, we
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propose the integration of local SSP narratives in the assumptions, in particular the
key trends of urbanisation and assumptions of population growth (with a special focus
on migration, see Table 3.1) to analyse divergences and similarities at local (Iberian,
Hungarian and Scottish) and European scales.
SSP1: Sustainability
In SSP1, the global and European assumptions on urbanisation reflect a fast urbanisation
process as a result of high income growth (Jiang and O’Neill, 2017). The European
SSPs, however, further specify that the shift towards compact cities is tempered by a
preference for green space. In the Iberian case study people move from cities to rural
areas, preferring small towns to cities and contributing to the “repopulation of the
countryside”, suggesting that stakeholders did not consider living in small settings to
be inconsistent with a sustainable lifestyle. A similar interpretation, but more directed
at correcting current trends of depopulation of the countryside, has been provided by the
Scottish and Hungarian stakeholders. More specifically, in Scotland, the countryside is the
destination of incoming migrants to “reinvigorate communities” and, in Hungary, small
towns become an attractive alternative to “overpopulated” Budapest. The migration
trends are consistent across scales (global – European – local), with the exception of
Scotland: the “medium” trend of the global SSP1 is the result of “low immigration and
limited movements in Europe” and a balanced migration in Iberia (explicitly accounting
for lower emigration). In Scotland, instead, returning emigrants and foreign migrants
result in strong migration flows.
SSP3: Regional Rivalry
In SSP3, the global assumptions reflect a slow urbanisation process as a result of low
income growth, limited mobility and poor urban planning (Jiang and O’Neill, 2017). This
does not mean that cities will not grow in Europe: cities will grow at the fringes, because of
sprawl, due to the lack of economic opportunity and consequent countryside abandonment.
This development is usually not favoured in sustainability-centric assessments that aim
at compact cities (see SSP descriptions in e.g. O’Neill et al. (2017)). In the Iberian case,
cities are assumed to grow as a result of low employment and countryside depopulation.
In the Hungarian case study, low employment and poor urban planning result in the
opposite trend, i.e. people’s movement to the countryside and the urban fringe from larger
cities. Migration is not a straightforward driver: globally, low migration is assumed; in
Europe as a whole people will emigrate; in the local case studies migration trends are
heterogeneous: high immigration from Africa and emigration from Iberia, low migration
to and from Scotland, and high immigration is assumed to Hungary.
SSP4: Inequality
In SSP4 the global assumption is that income inequality between rural and urban regions
acts as as pull factor towards urbanisation, although ageing is assumed to be a limiting
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factor in the rural to urban mobility. Similarly, in the European SSP4 densely populated
cities attract more and more dwellers resulting in the creation of urban ghettos. This trend
is consistent with the Hungarian and Scottish case studies. In Scotland “the unemployed
and new immigrants are forced to move to overcrowded housing surrounding the cities and
main towns” and in Hungary there‘s a continuous movement from rural areas to cities.
As in SSP3, migration trends vary greatly across regions in SSP4. In Iberia and Hungary
a strong European Union is assumed to effectively control immigration. However, a wave
of immigration affects Scotland throughout the scenario. Overall, the European narrative
assumes controlled migration but introduced also the flows of illegal immigrants (which
is not accounted for in the modelling exercise).
SSP5: Fossil-fuelled Development
In SSP5 the mobility trend is high but does not necessarily correlate with compact urban
development, but quite the opposite. The scenario is characterised at the European
scale by aﬄuence driven sprawl and strong preferences for pristine surroundings. In this
scenario the demand for new artificial surfaces is by far the highest. In the case studies,
within Iberia, movement to cities is strong following job opportunities in corporations. At
later time points, some major cities such as Madrid, are gradually abandoned as people
migrate towards the coast. For the Scottish case study, most people are expected to be
living in urban areas. In terms of migration, the scenario also depicts large numbers. This
is in line with the overall population development which is one of strongest growth. At
the European level, migration is assumed to be mostly towards Europe from less strong
economies. Also in the case studies, migration from Africa is expected to Iberia and the
rest of Europe. Retired, rich northerners will also move to Iberia. By the end of the
century, however, a collapse of the existing development model leads to emigration from
Iberia towards Northern Europe. Mobility is expected to be high for professionals across
Europe (See Table 3.1).
By 2100, artificial surfaces within all scenarios, still constitute less than 10% of the
European land area. However, the magnitude and spatial distribution of this change has
the potential to (i) increase the competition for land (for example, for food production
or nature protection) with potential tensions between land use owners/interest groups,
and (ii) detrimentally impact ecosystem services and biodiversity both within urban
areas and in neighbouring regions. Impacts would affect not only the extent of natural
areas but their quality given the market rather than ecological focus of society in this
scenario (see also (Gu¨neralp & Seto, 2013) . The insights from the cross-scale comparison
suggest potential competition for land in a sustainable scenario (SSP1) and the effect
of detrimental impacts in business as usual scenario (SSP5). In all local case studies,
SSP1 added the dimension of current depopulation trends in the countryside throughout
Europe, leading stakeholders to emphasize less the characteristics of compact cities
as simulated for global and European trends, and focus instead on environmentally-
3.3 Results 51
Table 3.1: Summary of SSP trends of urbanisation (including mobility within countries)
and migration (including emigration and immigration across countries). Global trends for
urbanisation are derived from Jiang and O’Neill (2017b) and migration from (KC and
Lutz, 2016), EU28 trends from Terama et al. (2017b), and local case studies from the
IMPRESSIONS scenarios (Kok et al., 2018)
Scenario Spatial
scale
Urbanisation Migration
SSP1 Global Fast urbanisation Medium
Europe Increasing (compactness) Low immigration
Iberia Small towns and repopulation of the countryside balanced migration
Scotland High and repopulation of the countryside High immigration and expats return (total population
increases)
Hungary Aging, reversed depopulation, high life-expectancy,
stability
Balanced migration (first high immigration).
Emigration declines
SSP3 Global Slow urbanisation “Limited mobility across regions”
Europe Decreasing, sprawl, low mobility Emigration
Iberia Country(side) depopulation, ageing High immigration from Africa, increasing emigration
from Iberia
Scotland NA Immigration remains but overall population slightly
decline (fertility)
Hungary people move to the countryside and the urban fringe
from larger citie (“urban and rural ghettoes”)
steady and massive influx and settlement of migrants
and refugees
SSP4 Global Central and fast urbanisation Medium
Europe Increasing (compactness) high mobility is high for the
elite
Selected immigration and illegal migrants
Iberia NA High immigration from Africa, until stabilisation in
2040s
Scotland First, elderly move to retire in Scotland, as economy
worsens the unemployed and immigrants move to urban
ghettoes
Increased migration
Hungary Rural to urban migration EU-controlled stable migration flux
SSP5 Global Fast urbanisation High
Europe Sprawl and high mobility High immigration from poorer countries
Iberia First, mobility to cities. From 2040s abandonments of
large cities
Migration from Africa and elderly (retirement) from
Northern Europe. From 2070s, mass emigration to
Northern Europe
Scotland High urbanisation High immigration
Hungary Urbanisation and mobility, but diseases decimate the
population
Emigration (brain-drain) decreases
friendly living arrangements in the countryside. In such scenarios, further assumptions
on preference for locally produced organic food and decreased food imports may result in
competition with land-use for nature conservation. Likewise, SSP5 added the dimension
of resource overexploitation, leading Iberian and Hungarian stakeholders to account for
the negative effects of business as usual such as population decimation (Hungary) and
city abandonment (Iberia). These trends are in stark contrasts to global and European
trends of unrestricted economic, population and urbanisation growth until 2100. The
socially unequal scenarios, SSP3 and in SSP4, added the dimension of high migratory
fluxes across Europe and to Europe, especially in the Iberian and Hungarian narratives.
These migratory trends are not reflected in the pan-European modelling which focuses on
assumptions of mobility and preferences as function of income. These assumptions from
local stakeholders may be at odds with projected trends of artificial surface, especially for
the very slow artificial surface increase in Hungary in SSP3 (cf. Figure 3.2).
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3.4 Discussion
The comparison of the subset of European countries has highlighted the influence of
differing population trajectories stemming from the global SSP assumptions and national
population projections, on artificial surface development. However, by exploring the
results it is evident that there is a complex interaction of population structure, societal
preferences and spatial planning as influenced by life-cycle and population growth.
These same factors have the potential to both restrict (SSP1) or magnify (SSP5) the
expansion of artificial surface. Furthermore, a declining population does not guarantee
static artificial surface footprints as changing residential habits will also drive urban
expansion as observed for the subset of European countries in SSP3. Also, changes
in population may lead to effects on poverty and isolation of rural populations, and
negative effects overall economy and health, which in turn further affect artificial surface
expansion (Linard et al., 2012). The Hungarian SSP3 narrative, for example, reflected
these complex relations, with fluctuating population patterns and health effects in the
Hungarian SSP3 (Li et al., 2017). The results also show that urbanisation trends might
be misinterpreted, if scenario users and other modellers are not aware of the full spectrum
of uncertainties/assumptions and their accumulation/interaction across scales. Especially
when we compare the scenario assumptions made at European scale with local scale
scenarios, we highlight the importance of common and diverging assumptions due to
specific importance to local case studies. This analysis further strengthen the importance
of understanding what assumptions are behind European scale trends and how they should
be interpreted to be relevant to both European and local policy making. Our approach
combines the advantage of both qualitative and quantitative forms of analysis, with
narratives to develop consistent assumptions when quantifications cannot be included
in the analysis. The quantified scenarios add a dimension of replicability and a more
systematic comparison across scales which helps to identify inconsistencies. Although
the method to link between narratives and quantified scenarios is similar to that used in
global scenario exercises (O’Neill et al., 2016; O’Neill et al., 2017), this link is not fully
transparent (Pedde et al., 2018c). A systematic approach to link qualitative elements
in multi-scale scenarios exist to develop consistent scenario (Schweizer and Kurniawan,
2016). In this study, however, we treated the question of multi-scale scenario consistency
as normative and fully stakeholder-driven. In other words, the stakeholders decided
what socio-economic trends were relevant for their case study and the direction of
their scenario– including u-turns and non-linear developments – within the SSP worlds.
Even though the European SSP narratives are internally consistent, in line with the
global SSP narratives, the global-European-regional quantitatively downscaled results do
not automatically translate to locally specific trends. Countries have different fertility
rates and regional population structures. However, these differences were not flagged
in the European SSP narrative. National fertility assumptions are not consistent, nor
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inconsistent with the European or global SSP narratives. By picking up the global data
and narratives and applying them in AS modelling, their assumptions are inherent in our
outcomes. In this case, the weight of differences between fertility assumptions between
different country groups was visible for the artificial surface development, particularly
in SSP5. As a consequence, spatially explicit analyses, such as this one, entail a trade-
off: either undertaking (a) a computationally expensive calibration with local scale data
and precise local assumptions which however reduce comparability across regions, or (b)
an analysis based on more generic assumptions which may hide locally biased patterns
but which produces spatially explicit and comparable outcomes. Both options have
intrinsic value, addressing different stakeholders and policy fora. The results of this
analysis aim to inform decision making at the EU scale. They are based on set of EU
and global scale assumptions, they are not country-specific to the extent that all local
information would be validated with stakeholders. Decision-makers need to be informed
and act in the context of the wider set of assumptions being propagated across scales.
While it is possible to downscale both SSPs and global scale trends (as we do with the
population data), which is advantageous in terms of modelling outcomes, it is not possible
to separate these downscaled approaches from their overriding assumptions: uncertainties
and assumptions will be inherited in the results and must be analysed together with the
results. Our approach allows to take advantage of a European scale modelling approach,
while analysing the underlying assumptions and interpreting them also in light of locally
derived drivers and assumptions.
3.5 Conclusions
European artificial surface future trends reflect scenario parameterisation at multiple
scales, but the fertility assumptions, developed at global scale for each country,
are reflected unevenly across scenarios and countries. Other factors, highlighted by
stakeholder-developed narratives at sub-global scales, can also influence the interpretation
of the trends. For example, local narratives highlighted migration as a key driver for
population changes, rather than fertility and mortality as emphasised in global population
modelling. Preferences for urban or green spaces were consistent across scales, although
the local narratives added nuances on the link between urbanisation and rural dwelling.
To ensure the correct interpretation of modelling results, all drivers and assumptions need
to be communicated along with key uncertainties. While valuable for consistency across
regions and scenarios, global SSP scenarios (Riahi et al., 2017) and further application of
global databases at sub-global scale, should be adapted to align and interpret quantitative
downscaled data with bottom-up data, even when if this comes in qualitative form, to
better capture the complexity of socio-economic drivers at multiple scales.
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Abstract
Complex interactions between climate and socio-ecological drivers and impacts has
resulted in the rise of multi-scale scenario analysis. Although linkages across scales
and levels depends on process and objectives of the specific problem, global-regional-
local multi-scale scenarios often involve downscaling global scenarios with links to locally
developed scenarios, posing a question on what ‘consistency’ across scales means in multi-
scale scenarios. The methodology consists of two steps. First, we analyse the Shared
Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs) narratives against four scenario archetypes. Second, we
utilise Cultural Theory to classify trends of recurrent scenario drivers (Socio-economic,
Technology, Environment, Economy, Policy = STEEP) to compare divergences in SSP
narratives in multi-scale case studies. The results show that the global narratives have
homogeneous worldviews and the match with the four archetypes is strong for three
scenarios. Although similarities to the global narratives appeared in all sub-global
narratives, in terms of dominant worldviews, the complexity and richness of sub-global
SSP narratives show that different worldviews coexist in the same narratives,even in the
well-established utopia-dystopia scenarios. For example, the multiple interpretations of
‘sustainable development’ were visible through different beliefs in governmental regulation.
Also, the “business as usual” SSP5 narrative was highly dependent on the interpretation
of how individualism affects society and the environment across the case studies, making
SSP5 the most diverging narrative at sub-global scale. Because of these nuances, multi-
scale scenarios entailing narratives and participatory scenarios development should better
integrate bottom-up knowledge in the process of downscaling STEEP drivers.
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4.1 Introduction
A key aspect to understanding the potential consequences of high-end climate-change
impacts is the exploration of uncertainty in long-term alternative socio-economic futures,
also in the form of scenarios (Field et al., 2014). The complex interactions of climate-
change impacts and drivers across scales has led to the development of multi-scale
scenarios (Biggs et al., 2007; Kok et al., 2007). However, scenarios at sub-global scales
are frequently inconsistent with global scenarios, limiting coherence in the use of multi-
scale scenarios (Pedde et al., 2018a; de Ruiter et al., 2017). This paper utilizes scenario
archetypes and Cultural Theory to demonstrate how the archetyping of the global
Shared Socio-economic Pathways along their worldviews supports coherence in multi-scale
scenario development.
Multiscale analysis has evolved from its early system theory conceptualisation developed
in the 1980s in the ecology hierarchy theory by Allen and colleagues (Allen & Starr, 1982;
Allen & Hoekstra, 1992). According to this theory, components of complex systems are
organized hierarchically based on multiple spatio-temporal and functional scales. Linkages
within socio-economic, political and biogeochemical systems (Gallop´ın et al., 2001; Gibson
et al., 2000) or, in other words, linkages in spatial, temporal scales (or ‘dimensions’
as in Vervoort et al. (2012) and levels (positions on a scale) of these systems (Cash
et al., 2006; Gibson et al., 2000) have also evolved in scenario exercises. A degree of
interconnectedness, such as in multi-scale scenarios, is desirable because the consistency
between global and regional level is paramount to assess impacts and vulnerabilities (Zurek
& Henrichs, 2007). However, different degrees of interconnectedness are possible, from
fully equivalent scenarios at different scales to loosely linked scenarios, depending on their
desired outcome and purpose (Biggs et al., 2007; Zurek & Henrichs, 2007). More precisely,
the degree of interconnectedness depends on the the direction that key variables normally
take (such as GDP and population) and define also whether multi-scale scenarios are
consistent with each other. Multi-scale scenarios tend to include stakeholders engagement
to better understand impacts due to socio-economic, political and natural (e.g., climate
and ecological) processes at different scales (Biggs et al., 2007; Kok et al., 2007). The
practice of multi-scale scenario development has involved downscaling global scenarios, to
define a suitable scale for impacts and vulnerability assessments. However, the sub-global
scenario scale scenarios often do not match the global narratives because the scenarios
elements, such as storylines, assumptions, and model quantifications, were not developed
to explore variation of factors relevant to impacts and vulnerability assessments (van
Ruijven et al., 2014). The new global Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs) have
been developed with the aim to providing socio-economic pathways of key socio-economic
drivers along the dimensions of challenges to mitigation and to adaptation which are
scalable to different regional contexts (Kriegler et al., 2012). The global SSPs have been
designed as ‘pathways’ exploring the relevant uncertainty space of challenges to mitigation
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and adaptation to climate change (O’Neill et al., 2015, 2017). The design of the SSP global
storylines is suitable for the development of consistent cross-scale global and sub-global
socio-economic storylines (Ebi et al., 2014; O’Neill et al., 2015) because of the inclusion
of indicators at global scale relevant to sub-global analyses therefore providing a global
context to local future scenarios (van Ruijven et al., 2014).
Recent examples of the application of global SSPs include sub-national and sub-sectoral
SSP storylines extensions for the South-east USA (Absar & Preston, 2015) and the
extension for Latin America within the Robin project (Jones & Kok, 2014) and more
recently Kebede et al. (2018). These extensions differ in sectoral and geographic extension,
but are methodologically similar in that they both develop sub-global storylines which are
‘nested’ in the global SSPs. One challenge with ‘nesting’ global scenario is that sectoral,
spatial and temporal extensions still incorporate subjective elements in defining what is
‘consistent’ across scales. Because scenarios consist of both model output and narratives,
‘consistency’ can be defined with reductionist methods, i.e. by reducing narratives to
single variable trends, generally belonging to five categories, so called ‘STEEP’: society,
technology, economy, environment, policy (Hunt et al., 2012). However, ‘consistency’ can
also be defined holistically by analysing the richer context of the narratives, which contains
further linkages and complexity that are not captured by model variables (Rasmussen,
2005). Because the dominant approach to assess consistency in multi-scale scenarios is
the reductionist approach, the meaning of what ‘consistent scenarios’ actually means is
only partly explored. One method for exploring consistent narratives and variables is the
identification of commonalities in global scale scenarios and grouping them in scenario
families (van Vuuren et al., 2012a) or archetypes (Hunt et al., 2012). These studies
conclude that scenarios share common elements, i.e.similar assumptions on the trends
of key variables. Although their analysis focuses on the global scale, the utilisation of
these scenarios by regional/local scientific community urges: (1) a clarification on the
concepts of scenario families and archetypes, considering that these terms have been
used interchangeably and (2) a re-consideration of the meaning of scenario ‘consistency’
across scales, once sub-global scenarios are developed to be ‘consistent’ within their
global scenario counterpart. In this study, we analyse the consistency of multi-scale SSP
scenario narratives to identify how scenarios vary within the same type of scenario and
discuss the importance of diverging assumptions in multi-scale scenario approaches. The
methodology builds on two existing approaches to analyse scenario archetypes. Firstly
the qualitative scenario mapping of global SSPs onto existing scenario archetypes, to test
whether SSPs can be categorised within existing scenario archetypes. Secondly, the global
and a selection of sub-global SSPs are analysed using Cultural Theory to systematically
compare similarities and divergences and extend the discourse on archetypes to better link
the global and the sub-global scales. We then discuss the importance of understanding the
importance of sub-global heterogeneous worldviews (typical of bottom-up approaches), to
promote a holistic understanding of the concept of ‘consistency’ in multi-scale scenario
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development
4.2 Material and methods
4.2.1 Scenario archetypes
The most recent analyses of scenario archetypes, use the words ‘archetypes’ and
‘scenario family’ interchangeably and focus on the qualitative interpretation of scenario
assumptions. For example, (van Vuuren et al., 2012a) defines ‘scenario archetypes’ those
scenario families that share similar storyline or logic which reflect in similar types of
quantifications. The methodology in this study has a similar focus on narratives as
van Vuuren et al. (2012a), i.e. on a qualitative analysis focusing on scenario logic.
To build the methodology we start from the well-established assumption that existing
scenarios tend to fall within archetypes (Hunt et al., 2012) and that archetypes can be
interpreted using Cultural Theory (Boschetti et al., 2016). The starting point consists
of the SSP global narratives which we chose to better address challenges to mitigation
and adaptation than previous scenarios such as the SRES scenarios. Compared to other
scenarios, the SSPs have the advantage of being separate from greenhouse gas emission
scenarios and policy assumptions. That means that the uncertainties explored by the SSPs
solely focus on socio-economic drivers. Because the SSPs consist of socio-economic and
environmental (but non-climate) elements (O’Neill et al., 2015), they can be more easily
mapped onto well-established archetypes of global socio-economic and environmental
scenarios (Hunt et al., 2012). This study focuses on all SSPs, excluding SSP2 for two
reasons: from a participatory point of view, the SSP2 scenario, also described as ‘Middle
of the Road’ (O’Neill et al., 2017) lacks a clear identity and therefore is difficult to
apply in a participatory setting (Kok et al., 2018), while being more useful for scenario
practitioners seeking for ‘closest to model baseline’ scenario (O’Neill et al., 2017; Raskin,
2005). All the other SSPs (SSP1, SSP3, SSP4, SSP5) have a clear direction, at the global
level, of socio-economic, technological, institutional and environmental trends. SSP1 is
a sustainable scenario with effective collaboration across all actors of society, SSP3 is a
socially fragmented and environmentally challenging scenario, SSP4 is a high-tech, green,
institutionally and internationally effective scenario but with high inequality across and
within society and SSP5 is a fossil-fueled, market- driven and reduced-inequality scenario.
The scenario archetypes of Raskin (2005) and Hunt et al. (2012) support the hypothesis
that the Global Scenario Group scenarios (as narratives of alternative world end states)
still form a distinct set of archetypes. This holds for both global and sub-global scenarios
(Hunt et al., 2012). The GSG archetypal social visions are four:
1. A world that evolves gradually as a result of market forces
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2. A world that is influenced by a strong push for sustainability
3. A world with novel approaches to development new human values
4. A fragmented world with environmental and institutional collapse
Because of the similarities across global scenario narratives and drivers (STEEP), we first
mapped the global SSPs against the GSG scenario archetypes, to test whether the SSPs
fit with existing archetypes. We mapped the SSP narratives against the GSG scenario
archetypes qualitatively, i.e. by interpreting narratives and qualitative trends against
each other. This methodology, although simple and rather subjective, is well established
in the scenario literature (van Vuuren et al., 2012a), especially when the narratives
are limited to generic depictions of the future and take into account the same type of
variables. In addition to the global SSPs, we also mapped five sub-global narratives,
developed to be ‘nested’ within the global SSPs, to systematically assess the similarities
and divergences at sub-global scales. The five case studies were selected to represent
different scales and cultural contexts. The first scale is the pan-European scale, and
it consists of the European version of the global SSPs, developed to be ‘equivalent’ to
the global SSPs and transferable across scales (Kok et al., 2018). The second scale
represents three geographically and culturally different regions within Europe: the Iberian
peninsula, Scotland and municipalities in Hungary. The third scale represents the macro-
region of Central Asia, consisting of a common narrative for five countries: Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. For more details in the process
of developing the scenarios we refer to Gramberger et al. (2015).
4.2.2 Archetyping the global SSPs
The archetypes pose a number of challenges, which have been identified at the global level
(see Raskin (2005) and van Vuuren et al. (2012a)) and motivate the extension with more
detailed information on sectors, actors and interactions (O’Neill et al., 2017; van Ruijven
et al., 2014). In this section, we introduce the extended scenarios and the Cultural
Theory as a tool to categorise firstly the global narratives and secondly compare the
nested scenarios with their global archetypes. The basic assumption is that divergence
from the global archetype is necessary, due to the inclusion of specific and local key drivers.
However, the magnitude of required divergence depends on the relevance of global drivers
such as international politics and policy, severity of local impacts and how local culture
affects these perceptions. The challenges of the credibility posed by the global archetypes
are directly related to the effect of specific contexts, not being captured at the global scale.
From a case study point of view, Cultural Theory facilitates systematic interpretation of
beliefs about society and nature in each scenario (Boschetti et al., 2016), considering that
individual perceptions of climate change are more informed by subjectivity and personal
worldviews than they are by science (Price et al., 2014).
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Cultural Theory (Thompson et al., 1990), as an analytic tool, is used here to systematically
analyse (and not to explain), divergences and similarities in the SSP narratives by
classifying statements according to different worldviews and perceptions about ways of
life and culture. According to Cultural Theory, four worldviews can be framed for
perception of the world and how to act in it according to two dimensions: one about
the degree of freedom of individual choice as bounded by the position in society (low or
high ‘grid’) and one about degree of solidarity among members of society (low or high
‘group’). The resulting worldviews are the hierarchist, the egalitarian, the individualist,
and the fatalist (Table 4.1. For the classification we build on a ‘coding’ method developed
by Beumer & Martens (2010). Scenario narrative statements are coded according to
the four worldviews For classification, these statements are judged against established
statements in the literature, summarised in Table 4.1 (Hoekstra, 2000; Middelkoop et al.,
2004; O’Riordan & Jordan, 1999; Thompson et al., 1990; Van Asselt & Rotmans, 2002),
on the worldviews about the key fundamental drivers (STEEP = Society, Technology,
Economy, Environment and Policies).
The actual ‘coding’ is carried out individually by a team of three experts, who code all
narratives according to the four worldviews, summarised in Table 4.1. For transparency,
all individual results are reported in the Supplementary Material. Similarities and
differences are discussed in the results section.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Global SSPs and scenario archetypes
The global SSP worlds map well onto the Global Scenario Group archetypes (Figure 4.1):
‘Great Transitions’ (GT), ‘Barbarisation’ (B), ‘Conventional-Policy-Reform’ (PR) and
‘Conventional-Market-Force’ (MF) (Hunt et al., 2012; Raskin, 2005). The conventional
market forces matches in most of the STEEP indicators: in both SSP5 and MF the
emphasis is on cost-effective technological development, strong economic growth and faith
in markets rather than social and environmental policies. The only mismatch is the
perception of how society changes. While in both SSP5 and MF archetypes the emphasis
is on individuals and consumerism, such trends are associated with a ‘worsening of society’
in MF (Hunt et al., 2012), but an increase in human and social capital in SSP5 (O’Neill
et al., 2017). The GT and B archetypes match in all STEEP indicators with SSP1 and
SSP3: in GT and SSP1 all indicators improve, while in B and SSP3 all the indicators
worsen. The main diverging match is SSP4 and PR. Although they both assume strong
government-led policies to achieve sustainability, the main difference is the interpretation
of how such a top-down policy approach fares in society. Whereas PR assumes that social
equity is an integral part of the sustainability policy (Hunt et al., 2012), SSP4 includes
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Table 4.1: Statements on socio-economic, technology, economy, environment, policy
(STEEP) indicators, selected from the SSP scenario element. The statements are
interpretations for each element according to four worldviews (hierarchist, egalitarian,
individualist, fatalist). Each statement refers to published literature, listed in the ‘Source’
column
STEEP SSP
element
Hierarchist Egalitarian Individualist Fatalist Source
Society Human
development/equity
Human nature is
ignorant, therefore
needs education.
Social stability is
desirable, also at
cost of maintaining
inequalities
Human nature is
essentially good,
communal and
act accordingly.
Equity and societal
development
Individual and
material self-
interest are the
motives of action.
Success is personal
responsibility
Human nature
is unpredictable,
more hostile than
friendly
(van Asselt and
Rotmans 2002
and Beumer and
Martens 2010)
Health
investments
Health as human
capital. Health
services
Health as human
asset.
Health as
consumption good.
Ageing
Unmanageable (van Asselt and
Rotmans 2002)
Social
cohesion
high within strata
stratified, hierarchy
(high group, high
grid)
high, low
predetermination
by societal position
of the individual
(high group, low
grid)
Low (but
individual is
not limited by
externally imposed
restrictions, i.e.
low-group and low
grid)
Low solidarity
and high limits to
individual choice
(low group-high
grid)
(from Thomson et
al. 1990)
Technology Development High technology Small-scale
technology
Cheap/energy-
efficient technology
No preference (Hoekstra 1998
and Van Asselt and
Rotmans, 2002)
Economy Economic
growth
Desirable with
conditions
Undesirable Desirable,
unconditionally
Desirable but
uncontrollable
(Hoekstra 2000)
Environment Environment Nature is
wilderness to
be tamed
Nature is fragile
and wild.
Nature is robust
and a resource
Nature is
capricious and
hazardous
(Beumer and
Martens 2010)
Land-use
regulation/
management
Regulation.
Supply-oriented
management.
Medium response
to climate change
Protection.
Demand oriented
management. High
response to climate
change
Adaptation.
Market regulation.
Low response to
climate change
Coping. Low
response to climate
change
(van Asselt and
Rotmans 2002,
and Beumer and
Martens 2010)
Agriculture Middle
productivity. Food
demand similar to
today
Low productivity.
Food demand is
lower: preference
for vegetarian diet
High productivity.
Food demand is
high, preference for
American style diet
No policy (van Asselt and
Rotmans 2002)
Policies International
cooperation
Controlled trade Limited trade Free trade Trade is for the rich (Hoekstra 2000,
reference to water
trade)
Environmental
policy
Reforestation
policies,
agricultural
planning
Eco-forestry; eco-
agricultural (low
pollutant)
Intensive
agriculture,
protection of
wood sector
No policies/
ineffective
(van Asselt and
Rotmans 2002)
Policy
orientation
Stability Nature
preservation/
precaution
Growth of
resources
Survival (Beumer and
Martens 2010)
Institutions Control-oriented Prevention oriented Market-oriented/
laissez-faire
Coping/passive (Hoekstra 2000,
Beumer and
Martens 2010)
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Figure 4.1: Four archetypical social visions of the world from the Global Scenario Group
(adapted from Hunt et al. (2012); Raskin (2005), matching onto global SSPs (O’Neill et al.,
2017). In grey: SSP axes. Dotted=partly unmatched archetype
a narrative for those excluded resulting in a dualistic scenario of effective international
cooperation in a socially unequal world (O’Neill et al., 2017).
The finding that the global SSPs match with the GSG scenario archetypes supports this
study‘s assumption that archetypes can be applied in heterogeneous social settings, such
as stakeholder workshops, to frame a common understanding of the socio-economic and
ecological world-scale scenarios. The divergence of narratives within the same archetype
is due to differences in worldviews within local characteristics rather than considerations
of internal consistency (Hunt et al., 2012; Price et al., 2014) or modelling framework
requirements (Kebede et al., 2015). Because different worldviews and local information
need to be included, nested multi-scale scenarios need to be developed by stakeholders.
The methodology for developing multi-scale SSPs from global to local (e.g. national,
regional, basin and municipality scale) to European SSPs (continental scale) consists of a
‘nesting’ process where local scenarios are contextualised in broader scale scenarios (Absar
& Preston, 2015). The specificity of our approach, compared to Absar & Preston (2015),
is that stakeholders are allowed to choose the drivers for their scenario and to match them
afterwards into the global (or European) archetype (Biggs et al., 2007; Zurek & Henrichs,
2007). This has the advantage of leading to more relevant scenarios for the stakeholders,
but has the disadvantage of resulting in numerous narratives. This disadvantage is reduced
by professionally facilitating the stakeholder engagement (Gramberger et al., 2015). The
resulting scenarios for all five case studies consist of a core of common elements to ensure
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a consistent process and products (Figure 4.1) while allowing representation of local and
specific drivers as legitimately selected by stakeholders.
4.3.2 Worldviews across European scenarios
Combinations of worldviews for the five case studies in each scenario are presented in
Figure 4.2. For the five case studies, we also added the analysis of the global narrative
sketches from O’Neill et al. (2017) in the last row of each quadrant. The global
narratives tend to be overall more homogeneous, with an overall agreement on one
dominant worldview for >70% of the narratives. In SSP1 and SSP5, the worldviews
are 100% egalitarian and individualist (Figure 4.2), which is in contrast with the more
nuanced combinations across the other case studies. In SSP3 and SSP4, the mix of two
worldviews, fatalist and hierarchist, is more representative of the nuances of the sub-global
scale narratives. The sustainability scenario, represented by SSP1, has the commonality
of the combination of egalitarian with, to a lesser extent, hierarchist worldviews in
all case studies and in all time slices. Compared to all the other SSPs, SSP1 is the
most homogenous scenario with the two worldviews being dominant across case studies.
The hierarchist worldview is represented by statements in all scenarios on human and
social development, green technology, equity and the value that nature is vulnerable.
Hungary and Iberia are the most egalitarian of all. In the Scottish and pan-European
case studies, hierarchist elements are stronger, reflecting the combination of high-green
tech development, and belief in governmental regulation together with egalitarian values.
Elements of individualism are also identified, related to statements on economic growth
(European case study), and a focus on business and diversified economy (Scotland)
and internationalisation in free market economies (both Europe and Scotland). The
regionalisation scenario, represented by SSP3, presents common traits with dominant
fatalist characteristics with a ‘return to ‘day-to-day’ mentality’ (in Scotland) and emphasis
on surviving and coping in a fragmented society – in combination with egalitarian (Iberia
and Hungary) or individualist (Europe) or both (Scotland). SSP4 is similar to SSP1
in that hierarchist and egalitarian views are commonly represented. The important
difference, however, is that the egalitarian perspective is generally associated with
reactions to the fatalist/hierarchist combination (also typical of SSP3): hierarchist and
individualist in Europe; hierarchist, hierarchist-egalitarian and egalitarian-hierarchist in
Iberia; hierarchist-individualist, individualist-fatalist and fatalist-egalitarian in Scotland;
hierarchist-individualist and fatalist-egalitarian in Hungary. The fatalist-egalitarian
perspective is dominant and visible in all local case studies as a result of perceived
top-down enforcement strongly hierarchist governance components. Interestingly, this
perspective is less visible in the European case study, where only the hierarchist
component is visible with individualist elements. Lastly, SSP5 is very heterogeneous.
A strong individualist perspective is present in the European case study, hierarchist
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Figure 4.2: Frequency count (in %) of worldviews in the case studies (Hungary, Iberia,
Scotland, Europe, Central Asia). The bottom case study is the analysis of the global sketch
narratives from O’Neill et al. (2017)
and individualist are both dominant in Scotland and in the Hungarian and Iberian
case studies, individualist and hierarchist perspectives shift to egalitarian and fatalist
perspectives in the last time slices. Generally, the interpretation of the narratives and the
combinations emerging from the analysis are aligned with the cultural context developed
in Cultural Theory (Wildavsky, 2018) and with the identified forms of governments in
the SSP narratives. The egalitarian/hierarchist combination, which emerged from SSP1,
corresponds to the social democracy model, which is the closest option amongst the
available ones to the participatory forms of governance sought in the SSP1 narratives;
the fatalist/individualist and hierarchist/individualist combinations, emerging from SSP3
and, in some cases, SSP5 is associated to state capitalism which corresponds to the
power of few actors and weak governments; fatalist/hierarchist, emerging from most
SSP4, is typical of totalitarianism which is close to the top-down, repressive governments
of all SSP4. Lastly, the association of individualism/egalitarianism corresponds to the
American individualist belief that equal opportunity leads to to equal results (Wildavsky,
2018). This combination is less visible, and partly identified in European and Scottish
SSP1.
Overall, the results highlight that the unequal global scenarios SSP4 and SSP3 are more
nuanced, at the sub-global scale, than the archetypes of SSP5 (business-as-usual) or
SSP1 (sustainability). Although, globally, the utopia-dystopia and, to a certain extent,
business-as-usual archetypes tend to be well defined (Figure 4.1) according to the STEEP
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analysis, the dominant worldview and combinations are not as straightforward across case
studies. The disagreement on social effects of the individualist SSP5, already identified
in Hunt et al. (2012) is visible in the different interpretations of the scenarios, both
across scales (Figure 4.2) as in the process of the analysis with larger disagreement on the
interpretation than for other scenarios.
4.4 Discussion
4.4.1 Towards consistency of scenarios: Archetyping Shared Socio-economic
Pathways across scales
This study assessed the consistency of Shared Socio-economic Pathways with earlier
scenarios and across scales. To this end, we archetyped the global SSPs in two ways.
First, we related the SSPs with the scenario archetypes developed by Hunt et al. (2012).
The results show a good match between the two, with only few deviations. This result
indicates that while the SSPs better address the uncertainty space of challenges to
mitigation and adaptation, they extend common underlying assumptions in a manner
that is consistent with previously developed global scenarios (Harrison et al., 2018b; Hunt
et al., 2012; van Vuuren et al., 2012a). The coding exercise is subjective in nature (e.g.
van Vuuren et al. (2012a)), and therefore a choice was possible between a comprehensive
(explanatory) model and a simple (comparative) model. Because the purpose of this study
is to compare worldviews across case studies, we chose for the second option, Cultural
Theory, as stated in the method. Cultural Theory cannot explain trends for two reasons.
Firstly, four worldviews constitute a too coarse model and a larger number of worldviews
and inclusion of social learning would be more realistic (Pahl-Wostl, 2008). Secondly,
driving forces in Table 4.1 have been selected depending on available information in
existing literature. A consequence is that several driving forces of the SSPs could not
be categorised in the four worldviews For example, key uncertainties of the SSP scenarios
relate to international cooperation and population growth, which cannot be directly
related to a specific worldview. We avoided additional assumptions and utilised the
existing categorisation, therefore excluding from the coding exercise information that does
not relate directly to existing literature. Two main uncertainties emerged in the exercise
process. The first was the interpretation of worldviews that do not fit, overlap or partly
mismatch in the typologies of the Cultural Theory model, such as the ‘environmentally
care-free’ attitude which was attributed to either fatalist or individualist worldviews and
the interpretation of large economic development and strong governmental investment of
most SSP5 narratives. The second was that the focus of the narratives drove the coding
colour, especially in SSP3 and SSP4. For example, in the same story, the colour coding
would change if the focus was on the ‘haves’ (interpreted as hierarchist or individualist)
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or ‘have-nots’ (generally fatalist, but also egalitarian when proactive). The emphasis on
strong government (or lack of it) has also an effect on the balance of the worldviews within
the same case study: hierarchist worldviews are comparatively strong in SSP1 and SSP5
for Scotland among all regions assessed here, they are lowest in the Scottish SSP3 and
SSP4. The heterogeneity of worldviews shows that contemporary downscaling of SSPs
to different regional contexts takes into consideration regional variation of worldviews
This effect, however, is inconsistent across SSPs. This result calls the consistency of
contemporary regionalization of SSPs into question. Furthermore, insights into the
heterogeneous worldviews have implications for the use of SSPs in policy development. For
instance, contemporary policy development based on scenarios with strong individualist
worldviews are less likely to succeed in countries with strong egalitarian values (Corner
et al., 2014). However, these mismatches also indicate the different foci, cultural bias and
beliefs held by stakeholders, even at a similar geographical scale. For example, even in
the most homogenous SSP1 archetype the Central Asian narrative is more focused on a
much stronger government intervention to drive sustainability compared to the European
(and global) SSP1. These mismatches also indicate that obvious and simple relations
across socio-economic (and, consequently, other STEEP) variables, identified at the
global scale, should be carefully interpreted both in multi-scale scenario development and
quantitative impact analyses. The narratives and the multiple worldviews in sub-global
SSPs show the different needs for the sustainable archetype world, with emphasis on not
only egalitarian worldviews but also hierarchic and individualist approaches. The analysis
also showed that more detailed narratives, such as Scottish SSPs, are characterised by
more detail and realism which made the coding more difficult but also more nuanced and
differentiated which was in stark contrast to the simple global SSP narratives. Scenario
narratives are not only archetypes, but contain information about different context needs,
for addressing those in strategies, and about the main actors that need to take action.
The analysis of worldviews embodied in scenario archetypes has highlighted sources of
(in)consistencies in scenarios across scales. Consistency of scenario archetypes across
scales can be strengthened by developing scenarios in a bottom-up manner to match
global archetypes, i.e. by using and refining global scenario archetypes in contextualized
scenario development. For instance, (Pereira et al., 2018) developed archetypal scenarios
of the Anthropocene in southern Africa through transformative visioning. Also, in a
regional watershed scenario project in Wisconsin, USA, (Wardropper et al., 2016) found
that local perspectives on how change occurs emphasized and contextualized three of the
global archetypes.
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4.4.2 Relating scenario archetypes to other archetype analyses in
sustainability research
Archetypes have also been used for pattern identification and diagnostic purposes
in sustainability research, with nuanced meanings and different research practices
(Oberlack et al., 2018). Pattern-identifying studies reveal archetypes inductively by using
comparative or statistical methods for analyses of empirical data (Levers et al., 2015;
Oberlack et al., 2016; Sietz et al., 2017). Archetypes function as diagnostic tools, if
well-established knowledge on archetypes is used to diagnose the system of concern or
test hypothesized causal effects in new empirical research (Banson et al., 2014; Mokhtar
& Aram, 2017). In both functions, archetypes refer to empirically validated, recurrent
patterns of the phenomenon of interest (Eisenack et al., 2006). Scenario archetypes, by
contrast, refer to a set of internally consistent scenarios with common narratives and
characteristics, often developed with stakeholder engagement in futures research (Hunt
et al., 2012). Better interplay of those strands of research could strengthen the knowledge
claims embodied in archetypes in at least two ways. First, scenario archetypes could help
frame the research questions of interest for empirical and diagnostic archetype research.
Second, empirical archetype analyses could help validate the causal effects or mechanisms
assumed in scenario archetypes.
4.5 Conclusions
This study raises the attention on the relevance of existing archetypes for scenario
narratives developed across multiple scales. Archetyping narratives has guided the
analysis through embedding narratives within a broader or narrower context. However,
the development of scenario archetypes needs to better address the different scales of
application of scenarios, looking jointly at global and sub-global scales. Scenario narratives
can be better employed to capture complexities at multiple scales, beyond the STEEP
approach. Global narratives can take into account the bottom-up development of the
same archetype at sub-global scales capturing their emerging patterns which, in turn,
provides an appropriate context at the sub-global scale.
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Abstract
With a range of potential pathways to a sustainable future compatible with the Paris
Agreement 1.5°C target, scenario analysis has emerged as a key tool in studies of
climate-change mitigation and adaptation. A wide range of alternative scenarios have
been created, and core amongst these are five socio-economic scenarios (Shared Socio-
economic Pathways or SSPs) and four emission scenarios (Representative Concentration
Pathways or RCPs). Whilst mitigation scenarios have been developed for each SSP-RCP
combination, describing the actions necessary to match the climate pathway of the RCP
(the Shared Policy Assumptions, or SPAs), there has not yet been a systematic approach
to address whether and how these actions can be enabled in practice. We present a novel
and transferable framework to understand society’s capacity to achieve the 1.5°C target,
based on four participatory case studies using the SSP-RCP scenarios. The methodology
builds on a framework for categorising different types of societal capitals and capacities
and assessing their impact on the potential to implement different types of mitigation
actions. All four case studies show that SSP1 has the highest potential to reach the
target. Although environmental awareness is high in both SSP1 and SSP4, continued
social inequalities in SSP4 restrict society’s capacity to transform, despite economic
growth. In the two least environmentally-aware SSPs, SSP3 and SSP5, the transformation
potential is low except in case studies where SSP5 has higher capitals and lower social
inequality. The study highlights that techno-economic assessments of climate strategy
need to be complemented by consideration of the critical role played by social and human
capital, and by societal capacity to steward natural resources, orchestrate positive change,
unlock new behaviours and transform existing institutions. These capitals and capacities
are essential to enable the rapid innovation, behavioural change and international co-
ordination needed to achieve the target.
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5.1 Introduction
The ambition of the Paris climate agreement to limit global temperature increase to
1.5°C by 2100 creates a pressing demand to find ways to achieve this goal (Rogelj et al.,
2016; Hulme, 2016). The IPCC special report on the 1.5°C target presents four alternative
pathways, which all involve major transformation of the energy system together with large-
scale changes to human behaviour and land-use (IPCC, 2018). These changes pose major
political challenges, and some authors argue that the 1.5°C target will be unattainable
without resorting to high-risk, large-scale geo-engineering (Akimoto et al., 2017). Others,
however, claim that limiting global temperature increases to 1.5°C is possible through
action-led, societal transformation (Hermwille, 2016; O’Brien, 2015; Rockstro¨m et al.,
2017; Ta`bara et al., 2013, 2018; Westley et al., 2011). With such different potential
pathways to a sustainable future, scenario analysis has emerged as a key tool in studies of
climate-change mitigation and adaptation, and a wide range of alternative socio-economic
and climate scenarios have been created (Akimoto et al., 2017; Friedlingstein et al., 2014;
Rogelj et al., 2009, 2015, 2016). Core amongst these are the five socio-economic scenarios
(Shared Socio-economic Pathways or SSPs) and four emission scenarios (Representative
Concentration Pathways or RCPs) which have been developed in parallel (Moss et al.,
2010) and are intended to be independent yet complementary (O’Neill et al., 2016;
van Vuuren et al., 2014). The RCPs describe the evolution of future greenhouse gas
concentrations and associated climate impacts without any assumptions on mitigation
actions. The SSPs explore different socio-economic futures and the challenges they present
for climate mitigation and adaptation (O’Neill et al., 2015) as socio-economic factors
enable or constrain the actions needed to meet climate and sustainability targets (O’Neill
et al., 2016). For example, scenarios including high investment in green technology and
low energy demand reduce the additional effort required for climate mitigation, whereas
scenarios assuming high levels of human well-being and flexible institutions may enable
easier adaptation to climate change (O’Neill et al., 2017). For each SSP, a baseline scenario
describes a future socio-economic pathway assuming no climate change and no additional
climate policy actions (Riahi et al., 2017). For each SSP-RCP combination, a mitigation
scenario has been developed that describes the additional actions that would need to be
taken (beyond the SSP baseline) to match the climate pathway of the RCP, consistent
with a set of Shared Policy Assumptions (SPAs) which describe the climate mitigation
policy environment for each SSP (Riahi et al., 2017).
Whilst the SSP-RCP scenario matrix has been designed to be relevant to end-users (such
as decision-makers, policymakers and practitioners) and consistent with climate policy
assumptions (Carlsen et al., 2013; Kriegler et al., 2012, 2014), there are limits to its utility
in decision-making contexts for several reasons. Firstly, the SSPs were not designed as a
direct tool for policy-makers, but only for researchers to produce climate assessments that
will then be shared with policy-makers (O’Neill et al., 2015a). As a result, policy-makers
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report “poor understandability of scenario data” (Pilli-Sihvola et al., 2015). Secondly,
the SSPs may not be sufficiently context-dependent or relevant to different situations
(e.g. a different spatial scale or context (Nilsson et al., 2017)). Thirdly, externally-
created scenarios may not be well connected to the users’ worldviews, impacting their
understanding of and buy-in to the scenarios (Lempert, 2013). There is therefore a need
for better connecting the knowledge of climate researchers and policy-makers (Klein &
Juhola, 2014; Pilli-Sihvola et al., 2015).
In this study, we advance the use of combined SSP-RCP scenarios to explore systematically
society’s ability to achieve the 1.5°C target, by identifying the potential to transform
as a function of capitals and capacities in the SSP-RCP combinations. Our main goal
is to clarify the implications of the combined scenarios, both in terms of contextual
opportunities and constraints and the ability of actors to achieve societal change, to better
inform decision-making. The scenarios have been co-developed with stakeholders as part
of a methodology targeted at addressing policy-relevant issues in a series of nested case
studies from global to European sub-national scale. The methodology involved identifying
the elements that ‘enable’ climate action in each SSP through an assessment of i) the five
capital stocks available for society to draw upon (human, social, natural, financial and
manufactured capital), and ii) the four types of agency capacities (stewarding, unlocking,
transforming and orchestrating) through which actors are able to leverage these capitals
and enact change. To this end, we developed a novel, cross-scale and transferable
approach combining capitals (as indicators of the material and non-material resources
available) with actors’ collective capacities for change, consistent with each SSP-RCP
scenario and each case study. We discuss how this framework of capitals and capacities
provides relevant information to decision-makers on the possible future challenges and
opportunities associated with the 1.5°C target.
5.2 Methodology
This study builds on the SSP-RCP framework to identify how different scenarios enable
or constrain the achievement of the 1.5°C target, for each of four case studies. We start
with the recognition that the 1.5°C target requires strong action, involving not just
technological and social development but also institutional change, behavioural change
and land-use change, consistent with the level of mitigation action reported in integrated
assessments globally (Riahi et al., 2017) and regionally (van der Zwaan et al., 2016). The
IPCC Special Report on 1.5°C Summary for Policymakers (IPCC, 2018) highlitghts the
importance of this framework, by stating that
“strengthened multi-level governance, institutional capacity, policy
instruments, technological innovation and transfer and mobilization of
finance, and changes in human behaviour and lifestyles are enabling
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conditions that enhance the feasibility to achieving the 1.5°C target”.
This requires moving beyond the original distinction between “challenges to adaptation
and challenges to mitigation” that defines the uncertainty space of the SSPs, and
adopting a more holistic approach geared towards a fundamental societal transformation
(Westley et al., 2011; Feola, 2015; Hermwille, 2016; Gillard et al., 2016; IPCC, 2018).
Societal transformation must be driven by different actors, defined as both individuals or
organisations representing different sectors (governments, communities, market and third
sector) with the capacity to change the state of human and natural systems (O’Brien,
2015, 2016; Avelino & Wittmayer, 2016). As these actors are embedded within societal
structures (e.g. formal and informal institutions, social networks, resource distribution),
their capacities are manifest in the extent to which they are able to mobilise, create and
change these structures (Giddens, 1979). We therefore base our methodology on assessing
two key sets of indicators:
1. Stocks of five types of capital: human, social, natural, manufactured and financial,
with a focus on human and social capital because they underpin the potential for
transformational societal change;
2. Four types of capacity that give actors the agency to mobilise, create and change
the stocks of these five capitals: stewarding, unlocking, transforming, orchestrating.
The main goal of our methodology is to identify which stocks of capital can be mobilised
by which types of actors in each scenario combination. Whether and how actors are able
to mobilise capitals is analysed by drawing on a systematic framework of their capacities
for transformation Ho¨lscher (2018a). The actors are identified inductively in the scenario
narratives, and are integrated into the capacity analysis. The first step of our methodology
was to determine what capitals and capacities need to be assessed and to link them to
potential mitigation actions in a theoretical framework (Section 2.1). We then applied this
framework within four case-studies (Section 2.2). In the results (Section 5.3) we interpret
the joint impact of the capacities and capitals on the potential for society to meet the 1.5
°C target under each scenario, and show how these findings relate to Integrated Assessment
Modelling approaches.
5.2.1 Capital stocks and societal capacities that constrain and enable actions
towards the 1.5°C target
‘Capitals’ are defined as stocks yielding a benefit valued by humans (Porritt, 2007).
The concept of capitals is useful for providing information on the enabling conditions
in scenarios. They are straightforward (Tinch et al., 2015) and provide a more systemic
understanding than economic- or population-based indicators. In this study, we consider
five capitals: human (education, knowledge, health), social (individual relationships,
societal trust, institutions and networks), manufactured (technology and infrastructure),
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natural (ecosystems) and financial (markets) (Ja¨ger et al., 2015; Porritt, 2007; Tinch
et al., 2015). Whether and how the capital stocks can be mobilised, created and changed
to achieve the 1.5 °C target essentially depends on questions of agency (Westley et al.,
2011; Gillard et al., 2016). In other words, who in the scenario narrative has abilities to
mobilise, create and change societal structures (e.g. formal and informal institutions,
social networks), knowledge, beliefs and resources for developing and implementing
strategies and actions (Westley et al., 2013). We employ the concept of capacities for
understanding the abilities of actors in the scenarios to effectively mobilise, create and
change capital stocks. At the same time, capital stocks can constrain or enable actors in
using their capacities. Different types of capacities can be identified that fulfil distinct
functions for developing and implementing transformative strategies and responding to
different types of transformation dynamics: stewarding, unlocking, transforming and
orchestrating (Table 5.1) (Ho¨lscher, 2018a,b). These capacities build on a literature
review of sustainability transitions and resilience approaches that are concerned with
transformative change and agency (Grin et al., 2010; Loorbach et al., 2017; Folke 2016;
Olsson et al., 2014; Westley et al., 2013). The three levels of capacity defined in Table
5.1 are based on the authors’ interpretation and synthesis of the literature review and are
subsequently used during the scenario analysis.
The theoretical framework facilitates the integration of human and societal dimensions of
agency (via the capacities) into the analysis of adaptation, mitigation and transformation.
To do this, we divide actions into four broad categories: technological, institutional,
lifestyle and land-based, based on expert judgement of our interdisciplinary authorship
team. In our framework, these categories each depend on a different mix of capital
stocks, and require the relevant actors and capacities to mobilise these stocks (Figure 5.1).
Using mitigation action as an example, technological mitigation involves developing and
investing in new and improved technologies such as energy supply and energy efficiency,
carbon capture and storage and (in some scenarios) ‘geo-engineering’, requiring high
stocks of financial and manufactured capital as well as social and human capital for
technical expertise. This therefore links with the transformative capacity for innovation
and learning (capacity ‘T’ in Figure 5.1). Institutional action includes governance-related
actions such as taxation, regulation and market reform (e.g. carbon trading). Lifestyle
change includes individual and collective actions that reduce demand for energy and
resources, including dietary change and waste avoidance. Both institutional and lifestyle
change require high levels of social and human capital. To mobilise these capitals towards
institutional change, all four capacities are required. For individual lifestyle change, the
focus is on the capacity to build flexible networks of individuals (stewarding), social
innovation (transforming) and effective counter-movements (unlocking). Land-based
mitigation (including reduced emissions from agriculture, increased carbon storage and
sequestration in soils and vegetation, and bioenergy with or without carbon capture and
storage) requires integrated and long term planning as well as know-how (stewarding and
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Table 5.1: Interpretation of capacities to measure enabling and disabling conditions in SSP-
RCP combinations. The literature reviewed to assess the level of capacity is indicated in
column 1, below the definition of each capacity
Capacities Low Medium High
Stewarding Ability to anticipate, protect
and recover from disturbances while
exploiting opportunities beneficial for
sustainability (Chapin et al., 2010; Folke,
2006) (Garmestani and Benson, 2013)
- Low social cohesion - Communities of interest
without collective identity.
- Strong social networks and
supportive social contexts
- Risk-numb: No desire
for long-term planning and
reactive risk management
- Risk-averse: Mid-term
planning to control risk
- Proactive long-term
integrated planning. Risk
taking and uncertainty
embracing
- Coping, no reflexivity - Fragmented know-
how (without knowledge
integration)
- Collective memory
and learning (reflexivity,
integration of knowledge)
Unlocking Ability to recognise and
dismantle drivers of unsustainability and
path-dependencies (Geels, 2014; Kivimaa &
Kern, 2016)
- Acceptance and support of
existing institutions, values
and practices.
- Uncoordinated counter-
movements
- No support for status-quo
- Powerful interest networks
to maintain status quo
- Competing interest
networks along with weaker
counter-networks
- Effective opposition
networks
Transforming Ability to create novelties
and embed them in practices (Frantzeskaki
et al., 2012; Westley et al., 2013) (Raven et
al. 2010)
- Low investments in and no
leadership for innovation
- Innovation and
competition for specific
interests
- Leadership for innovation
- Learning from tested
solutions (e.g upscaling and
replicating)
Orchestrating Ability to coordinate multi-
actor processes to maximise synergies (Chan
et al., 2015; Frantzeskaki et al., 2014; Hodson
& Marvin, 2010)
- No shared development
goals and frameworks
- Shared and long-term
development goals between
small groups
- Shared and long-term
development goals
- Low collaboration across
scales and sectors
- Collaboration limited by
competition across scales
and sectors
- Collaboration across scales
and sectors
- No transparency in
decision-making
- Good governance but no
political culture
- Good governance, with
engaged political culture
transformative capacities). The crucial point in the framework is that the level of societal
transformation required to meet the 1.5 °C target cannot be achieved through only one
type of action, e.g. technological action alone, due to spillovers and trade-offs (IPCC,
2018). According to this reasoning, mobilising capital stocks to enable the full spectrum
of actions requires all four types of capacity. However, the societal context (in this study,
the SSP-RCP combinations) determines which capacities and which types of action will
be feasible.
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Action Types Capitals Actors Capacities
Technological S H N F M G C M T S U T O
Institutional S H N F M G C M T S U T O
Life-style S H N F M G C M T S U T O
Land-based S H N F M G C M T S U T O
Figure 5.1: Elements of the theoretical framework to analyse the potential to reach the 1.5
°C target. Capitals are social (S), human (H), natural (N), financial (F), manufactured (M).
Actors are governments (G), communities (C), markets (M), third sectors such as NGOs and
research (T). Capacities are: stewarding (S), unlocking (U), transformative (T), orchestrating
(O). The shaded cells are capitals, actors and capacities which are most influential in
determining the effectiveness of a given mitigation type
5.2.2 Case studies: participatory development of SSPs for the European
region, Iberia, Hungary and Scotland
This theoretical framework has been applied in four case studies: Europe as a whole (the
2013 EU 27 plus Switzerland and Norway); Scotland, the Iberian Peninsula (Spain and
Portugal) and two municipalities in Hungary. SSPs were co-produced with stakeholders
for each case study: the ‘Eur-SSPs’ for Europe and the three ‘local SSPs’: Scottish,
Iberian and Hungarian.
The European and Scottish case studies focus on the cross-sectoral impacts of land-
use and climate change, linking urbanisation, agriculture, water resources, forestry and
biodiversity sectors (Kok et al., 2018 and Harrison et al., 2018). Both European and
Scottish case studies build from previous scenario work in the CLIMSAVE project
(Harrison et al., 2015) and have been further developed to include the socio-economic
and climate drivers of the SSPs and RCPs (Kok et al., 2018). The Iberian and Hungarian
case studies focus on the sectors and impacts that are more relevant to local societal
interests. For Iberia the focus is on impacts on agro-forest systems and governance of
transboundary river basins (Ta`bara et al., 2018) while for Hungary the focus is on impacts
of population dynamics on urban land-use and health (Li et al., 2017). The scenarios have
been developed by engaging stakeholders to develop the scenario narratives and review
the analyses (Ta`bara et al., 2018), therefore ensuring that scenarios are diverse enough to
be relevant for and driven by stakeholders but still comparable in terms of structure and
process. In line with van Ruijven et al. (2014), the local SSPs are consistent with the global
SSPs, while allowing for specific characteristics, depending on the stakeholders’ choice of
key drivers of change and their interpretation of the global and Eur-SSPs. The local and
Eur-SSPs describe a range of challenges to adaptation and mitigation, which have been
interpreted as varying levels of inequality and carbon intensity (Figure 5.2). Eur-SSP1
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Figure 5.2: Interpretation of challenges to adaptation (inequality) and mitigation (carbon
intensity) of the European SSPs
and Eur-SSP5 develop into relatively inclusive societies, whereas Eur-SSP3 and Eur-SSP4
are highly unequal. Eur-SSP1 and Eur-SSP4 are less carbon-intensive than Eur-SSP3 and
Eur-SSP5. A European SSP2 was not developed as it was interpreted to converge to the
average of the other scenarios, and therefore was less suitable than the other SSPs for
identifying alternative capacities and challenges. We refer to (Kok & Pedde, 2016) for the
Eur-SSPs and local SSPs and to the IMPRESSIONS Deliverable (Kok & Pedde, 2016)
for the sketch of all the SSP narratives for all case studies.
This conceptualisation is consistent with the original separation between SSPs and
SPAs. Actions (SPAs) are not included in our scenarios (SSP-RCP) but are enabled
or constrained by the differing capacities of the actors and capitals in each SSP-RCP.
In this reasoning, SSP-RCP represent the societal potential to transform, and the SPAs
represent societal action towards transformation. The SSP-RCP context thus needs to
contain information on what conditions exist to enable (or constrain) the additional
actions needed to reach the 1.5°C target.
The participatory process to develop the Eur-SSPs and local SSPs consisted of workshops
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in which stakeholders addressed the exploratory question: “what could happen?”
(Bo¨rjeson et al., 2006), in order to develop trends for capital development within three
time slices (2010-2040, 2040-2070 and 2070-2100). The workshops were professionally
facilitated (Gramberger et al., 2015) to produce iteratively trends for capitals consistent
with the scenario narratives. Subsequently, the narratives were interpreted to assess the
capacities qualitatively against the categories and levels of capacities of Table 5.1. The
capacities interpreted for each scenario narrative were then combined with the stakeholder-
derived capital trends to assess the potential of society to transform to achieve the 1.5°C
target. The potential was then interpreted against the categories of mitigation actions to
define what mitigation is feasible and this was compared with potential identified with
the global SSP-RCP mitigation scenarios (Riahi et al., 2017). The Eur-SSPs and local
European SSPs paired with the respective RCP can be used to structure “what could
happen” and map the trend onto a theoretical space in time (until 2100) and to show the
distance from “what do we want”, i.e. the 1.5°C target (Figure 5.3). The pairing of each
SSP and RCP was chosen to reflect the challenges to mitigation. SSP1 and SSP4 have
lower challenges to mitigation so they were paired with RCP4.5, while SSP3 and SSP5
were paired with RCP8.5.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Potential to achieving the 1.5°C target in each scenario combination
The results show what capacities and capitals are available in the SSPs to transform
society to function consistently with the requirements to achieve the 1.5°C target. The
availability of capitals and capacities in each case study is summarised in Figure 5.4.
In all case studies, SSP1 achieves the highest capitals and capacities because of the active
participation of all types actors (market, research, government and third sector) towards
sustainability. In the Eur-SSP1, strong international cooperation and institutions, most
importantly the political integration of European countries in view of shared sustainability
priorities, enable the establishment of multi-level governance and an early shift towards
a sustainability focus. European institutions also play a positive role in enabling a
strong early push towards sustainability in the Hungarian and Iberian SSP1 (a “European
social framework” in Iberia and the European Union in Hungary), in combination with
bottom-up participation and municipality-level sustainability-oriented investments and
governance. Only in the Scottish SSP1 the trigger towards sustainability is not directly
enabled by the European Union but rather by the Scottish government.
The quick transition towards sustainability in SSP1 leads to the maintenance and
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Progress 
towards the 
vision of a 
sustainable 
society 
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with the 1.5oC 
target
1.5˚C
Scenario (SSP5 with RCP8.5)
“what could happen”
Actions and Strategies
“how could we reach the target”, 
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adaptive actions
1.5˚C target 
“what do we want”
Transformative actions
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and enable win-win solutions
Figure 5.3: Conceptualisation of scenarios as context to develop mitigation and adaptation
pathways to reach a desired vision in 2100. The actions to develop sustainable pathways
towards the vision build from the scenario and are scenario-contextualised in time
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H S M F N S T O U
Europe
High commitment to achieve sustainable development goals through effective governments and
global cooperation, ultimately resulting in less inequality and less resource intensive lifestyles 
Scotland
Effective regulation ("communitarianism"), stable but slower economic growth and social participation
lead to a sustainable Scotland
Iberia
Triggered by continuing and growing social participation in environmental, social, and economic
issues and fuelled by a European social-oriented political framework, Iberia embraces a path towards
a new development model
Hungary
A transparent and multi-level governance leads to a prosperous and greener Hungary characterised
by local circular economies and integration in Europe   
Region H S M F N Storyline S T O U
Europe
Sparked by economic woes in major economies and regional conflict, antagonism between and within
regional blocs increases, resulting in the disintegration of social fabric and many countries struggling
to maintain living standards
Scotland
Driven by resource pressure and migration, rivalry between social groups explodes, resulting in
feudal-like systems where the have-nots work to provide the haves. Everyone learns to live with less
Iberia
Short-lived governments lead to a fragmentation of the social and economic fabric in Iberia
Hungary
Hungary finds itself in a ‘war zone’ between competing regional powers. A day-to-day mentality
establishes. This leads to social fragmentation, stratification and sectarianism.
Region H S M F N Storyline S T O U
Europe
Globally, power and economic opportunities concentrate in a relatively small political and business
elite, leading to substantial proportions of populations having a low level of development. Europe, as
a whole, becomes an important player in a world full of tensions
Scotland
The private sector gains political power and the country is ruled by few multinationals. Wealthy live in
eco-communities, while social unrest slowly takes over, resulting in the revolutionary "tartan spring"
Iberia
Higher inequalities lead to substantial proportions of the population having a low level of development
and a “subtle” enforcement of inequality, while an increase in renewable energies business is very
lucrative for the political elite
Hungary
With social inequalities and power centralisation on the rise, Hungary becomes a socio-economically
stratified country. Resources are scarce for the have nots. Local communities self-organise at the
periphery of an elitist regime
Region H S M F N Storyline S T O U
Europe
Competitive markets, innovation and participatory societies produce rapid technological progress and
development of human capital as the path to sustainable development. A lack of environmental
concern leads to the exploitation of abundant fossil fuel resources
Scotland
Establishment of for-profit publically owned energy companies, such as Statoil and the Scotland
Energy Corporation (SEC), leads to high revenues, redistributed with egalitarian social policies. High
employment and population growth, but higher pressure on the environment
Iberia
Iberia becomes dependent on technology, fossil fuels, subsidies from the EU and gas from northern
Africa, and investments of large corporations. Eventually this development model collapses
Hungary
Economic growth and rigid governance schemes hook Hungary to fossil fuel development model.
Eventually, this leads to environmental degradation and atomizing society: Hungary ends in turmoil
SS
P4
SS
P5
Capitals CapacitiesRegion
SS
P1
SS
P3
Storyline 
Figure 5.4: Conceptualisation of scenarios as context to develop mitigation and adaptation
pathways to reach a desired vision in 2100. The actions to develop sustainable pathways
towards the vision build from the scenario and are scenario-contextualised in time
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further steady creation of capacities until 2100. Societal and environmental awareness
is generated early in the scenario, resulting in high levels of human and social capital
and thus in high orchestrating, transformative and stewarding capacity. The unlocking
capacity that has supported the establishment of effective counter-movements and social
innovation decreases towards 2100, as the new sustainability paradigm is established and
the importance of opposition networks decreases. In all case studies SSP1 gets close to
the 1.5 °C target but there are still some challenges that need to be addressed to fully
achieve the target and avoid trade-offs. Nonetheless, SSP1 is the scenario with the highest
potential to achieve the 1.5 °C target .
In SSP3, capacities and capitals decline in all case studies. The cause of the overall
decrease of capacities is the focus on short-term governance, weak leadership and low
investment for innovation. The lack of reflexivity and learning from tested solutions results
in generally low stewarding, transformative and orchestrating capacities, apart from the
Scottish case study, where governance and innovation are managed by large companies.
However, unlocking capacity brings the potential for novel networks, unconstrained by
top-down enforcement given the lack of leadership. The potential for a reversal of
the status-quo is limited by the general lack of coordination and competing interests
of counter-movements. In SSP4, capacities tend to average at medium level for two
main reasons: overall competition and a combination of low capacity for local actors
with higher capacity of actors at national or European level. In Europe, Iberia and
Scotland, powerful multinationals exert a stabilising influence which enables cooperation
(orchestrating capacity) and innovation (transformative capacity). These capacities are
however exercised in a very top-down manner due to the concentration of power, and
learning is limited due to competition, political and economic power-grabbing and large-
scale social exclusion. In Hungary, social networks and reflexive learning together with
the existence of counter-movements until 2070 generate high stewarding and unlocking
capacity, enabling communities to push for sustainability and resilience. At national
level, however, the focus is on coping , low investments, and rigid top-down maintenance
of status throughout the whole scenario, de facto decreasing the potential of local
actors.
SSP5 shows the greatest variation of capitals and capacities between case studies. Natural
capital is low in all SSP5 case studies, while human and social capitals are high in
Europe and Iberia but low in Scotland and Hungary. Although all SSP5 case studies
share the common traits of economic development and social equality, the effect of
individualism, economic growth (linked to high resource exploitation and consumption)
and environmental damage were perceived differently in different case studies. Scotland
and Iberia end up with medium unlocking capacity, consistent with lack of support for
the status-quo and effective opposition. Because other capacities and/or capitals are
limited, overall potential remains close to ‘medium’, except for Europe (and Scotland,
to an extent) where potential is ‘high’ due to the availability of knowledge, capitals,
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technology and preparedness to shift to ‘re-emergence of investments in renewables’ when
needed.
In Figure 5.5, we show the overall potential of the European SSPs to transform societies
towards a 1.5°C-consistent world as a function of capitals and capacities. Letters
representing each of the four capacities (S, U, T, O) are plotted on a scale of high-
medium-low (according to the definitions in Table 5.1) on the x-axis, and their position
on the y-axis is determined by the combined level of human and social capital (the
capitals that underpin social transformation). The colour of the boxes indicates how
these levels of capitals and capacities combine to determine society’s overall potential to
achieve the 1.5 °C target in each scenario, from ‘very low’ to ‘very high’. For example,
in the Eur-SSP1 the potential for achieving the 1.5 °C target is ‘very high’ as a result of
‘high’ social and human capitals and ‘high’ stewarding, orchestrating and transformative
capacity, whereas Eur-SSP3 results in ‘low’ potential because of overall ‘low’ capitals,
‘low’ stewarding and orchestrating capacity, ‘medium’ transformative capacity, and ‘high’
unlocking capacity.
Because of the high levels of both capacities and capitals, SSP1 has generally ‘very high’
potential to transform. However, because people are generally more satisfied with this
world and there is less impetus for transformative change, this manifests in medium
unlocking and ‘high’ (rather than ‘very high’) transformative capacities. In contrast,
SSP3 has ‘very low’ or ‘low’ potential in all case studies, as the capitals and capacities
are low due to the power of ‘elites’ coupled with conflicts and disparities. However
stewarding, unlocking and orchestrating capacity can grow as people organise themselves
into communities of interest to counter the status quo, and to share resources such
as food (as in the Hungarian and Scottish case studies). This provides some stability
and decreases conflict, albeit with larger inequalities than at present. In the European
SSP3, the European Union collapses but ‘richer (ex) Member States’ can still afford clean
technology, clean water, energy and health services.
SSP4 tends to have ‘low’ or ‘medium’ potential across all case studies. This is because
cohesion, collaboration and networks exist within social classes (unlike the more conflictual
SSP3 scenarios). Capacities and capitals are high for the elite, who adopt green
technology, but low for the majority. This stratification and social exclusion limit the
capitals and capacities, and thus the overall potential to transform. Despite generally
having higher capitals than SSP3, due to more stability and economic growth, the overall
potential of SSP4 is similar to or only slightly higher than SSP3 because the capacities
tend to change little over time.
The SSP5 potential, in contrast, ranges from ‘very low’ to ‘very high’. In Europe and
Scotland high stewarding and transformative capacity are available, as risk-taking and
uncertainty are embraced and innovation is embedded. However, the lack of engaged
political culture tends to reduce the potential in all case studies. A U-turn towards
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Figure 5.5: Analysis of the potential to transform society to function consistently with the
requirements to achieve a 1.5 °C world for each SSP-RCP combination as a result of the
combination of different levels of capitals and capacities in each case study in 2100. The
capacities assessed are stewarding (S), unlocking (U), transformative (T) and orchestrating
(O). Their position on the y axis depends on the combined level of human and social capital.
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sustainability emerges in all SSP5 case studies by 2100, but this happens smoothly in
Europe and Scotland whereas in Hungary and Iberia, with lower transformative potential,
the transition is much more chaotic.
In summary, these results show important differences in the way in which capacities are
manifested both between case studies and between SSPs. For example, in SSP5 (and to
some extent in SSP4) transformative capacities enable large-scale deployment of high-tech
solutions, whereas in SSP3 unlocking and orchestrating capacities can grow and enable
low-technology community-based action and social innovation.
5.3.2 Potential application of the SSP capital and capacity framework to
Integrated Assessment Modelling
The assessment of capitals and capacities for each scenario can complement the use of
Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs). Our framework can provide a ‘reality check’ to
indicate whether the societal conditions assumed within each SSP would actually allow
the relevant actors to build and mobilise the capitals that are required to implement the
mitigation options to meet a given RCP. In this section we link the level of capitals and
capacities within each case study SSP (from Figures 5.4 and 5.5) to the mitigation and
transformation options required to achieve the 1.5°C target (Figure 5.3), and consider the
implications for IAM modelling.
For SSP1, all four case studies envisage that the level of social and human capital and
the stewarding, transformative and orchestrating capacities increase to high levels by
2100, with the unlocking capacity starting high but falling to medium by 2100 as most
citizens become satisfied with the status quo. The potential to implement all four types
of mitigation (technological, institutional, lifestyle and land-use) is therefore generally
high, if we assume that the high social and human capital will enable the high levels of
manufactured and financial capital that are required for technological mitigation. Natural
capital also increases in SSP1 (e.g. a large increase for Iberia and moderate increase for
Hungary by 2100), indicating that land-based mitigation would also be viable, especially
as there is a high level of stewarding and transformative capacity.
This can be compared with the mitigation actions required to reach RCP2.6 from the
SSP1 baseline for the OECD region according to IAM modelling (Bauer et al., 2016,
2017; Popp et al., 2017; van Vuuren et al., 2017), bearing in mind that even stronger
mitigation (beyond RCP2.6) will be required to reach the 1.5°C target. Mitigation in the
SSP1-RCP2.6 IAM starts with a strong focus on reducing energy demand, through both
technological and lifestyle measures. After 2040 there is a major shift from fossil fuel
towards biomass and renewable energy, as well as extensive afforestation, which is made
possible by the low demand for meat which frees up land for biomass and forests. This
scenario thus involves rapid implementation of all four types of mitigation (technological,
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institutional, lifestyle and land-based), which in turn requires high levels of all four
capacities. Our study complements the IAM modelling by giving confidence that the
locally derived versions of SSP1 for Europe are broadly consistent with high levels of
these capitals and capacities. For SSP3, in contrast, levels of social and human capital
and orchestrating capacity decrease to low levels in all case studies as governance breaks
down and anarchy prevails. Levels of the other capacities vary from low to medium
across the case studies, with unlocking potential reaching a high level in the Eur-SSP by
2100 because of general dissatisfaction with the prevailing situation . This means that it
is not possible to achieve a significant level of climate-change mitigation either through
technological innovation (e.g. due to low transformative capacity) or land-use change
(low stewarding capacity) consistent with the finding in the IAM literature that RCP 2.6
is not achievable with the global SSP3 (Riahi et al., 2017). However, this study shows
that SSP3’s turbulence may also enable dramatic (and, sometimes, enforced) behavioural
and institutional changes with potential for local reconstruction when networks of people
reorganise and effectively oppose the status-quo (when unlocking capacity is high). Similar
potential has been identified in the POLFREE project, where low internationalisation
and economic growth (as assumed in SSP3) have been linked to reduced GHGs emissions,
increased circular economies and overall employment (Schanes et al., 2019; Ja¨ger, 2016).
For the unequal and divided society portrayed in SSP4, levels of social and human capital
are low in the Eur-SSP and Hungary and medium in Scotland and Iberia. Transformative
capacity is medium in Scotland and Iberia, indicating some potential for technological
development including wind and solar power in Iberia. The other capacities are medium
to low, indicating that it will be difficult to implement a comprehensive mitigation strategy
that includes lifestyle change and land-based change. For comparison, the IAM modelling
of SSP4 (Bauer et al., 2017; Calvin et al., 2017; Popp et al., 2017) requires very high
investment in low-carbon energy technologies (nuclear, renewables and bioenergy with
CCS) to reach RCP2.6, because the potential for land-based measures is limited by high
population growth and high demand for food. This reliance on low-carbon energy supply
results in a very expensive mitigation strategy, with carbon prices reaching over US$2000/t
CO2 (compared to just US$140/t CO2 in SSP1 which focuses on demand reduction
and land use). However, the low level of capitals and capacities in the locally derived
SSPs raises doubts that this high level of technical investment and innovation could be
achieved in practice. In addition, IAM modelling of SSP4 indicates that food prices
would increase by a factor of six (Popp et al., 2017) due to pressure on land for bio-energy
and afforestation. This would have implications for human and social capital that could
further limit the mitigation potential. The locally derived fossil-fuel based SSP5 scenarios
vary markedly between case studies. There could be a high potential for technological and
land-based solutions in the Eur-SSP and Scotland to some extent, though in the other
case studies and for other mitigation options the mitigation potential is limited by low
capacities or capitals. The IAM modelling for SSP5 indicates that very drastic mitigation
is needed to reach RCP2.6, to counter the strong growth in energy demand and lock-in
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to fossil fuel technologies up to 2040 (Bauer et al., 2017; Kriegler et al., 2017; Popp et al.,
2017). By 2100, 65% of global final energy demand must be delivered as electricity and
7% as hydrogen, and fossil fuels are almost completely replaced by renewables, biomass
with CCS (to provide negative emissions), and nuclear. Biomass demand in 2100 is
the highest of all the scenarios, though a high biomass production efficiency is assumed,
limiting the global cropland area to slightly less than in SSP4. As for SSP3, the uneven
spread of capitals and capacities highlights potential difficulties with reaching this level of
mitigation in practice. The Eur-SSP does provide the required high levels of capital and
capacity for technological and land-based mitigation, but the local SSPs reveal limitations
in capitals (Scotland), capacities (Iberia) or both (Hungary).
5.4 Discussion
The analysis of capitals and capacities within the locally derived European scenarios
appears to reinforce the ability of SSP1 to deliver mitigation to at least RCP2.6, and
confirms the finding that SSP3 is unlikely to be able to meet RCP2.6, unless the turbulence
in the scenario leads to major institutional and lifestyle changes. For SSP4 and SSP5,
which rely mainly on technological and land-based mitigation, the analysis raises doubts
over the ability of society to deliver the level of mitigation required to achieve RCP2.6,
given the relatively weak and uneven levels of human and social capital and governance
capacity. To meet the 1.5°C target, even higher levels of mitigation would be required,
which emphasises that only SSP1 might have a good chance of meeting this target. It
is worth noting that the IAM modelling of the global SSP-RCP scenarios reported in
Riahi et al. (2017) is intended as a reference case on which further analysis of climate
impacts and adaptation can be built, and therefore does not consider the feedback effects
of climate change on socio-economic systems (e.g. via impacts on ecosystems, energy
systems, infrastructure or health). Given that some level of warming is implicit in
all scenarios, even those which eventually achieve a RCP2.6 or 1.5°C target (possibly
after overshoot), these potential negative feedbacks are significant. Consideration of the
capitals and capacities framework helps to illustrate that climate change could negatively
affect all five types of capital, which could further reduce the chances of reaching climate
targets. The SSP1 scenario, which acts early and strongly to limit climate change and does
not rely on overshoot followed by negative emissions, is likely to minimise these negative
climate feedback effects and maximise the chances of successful mitigation. The choice of
mitigation action could also create positive or negative feedbacks on capacity, as with the
example of high food prices for SSP4 reported in Popp et al. (2017). Again, SSP1 with its
focus on reduced demand for resources minimises this type of impact. Similarly, high levels
of capital and capacity will foster more effective adaptation to climate impacts, which in
turn will reduce the damage from climate change. The four ‘mitigation types’ used in our
framework are derived from macro-scale mitigation studies. In local SSPs, the boundaries
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between those types become more blurred. In future assessments, the categories need to
be explicitly assessed to capture the full potential of SSPs. For example, the results of
SSP5 show that, in spite of lower potential for institutional and lifestyle change, there
could be potential for actors to move towards the goal in ways that are (1) not covered
by the categories or (2) fall between the categories. It is therefore necessary to inform
global assessments with results from continental and local case studies and increase the
relevance of mitigation at multiple levels. In the theoretical framework we have assumed
that the capacities of actors to mobilise capitals can explain the potential to achieve
the 1.5°C target. The results have shown that using the combined capitals-capacities
framework allowed us to systematically identify the enabling and disabling conditions in
the scenarios. This results in further enriching the understanding of the scenarios, with
the capitals-capacities framework acting as the bridging framework between scenarios
and policy. However, there was some mismatch between the results in Figures 5.4 and 5.5
and our framework of capacities (Figure 5.1) even though these categories were derived
from a review of state-of-the-art literature on sustainability science. The main mismatch
was the stewarding capacity in SSP1 and SSP5. With low challenges to adaptation and
mitigation, SSP1 implies some level of transformation towards the 1.5°C target. However
the stewarding capacity inferred from analysis of the stakeholder-derived scenario did
not fit perfectly in either the ‘medium’ or ‘high’ category in our framework (Table 5.1).
This was due to the combination of both long-term integrated planning and learning,
typical of high stewarding capacity with a tendency to need strong regulation and a
risk-averse attitude typical of medium stewarding capacity found in all SSP1 narratives
(except for Iberia SSP1). Similarly, in the SSP5 scenarios the risk-embracing society in
Europe and Scotland was difficult to match with the profit-driven communities of interests.
The mismatches between capacity categories and challenges to mitigation and adaptation
assumptions behind the European SSPs can be explained by the uncertainty due to (1)
the interpretative nature of the capacity categories and (2) the diverging worldviews and
opinions on the social challenges to sustainability and the 1.5°C target. Although studies
such as Rockstro¨m et al. (2017) suggest clear decadal steps to be undertaken at global level
for the road to 1.5°C target, the sub-global level shows diverging opinions because different
beliefs and stakes are accounted for in order to enable the (global) action. This study
adds two novel dimensions to actor-based approaches, participatory and policy-relevant
scenarios over the past few years (Klein & Juhola, 2014), and narratives-only approaches
(Nilsson et al., 2017) and fully empirical studies that cannot be directly applicable in
other geographical areas or sectors (Chaudhury et al., 2013; Vervoort et al., 2014). This
shows the complementarity of combining qualitative but systematic capacity analysis with
indicators of capitals. Because the approach is systematic, it can be applied and tested in
other geographical areas and sectors to increase comparability, in spite of the inevitable
interpretative nature of narratives. Because of its simplicity and inclusion of actor-based
capacity analysis, the approach can appeal to decision-makers and practitioners (Klein
& Juhola, 2014). The categories of capacities in Table 5.1 enable impact modellers to
88 Chapter 5
include qualitative and quantitative information about the SSP context, beyond GDP
and population-based indicators.
5.5 Conclusions
Our study has developed a transferable method for assessing the capacity of society to
achieve the societal transformation necessary to meet climate targets, which has been
tested across a range of spatial scales in European case studies. The assessment of capitals
and capacities in the SSPs has the potential to inform a more realistic assessment of the
potential uptake and effectiveness of a range of mitigation options needed to achieve 1.5°C
by taking account of the diverse scenario-specific constraints and enablers. By integrating
social science and participatory approaches with climate and socio-economic scenario
modelling outputs, this transdisciplinary method can explore important feedbacks on the
capacity for transformation that cannot be included in techno-economic models.
The results at sub-global level have highlighted different potentials to achieve the 1.5°C
target for the same SSP across different case study areas, not only due to scale effects,
but also to the normativity of the SSPs and the different beliefs and stakes of local actors
that must be taken into account in order to enable change at global scale. Even in
the most archetypal SSP1 and SSP3 scenarios, the capacities to enable change result in
multiple possibilities to act which may lead to trade-offs or give unexpected opportunities
for transformation and mitigation, such as in SSP3. The case studies consistently show
that the SSPs with least challenges to mitigation, SSP1 and SSP4, have very different
potentials for transformation, with SSP1 high or very high potential whereas SSP4 is
restricted to low or medium potential due to high levels of inequality. Likewise the two
SSPs with highest challenges, SSP3 and SSP5 have different potentials, with SSP5 having
the highest potential in those case study versions with higher capitals and lower social
inequality.
This study highlights the critical role played by social and human capital, and also by
societal capacity to steward natural resources, orchestrate positive change, unlock new
behaviours and transform existing institutions. These capitals and capacities are essential
to enable the rapid innovation, behavioural change and international co-ordination needed
to achieve the 1.5°C goal. Consideration of future changes in capitals and capacities
alongside IAM projections could help to inform policy-making and determine the actions
and strategies needed to achieve ambitious climate targets.
Chapter 6
Synthesis: The importance of
scenarios to understand
climate-change science
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6.1 Introduction
This thesis should be seen in the context of current understanding of climate change as
a socio-environmental problem and related to challenges to achieving a sustainable and
equitable future (IPCC, 2018). The overall research questions were developed to guide the
operationalisation of the essence and definition (ontology) as well as knowledge paradigms
(epistemology) of climate-change science through scenario analysis. The scenario analyses
in Chapters 2 to 5, which build on the state-of-the-art multi-scale scenario typologies
and methodologies identified in Chapter 1, have been concretised using (i) a fuzzy-
set methodology (Chapter 2); (ii) combined pan-European urbanisation modelling with
narratives (Chapter 3); (iii) archetype analysis (Chapter 4) and (iv) a capital-capacity
framework (Chapter 5). In this synthesis, the general contribution of Chapters 2 to 5
is evaluated in section 6.2 using the criteria of credibility, legitimacy, consistency and
salience as introduced in Chapter 1. The results of this evaluation, which are shared
across SSPs, are elaborated in Section 6.3 by discussing the concept of consistency which
has emerged from Section 6.2. A special focus is given to one of the scenarios, Fossil-
fuelled Development SSP5, because of its different weights on credibility, legitimacy,
consistency and salience compared to the other scenarios. The synthesis concludes
with a recommendation to further develop truly cross-scale quantitative and qualitative
scenarios, based on the findings of this thesis.
6.2 The ontology and epistemology evaluation of
climate-change scenarios
6.2.1 Linking different types of knowledge: credibility
Chapter 2 addresses RQ1: ‘How can different types of knowledge be linked in exploratory
scenarios?’. This involves linking narratives (qualitative scenarios) and quantifications
(quantitative scenarios) in an SAS approach and, thus, addresses the epistemological
problem of linking different sources of knowledge and uncertainties. Specifically, RQ1
focuses on involving stakeholders in the process of estimating model variables. On
the implications of what stakeholder-led scenario narratives and modeller-led scenario
quantifications actually mean before being linked with the SAS approach. While SAS
consists of an iteration between narratives and quantifications, current methodologies
link them by ‘simplifying’ or ‘translating’ the narratives into model variables. Starting
from the premise that participatory narratives and model input are intrinsically different,
Chapter 2 has tested the hypothesis that narratives can be linked to models, without
being simplified. Although full uncertainty analyses have not been performed here, the
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results published in Li et al. (2017), Harrison et al. (2018a) and Rohat (2018) have utilised
quantifications derived using the fuzzy-set methodology described in Chapter 2.
The discussion of the results in Rohat (2018) specifically addresses the credibility issue by
recognising that the projections (derived using the fuzzy-set methods) do represent the
experts’ quantitative views. However, he recognises that the accuracy of the projections
remains unknown and that the results reflect the experts’ worldviews.
From the findings in Chapter 2 and Rohat (2018)’s conclusions, I derive that the
fuzzy-set methodology has enhanced the transparency of the link between stakeholder
and experts worldviews, but that it has not addressed the issue of replicability of the
results. This implies that a different group of experts and stakeholders could potentially
yield different results. Nevertheless, this observation relates to the development of
environmental assessments in general (and thus not only scenarios) and the inclusion of
ad-hoc assumptions and subjective decisions in the quantitative knowledge-development
process (van der Sluijs, 2002). Fuzzy sets and probabilistic methods have both
been identified to address the problem regarding the inclusion of expert knowledge.
Chapter 2 acknowledges that both are important and complementary, because they
address two types of uncertainty, related to different thinking systems. These are
probabilities and vagueness, mathematically expressed in probability density functions
and membership functions. By using the fuzzy-set methodology to analyse stakeholder-
led key quantifications, developed as part of scenario narratives, modellers can reduce the
difficulty of interpreting stakeholder-led narratives and link directly to the probabilistic
uncertainty model (Krueger et al., 2012).
It is worth noting that, unlike Chapter 2, Rohat (2018)’s quantifications were directly
translated into scenarios, whereas Chapter 2 and Harrison et al. (2018a) and Li et al.
(2017) utilised the fuzzy-set method within a full SAS environment. Within this
implementation of fuzzy sets, Li et al. (2017) suggested reducing the number of variables
quantified with fuzzy sets to ensure internally consistent narratives, reducing subjectivity
and the replicability fallacy. Additionally, Chapter 2 and Kok et al. (2014) emphasise the
importance of limiting the number of stakeholder-quantified variables to ensure the process
is understandable and feasible within the timing and effort constraints of a participatory
setting.
As credibility is defined as scientific adequacy, the scenarios need to entail “authoritative,
believable, and trusted information” (Cash et al., 2002) for both stakeholders and experts.
The fuzzy-set methodology contributes to credibility from both perspectives due to the
direct participation in both narratives and the quantifications and transparency of the
process. In light of the results discussed above, I emphasise that fuzzy sets need to link
both narratives and quantifications within an SAS approach to ensure overall internal
consistency. Within SAS, the fuzzy-set methodology strengthens and clarifies the link
between narratives and quantifications by allowing stakeholders rather than modellers to
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quantify key scenario assumptions. This increases the credibility of the linked narratives
and quantifications.
Such a conclusion raises the question whether the scenario community should ‘upgrade’ the
role of narratives in SAS. Currently, narratives are considered essential for communication
and creativity in the stakeholder process but they are are not considered consistent and
credible as quantitative scenarios (Van Vliet, 2011). The criteria for qualifying narratives
as internally consistent and credible are thus limited to their internal consistency as model
input
6.2.2 Implications of matching top-down with bottom-up scenarios:
legitimacy
Chapter 3 addresses RQ2: ‘What are the implications of matching top-down model-led
quantitative knowledge and bottom-up stakeholder-led qualitative knowledge in multi-
scale exploratory scenarios?’. Only by analysing narratives with quantifications can
scale- and context-dependency be better identified, through the integration of bottom-
up information in downscaled scenarios. Importantly, this allows different worldviews to
legitimise the final analysis. The results have highlighted differences and commonalities
among local scale drivers. These possibly revert directions of key global and European
scale drivers (such as GDP or population trends) that are used as boundary conditions
to downscale or nest scenarios. Examples of contrasting trends and directions emerged
in all scenarios. In regional versions of SSP1, environmentally friendly countryside was
proposed as being preferable to current countryside depopulation in Europe, whereas the
preference for compact city dwelling is a key assumption of European SSP1 (although this
latter trend often manifests in the form of green urban development). Locally-produced
organic food and nature protection were also likely to lead to Europe-wide land-use change.
In the regional versions of SSP3, an increase in poverty acts as a pull towards city fringes
and the countryside. In climate-friendly but unequal regional versions of SSP4, spatial
planning and compact cities are not only the result of rural to urban mobility (as a result
of increased poverty), but also of Europe-wide ghettofication. In regional versions of
SSP5, resource overexploitation and detrimental impacts result in possible inconsistencies
with global SSP5 IAM-modelled strong economic growth trends.
In answer to the RQ, the implications of matching top-down and bottom-up scenarios
increase legitimacy (and credibility) but bring about fundamental differences between
sets of scenarios that are difficult to deal with. These include the balance between
global scenarios being usefully constraining but not overly prescriptive (O’Neill et al.,
2011). Chapter 3 reinforces the initial finding from Chapter 2 that judging the credibility
of narratives based solely on consistency with model input is a shortcoming of current
SAS. The results demonstrated that the model input, generated from downscaling global
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SSPs, partly mismatched with participatory-derived trends for population growth and
urbanisation. While the modelling exercise showed that the effect of the input variables
can become confused with scenario trends, local scale qualitative narratives demonstrated
that stakeholders consider different processes and even weigh different variables to explain
demographic trends.
The results question whether ‘nested’, top-down and quantitatively-driven multi-scale-
scenarios yield relevant information, given the influence of assumptions developed at
different scales in different scenarios and divergence with parts of the narratives, and
whether this comes at the expenses of legitimacy. While there are clear advantages to
downscaling scenarios, such as consistently capturing the diversity across scenarios, the
complex relationship of downscaled drivers, scenario and model uncertainty make results
much more complicated and less distinguishable, especially for policy communication.
Therefore, rather than prioritising either downscaling or stakeholder-led trends, combining
both to interpret model-led downscaled drivers can add different views about what
drives the problem (and thus enhance legitimacy while having credible scenarios). In
conclusion, the scenarios in Chapter 3 include different views and are, in principle, thus
legitimate. However, it should be stressed that the analysis is still a ‘nested’ multi-
scale scenario analysis, because scaling is still addressed using a hard-linking “nesting”
approach (Absar & Preston, 2015). Therefore, pan-European modelling results are fully
consistent with global assumptions (Zurek & Henrichs, 2007) on economic growth, fertility,
mortality and migration. Stakeholder-led narratives are only soft-linked a posteriori
to both results and assumptions, and thus not directly modelled. This is because, in
line with state-of-the-art pan-European modelling (see e.g. Rohat et al. (2019)), the
European scale modelling results were designed to be fully consistent with the global
SSP quantifications at the expense of divergent beliefs and values, to ensure credibility of
the quantifications. Implementing a soft-linked modelling approach at pan-European scale
would imply raising the question about a possible trade-off between salience and credibility
to yielding legitimate scenarios. Further linkage between credibility and legitimacy of the
analysis, and the relative importance of bottom-up and downscaled top-down knowledge
is also addressed in Chapter 4 by evaluating the consistency of the scenarios.
6.2.3 Archetyping scenarios to frame top-down and bottom-up scenarios:
consistency
Considering that both top-down and bottom-up and quantitative and qualitative
knowledge should be matched to develop credible, legitimate scenarios (RQ1 and RQ2),
in RQ3 (Chapter 4) I addressed the question ‘How does archetyping scenarios frame
global top-down and local bottom-up scenario narratives?’ to evaluate credibility and
legitimacy together by examining the consistency criterion as a balance for the other
criteria. Consistency is a key element of multi-scale scenarios and determines the rigidity
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of the link across scales (Biggs et al., 2007; Zurek & Henrichs, 2007). The concept of
scenario archetype is therefore well suited for this evaluation given its definition in the
literature as “scenario families which share similar scenario logic which, in turn, reflect on
similar quantifications” (van Vuuren et al., 2012a; Hunt et al., 2012) and (Harrison et al.,
2018b). However, archetypes have also raised questions about the meaning of terms such
as ‘scenario logic’ or ‘similar’, which is analysed in Chapter 3.
The results suggest that divergences across scales, for the same SSP, also relate to
different meanings for the same scenario driver. For example, stakeholders gave different
interpretations of the implication of ‘inequality’ and ‘carbon intensity’. Unequal and
dystopian SSP3 and SSP4 are locally more nuanced than low-inequality SSP1 and SSP5.
Low ‘inequality’ in SSP1 implies strong state intervention, emphasis on family values and
economic growth in the Central Asian and, partly, in the Scottish case studies, whereas
inequality implies local actors’ empowerment in the other European SSP1. SSP5 low-
inequality and economic growth drivers were associated with ‘individualism’ in all case
studies. Additional assumptions include free markets and human development in Europe,
Central Asia and Scotland (although with strong state intervention in the last case). The
particular combination of individualism, economic growth and environmental degradation
was also associated with a fragmented society and overall social and environmental
degradation in Hungarian and Iberian case studies.
The scenario consistency has been evaluated in all scenarios using scenario archetypes
based on the qualitative analysis of key drivers (STEEP). Archetypes are affected by both
scales and worldviews. The results show, as in Chapter 3, that the level of consistency
across scales also depends on the scenario. Overall, the results of Chapter 4 highlight,
perhaps unsurprisingly, that longer narratives tend to be more complex and describe
more nuanced worldviews. Short narratives tend to systematically depict one worldview
– typically described as ‘utopia’, ‘dystopia’ or ‘business as usual’.
The narratives’ scales and main purpose affect the level of detail and consistency provided.
For instance, global narratives are homogenous because they are developed to depict the
scenario archetype and provide qualitative information for IAV (narratives’ objectives).
Instead, the European, Central Asian and local European scenarios are developed
to be legitimate and reflect the input of different stakeholder backgrounds, besides
providing credible qualitative information for IAV. The degree to which scenario narratives
diverge from their corresponding archetypes reinforces the conclusion in Chapter 2
that both narratives and quantifications should be fully utilised to develop consistent
and comparable scenarios that are capable of capturing the specific, context-relevant
characteristics (legitimacy and salience). The concept of archetype effectively embodies
the intermediate role between the level of generalisation of global scenarios, aimed to
be boundary conditions for local case studies, and the specific bottom-up knowledge
developed in local case studies aimed to reflect diverse stakes (Figure 6.1).
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Figure 6.1: Role of archetypes in linking Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs) and
Integrated Assessment Model input at global scale (global IAM) with case studies and
empirical approaches (local scale models, observations and stakeholder-led input). The blue
arrows indicate the direction of input data and the orange arrows the conceptual linkages
Archetypes also guide the understanding of the different ways climate change is framed
as an ontological problem. This, in turn, is affected by the different perceptions of what
barriers and opportunities develop to challenge or support mitigation and adaptation
strategies. The analysis was carried out ultimately to match the global IAM-perspective
and the stakeholder-driven local worldviews. Its design reflects the current global
community’s framing of climate change as a driving force, along with the other STEEP
drivers (in the form of SSP-RCP matrix) of challenges to adaptation and mitigation.
Redefining climate change from an ontological point of view, as a problem of societal
transformation rather than challenges to mitigation and adaptation, is addressed in
subsection 6.2.4 with the analysis of scenario capitals and capacities.
In answer to the RQ, archetypes help framing and comparing scenarios developed
at different scales by taking an intermediate position in the degree of specification.
Archetypes were instrumental in identifying differences in worldviews and goals of different
scenario sets.
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6.2.4 Scenario relevance as potential to societal transformation:
salience
In Chapter 5 I address RQ4: ‘What is the role of exploratory scenarios in improving
understanding of the future potential to achieve desirable futures and address the
challenges ahead?’. I start with the finding from Chapters 2 and 4 that both narratives and
quantifications are needed to develop both credible and legitimate scenarios. If narratives
are developed in close connection with quantifications, exploratory scenarios can be used
not only to quantify impacts but also to assess potential in the scenarios to achieve a
desirable future. The findings in Chapter 5 are based on the assumption that well-being
and wealth indicators can combine both quantitative and qualitative information, such as
capital s as semi-quantitative scenario drivers and the actors’ capacities as part of scenario
narratives.
The importance of analysing both capitals and capacities is emphasised by the emergent
characteristics of European and regional SSPs. Even in the most archetypical SSP1 and
SSP3 (see also Chapter 4), the capacities to enable change result in multiple possibilities
to act, which can lead to unexpected trade-offs and opportunities. For example, SSP3
can result in unexpected opportunities emerging from unlocking and transformative
capacities. Differences exist across case studies because of scales, beliefs and stakes of
local actors. Additionally, actors in SSP5 have the broadest range potential across all
case studies, depending on varying assumptions on inequality, capitals and environmental
degradation.
In answer to the RQ, scenarios are salient because they improve understanding of the
future potential to achieve desirable futures by analysing real-world capacities, embedded
in the local scenario contexts, consistently across case studies. Consistency enhances
rather than limits relevance because of the balance between top-down framing and
specific information in the scenarios. In this form, the role of scenarios is not limited
to exploring impacts (quantitatively); it also has the potential to effect future societal
transformation, thus beyond the socio-economic model-led definition of climate change
as challenge to adaptation and mitigation. Both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 address the
link between exploratory and normative scenarios and the meaning of the climate-change
challenge.
6.3 Revisiting the concept of ‘consistency’
6.3.1 Comparing SSPs across scales
In Section 6.2, I evaluate the definition of ‘consistent scenarios’ by expanding it to
include the credibility, legitimacy and relevance criteria. The comparison across the SSPs
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demonstrates how the balance across the four criteria highlights different components
when analysed together. For instance, credibility evaluates how ‘scientifically sound’, i.e.
‘internally consistent’ and ‘plausible’ (e.g Jiang (2014)) scenarios are. This also implies
an element of ‘trust’ in the results (Kunseler et al., 2015) and ‘trusting’ the results also
implies that users recognise the relevance or the legitimacy of the scenarios.
In such a broader interpretation, evaluating credibility, legitimacy, relevance and
ultimately consistency for specific scenarios can be more complicated. While the archetype
analysis in Chapter 4 demonstrates that some archetypes recur more frequently and tend
to match, others tend to show a mismatch of scenarios across case studies for different
reasons. The reasons can be attributed to different processes active at different scales
(Chapter 3) and different worldviews on how the same attribute can be interpreted
(Chapter 4), which affect the availability of capitals and capacities in each scenario
(Chapter 5).
Another important factor may be the engagement process, as this could add an additional
bias to the consistency of the scenarios (Gramberger et al., 2015; Kunseler et al., 2015).
As the engagement process is not part of the analysis, and because the scenarios were
all developed in similar processes across case studies, I treat all the scenarios of this
analysis as comparable and focus on the analysis results rather than the development
process.
Given these premises, the scenarios are compared in Figure 6.2 to represent key scenario
drivers at the global scale, as represented in Jiang (2014), with the nested scenarios
analysed here: Europe (EU), Central Asia (CA), Scotland, (SC), Iberia (IB), Hungary
(HU). In addition to the overall global scenario logic, specific assumptions in the
global SSPs have been tested against the literature and developed to be internally
consistent. In this way, the correlations between GDP and education and GDP and
urbanisation are positive (except for low/medium income countries in SSP4). Population
and GDP/education/urbanisation are negatively and positively correlated in SSP1 and
SSP4 and positive under SSP3 and SSP5 (high income countries) and negative in low-
income countries for all SSPs except for SS4 (mixed trends) (Jiang, 2014).
As GDP and population trends for the sub-global SSPs were directly derived from the
global SSPs, I compare these global trends to generic sub-global capitals utilised in this
scenario analysis. I chose for human and social capitals because they tend to follow the
same correlation to global variables, especially education and GDP (Dunford et al., 2015).
From the analysis in Chapters 3 to 5 and the overview of Figure 6.2, SSP1 and SSP3
emerge as the most similar across case studies and global scenarios with either positive
trends (‘H’) or negative trends (‘L’). However SSP4 and, especially, SSP5 emerge as
the most diverse, with opposing trends both within sub-global case studies and between
global and sub-global case studies. Based on the state-of-the-art literature definitions
that consistent scenarios across scales means scenarios sub-global scenarios need to fit
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Figure 6.2: Comparing scenario trends (L=low, M=medium, H=high) of key socio-economic
assumptions in global scenarios (population, GDP, urbanisation and education from Jiang
(2014) and human and social capitals in European (EU), Central Asian (CA), Scottish (SC),
Iberia (IB) and Hungarian (HU) scenarios in Chapter 5)
the global-scale scenario logic (Zurek & Henrichs, 2007), such SSP5 as analysed in this
thesis should simply be dismissed as inconsistent. While the approach differs from
Schweizer & Kurniawan (2016), in line with them I propose that such strict boundaries are
unrealistic and undermine the relevance and legitimacy of the scenarios, and ultimately
their credibility. As my analysis of the meaning of ‘consistent scenarios’ has been expanded
to include the credibility, legitimacy and relevance criteria, I do not dismiss SSP5 across
scales as ‘inconsistent’ (as would be the case in nested case studies), but rather utilise
it as a concrete example of trade-offs and a way forward in both scenario analysis and
climate-change science ontology and epistemology.
6.3.2 Is SSP5 consistent across scales?
In the global SSP uncertainty space of challenges to mitigation and adaptation, SSP5
presents high challenges to mitigation but low challenges to adaptation. The global
scenario logic matches high human and social capital with energy-intensive economies and
lifestyles, technological development and fast economic growth with low concern about
environmental degradation. When presented with the SSP5 scenario logic, stakeholders
in different case studies interpreted the narrative very differently. These differences are
highlighted in both quantifications and narratives: - Quantifications: the assumptions
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of the global population projections reflect the current classifications of population
growth as a function of economic growth and fertility. SSP5 is the only scenario with
positive population growth (up to 47% in 2100) in Europe. Together with specific
assumptions on urbanisation development such as, for example, high sprawl and suburban
development, SSP5 has resulted – unsurprisingly – in the fastest urbanising scenario.
However, for the ‘low fertility’ (Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Romania)
countries, such urbanisation does not happen. Stakeholder population and urbanisation
assumptions partly matched: for example, stakeholders identified higher urbanisation as
a result of changing lifestyles and ageing population. Current fertility trends were not
considered at all in stakeholder-led population dynamics, while they were determinant
in the geographical distribution of pan-European SSP5 urbanisation trends. On the
contrary, stakeholders in the local case studies all identified mortality and, especially,
migration as fundamental factors for future urbanisation trends. In other words, if
urbanisation modelling were guided bottom-up, i.e. by stakeholder-led model input, SSP5
urbanisation drivers and results would have probably looked very different. -Narratives:
the SSP5 narrative is very straightforward, at global scale, in that it fits previous scenarios
(Kriegler et al., 2017) and the ‘market-first’ scenario archetype (Chapter 4). The cross-
scale analysis, however, has demonstrated that not only some variables could diverge,
but that key driving variables such as GDP and population trends can diverge as well.
In the Scottish and European case studies, the trends were more consistent with the
global STEEP drivers than in the Iberian and Hungarian case studies. For instance, the
GDP growth and energy intensity drivers lead to lower inequality and high development of
human and social capital in the European, Scottish and Central Asian scenarios, while the
same drivers ultimately lead to collapsing socio-ecological systems, which in turn halted
economic growth and, in the Iberian and Hungarian case study (in this latter case study,
SSP5 ends with high mortality and increase in epidemics). Although the narratives vary
greatly across case studies, stakeholders in all case studies emphasized the importance
of the environment to sustain both societal and economic growth and deemed a ‘return’
to intensive energy lifestyle, focus on unconstrained economic growth and globalisation
highly incompatible with low social inequality and high human and social capital. These
considerations on SSP5 thus raise several questions:
1. Is such a ‘divergent’ scenario actually consistent across scales? SSP5 was developed
using a similar stakeholder engagement process across all case studies, allowing
stakeholders to diverge from the global archetype where they deemed necessary,
so why is SSP5 more divergent than ‘utopian’ or ‘dystopian’ scenarios? For
stakeholders, SSP5 contained elements of both ‘utopian’ and ‘dystopian’ scenarios.
When matched with local conditions, qualitative drivers may change locally
non-linearly and lead to a geographically diverse picture of the same scenario.
Conversely, it is questionable whether ‘consistent’ narratives, across very diverse
local conditions, are actually credible. This was the case, for example, of strong
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outmigration in all case studies in the ‘dystopia’ SSP3 scenario need necessarily
to assume that other hypothetical case studies find themselves in the opposite
conditions (i.e. with strong immigration). Such linkages, across local scenarios,
could be easily overlooked in the nested global-continental-national-local structure.
2. Are some of the key SSP5 assumptions obsolete in sub-global scales? The results
suggest that truly cross-scale scenarios are hampered by the assumption that global
scale scenarios provide unquestioned boundary conditions for multi-scale scenarios.
More broadly, one of the IMPRESSIONS project’s key findings is that solutions to
high-end climate change ought to be radically ‘transformative’. Additive ‘adaptive’
or ‘mitigative’ actions that can result in trade-offs (Ta`bara et al. 2018) may
not be sufficient to explore radical solutions to, for example, achieve the 1.5°C
target (Chapter 5). These results imply that the overall architecture of the SSP-
RCP-SPA could be aligned to represent the uncertainty space of challenges to
societal transformation rather than challenges to mitigation and adaptation. The
determination of key drivers should also be challenged, in view of the specific
application of the SSP-RCP-SPA framework. For example, the inherent assumption
that the GDP metric will relate to high human and social capital in the future as
well, can be questionable as demonstrated by the local versions of SSP5.
The analysis of SSP5 has highlighted the importance of divergence in multi-scale scenarios,
not only for specific context-bound drivers but also for others which are taken for
granted in multi-scale scenario assessment, such as GDP or population trends. Such
divergence possibly reflects different worldviews that challenge state-of-the-art knowledge
and can ultimately question the role of global scenarios in guiding local scenarios versions
with a nested approach. Ontologically, redefining the climate-change challenge as a
sustainability challenge has helped frame the SSP uncertainty space as one of challenges to
transformation, rather than challenges to mitigation and adaptation. Epistemologically,
this challenge has implied the role of both narratives and quantifications to be equally
important in capturing different uncertainties, stakes and worldviews.
6.3.3 Are consistent qualitative and quantitative scenarios desirable?
One clear advantage of developing multi-scale scenarios in with line the baseline SSP is
the consistency of the quantifications, all coming from the same source. As a result, they
are also better comparable across SSPs. However, some challenges may arise in future
sub-global application of the baseline SSPs. This thesis has highlighted the following
potential shortcomings of utilising the baseline SSPs:
1. scale issue (Ch3) globally, some SSPs cannot be linked to a certain RCP given
their assumptions on land use, energy, etc. This is the case for SSP3 and RCP 8.5
and raises the question whether the global assumptions hold at sub-global scale, and
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in particular at continental scale. This also relates to the problem of using the same
data for the same set of scenarios, as this data needs to be scaled to the specific
characteristics of the regions.
2. qualitative-quantitative consistency (Ch2 and Ch4) The overall consistency
between narrative and quantification may be called into question when sub-global
versions are developed, especially with participatory processes. As mentioned in
the SSP4 marker publication by Calvin et al. 2016, stakeholders raise questions
on how realistic such narratives are such as ‘how realistic is the continuation
of the inequalities of SSP3 and SSP4, or the unconstrained emissions and GDP
growth of SSP5?” Therefore, to yield relevant and credible scenarios, stakeholders
generally re-define the scenario logic to make the narratives credible for the context.
As a consequence, if local scenario narratives deviate excessively, SSP marker
quantifications become inconsistent with the local narratives.
3. exploratory vs normative (Ch5) The baseline SSPs have led to the development
of mitigation scenarios which explicitly incorporate the effect of climate change and
mitigation policies. As the baseline SSPs are developed to be used in IAV (Riahi
et al., 2017), the challenges to adaptation and mitigation, originally designed in the
‘basic SSP’ framework, are addressed separately.
More precisely, not all pathways available within SSP3 and SSP5 have been explored yet
in the literature. Therefore, excluding a priori SSP3 and SSP5 combinations would limit
the potential of SSPs and RCPs as exploratory scenarios. This thesis also urges scenario
practitioners and users to carefully interpret scenario drivers and be aware that these
do not necessarily contextualise the entire problem. This applies also to unquestioned
drivers such as GDP, population and urbanisation. However, the design of the SSPs
makes it problematic, as the scenarios have been designed to be further developed for sub-
global analysis. Given the effective lack of bottom-up iteration, the globally developed
databases for GDP, population and urbanisation do not necessarily account for locally
relevant processes.
The sections above show that scenarios can have a different meaning depending on what
they are treated ‘holistically’ or ‘reductively’. If scenarios consist of internally consistent
variables, state-of-the-art methodologies such the linked-CIB approach (Schweizer &
Kurniawan, 2016) and Morphological Analysis (Carlsen et al., 2016) exist to compute
systematically internally consistent and diverse scenarios. The ‘intuitive method’ is based
on developing narratives from a limited number of scenario drivers and was used to
develop the scenarios analysed in this thesis. This method is less structured and may
lead to less diverse scenarios than CIB or Morphological Analysis. However, it has the
advantage of being established and facilitates discussion and comparison across scenarios
in participatory settings.
Assuming the validity of utilising the ‘intuitive method’, this thesis has shown that it is
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possible to develop multi-scale scenarios according to well-established methodologies and
yet that a dichotomy still exists in the link between qualitative and quantitative, between
consistent and relevant scenarios and between exploratory and normative.
6.4 Conclusion
The European SSPs have been defined as a set of scenarios that should maximise
credibility, legitimacy, consistency and salience in this synthesis. I have also discussed how
reaching these criteria often entails trade-offs, especially in relation to the SSP5 example.
With SSP5, the ‘consistency’ criteria needs to explicitly include both quantitative and
qualitative aspects of the scenarios, in equal weight, to address all the other criteria.
The contribution of this thesis to the debate on the ontology of climate change is the
recognition that scientific credibility is determined by the relevance to the real-world
problems of both scientific approaches and findings. Climate change research has long
focused on understanding the problem and quantifying likelihood of different emissions,
rather than identifying robust solutions to adapt to climate change (Dessai & Hulme,
2004; Dessai et al., 2009). Given the worldwide emergence of sustainability and climate-
change targets, the broader climate-change community acknowledges that the focus of
climate change should be on win-win transformative solutions to avoid trade-offs between
targets (Ta`bara et al., 2018; IPCC, 2018).
From an epistemological perspective, relevance of scenario analysis to real-world problems
can only be achieved if they are consistent, i.e. both scientifically credible and legitimate,
in including multiple viewpoints. I addressed this by regarding narratives as a complement
to quantified scenarios, without simplifying them. In line with Geels et al. 2016,
I acknowledge different and complementary epistemologies in scenario analysis. True
complementarity of both narratives and quantifications can address the oversimplification
of global scenarios as non-realistic “mini-worlds” (Frame et al., 2018) and move towards
cross-scale links to enhance scenario relevance to climate change.
The recently published Special Report on 1.5 °C (IPCC, 2018) emphasises that reducing
future climate-related risks would require upscaling transformative action by identifying
context-relevant capacity. Only by truly addressing societal needs at multiple scales can
the urgent action needed to tackle climate change transform from one of the greatest
challenges to one of the greatest opportunities of our time.
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The seed for opportunity is given by exploiting the full potential of both scenario narratives
and quantifications. While the importance of narratives has been recently re-instated
(Kok et al., 2018; Schweizer & Kurniawan, 2016), its de facto role in recent extensions of
the SSP framework is still too limited to communicative and creativity roles. This relates
to the overarching epistemological questions on credibility and legitimacy: not only past
trends and literature should inform key future scenario projections, but also novel insights
from other sources of knowledge to better address the novel paradigm of demand-driven
climate-change science (Lourenc¸o et al., 2015).
More credible and legitimate scenarios are also more consistent and salient to address
the ontological character of climate-change problems and solutions, also in the context
of policy-relevant trade-offs with sustainability and equity. This is because consistency
relates to scenarios which can balance credibility and legitimacy, without limiting either
aspect.
As said, the contribution of this thesis is to emphasise these points. However, the
operationalisation of consistent, truly cross-scale scenarios still needs to be addressed
in the literature, although analyses are moving towards this direction e.g (Nilsson et al.,
2017). A promising approach to developing a cross-scale scenario is further application of
the archetype analysis to explore a wider range of uncertainty, beyond what is defined in
the current understanding as ‘plausible’ or ‘internally’ consistent. This is because a diverse
set of scenarios can enable more robust policies, but also contextualise transformative and
emerging pathways to facilitate a normative vision (Carlsen et al., 2016).
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